He further explained that, as to Santa Cruz, Denmark was under a standing, well-defined obligation to offer it to France first, if ever the Government was willing to sell. I then suggested that, if negotiations were opened, it would be well that St. Thomas and St. John should be definitively disposed of before mentioning anything to France about Santa Cruz. He clearly agreed with me in this view, as he also does that French influence here is greater than the interests of this Government strictly require. He stated that the cabinet were quite determined and united that the consent of the people of the islands must be had. I suggested some difficulties and objections in regard to plebiscit, but he said he supposed it would be impossible to overcome that resolution. He said the cabinet felt the great political importance of the cession in its effects upon the relations of Denmark with other powers; that they would consider it as the beginning of the end of their entire colonial system in that quarter, and would regard the act as unkind and unfriendly in Denmark, and that, therefore, she ought to have ample pecuniary and political compensation. I sought from him an expression of opinion in regard to the permanency of the cabinet. He does not now have so much apprehension of defeat on his military bills, which are made a Government question, as when he last saw me, but he has more apprehension now than then of war between France and Prussia, and that France and the National party here will make very great and, he fears, successful efforts to draw Denmark into the war, and thinks that this would result in an entire change of administration. To my inquiry how that would affect the matter in hand he replied that it would make it impossible, for the new Government would, in feeling, be more opposed to it, and would, moreover, be entirely under the influence of France, and that France would prohibit it. He fears that, if the present administration succeeds in keeping Denmark out of the war, French influence, a French fleet, and possibly a French force would so excite and direct the action of the National party and of the King of Sweden as to result in serious trouble, if not danger, to Denmark. I think this is only a possible event, and not probable. He was distinct, earnest, and repeated in his representation that the presence here, during the summer, of a Russian and an American fleet would be vastly beneficial to Denmark, to neutral rights, and probably to the matter we were discussing. I have been careful to report his views in detail and with accuracy, for, although unofficially given, they were given in great part as the views of the cabinet, and with the consent of his colleagues; and he understands that, though given confidentially, I was seeking for information with a view to communicating it to you. It may not be just as you would expect an informal communication from the Government of Denmark, but I have made it full in the belief that some of the matters would be of interest to you. I will add that I have conversed with some of my colleagues upon the possibility of a change of administration here, and I find they have received precisely the same impressions from Count Frijs and General Rassloff that I have on that subject. I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, Hon. WILLIAM H. SEWARD, GEO. H. YEAMAN. Secretary of State, Washington. Mr. Yeaman to Mr. Seward. No. 66.1 LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES, SIR: This being conference day at the foreign office, I have just had an interview with Count Frijs. He seems now to have no apprehension of defeat of the ministry upon the military measures of the Government. He thinks the appearance more peaceable between Prussia and France, but still very uncertain, with a strong chance for war. He is unequivocal in his expression of a desire that Denmark may remain neutral, but deems it uncertain whether neutrality can be preserved. To my inquiry about the probability of sending a minister to Washington at an early day, he replied that several names had been proposed and discussed, and none agreed upon yet, but he thought a selection would be made before a conclusion upon the subject General Raasloff had discussed with me. I then took occasion to say to him that it would be very agreeable to my Government, and was deemed material, that it should hear from his as soon as convenient, and that I hoped it might be possible to reach and dispose of it in council to-morrow. He said he thought it could not be done to-morrow as there were several other matters of importance which had precedence in the order of business, which is successive, but that he thought it would certainly be done at the council meeting of next Friday, the 10th instant, and that I should then be promptly advised of what was done. I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, Hon. WILLIAM H. SEWARD, Secretary of State, Washington. GEORGE H. YEAMAN. Mr. Bithome to Mr. Seward. ST. THOMAS, DANISH WEST INDIES, The undersigned, Charles H. Bithome, born in the island of St. Croix, Danish West Indies, A. D. 1827, and educated at the Prussian high school, Torgan, where he graduated in 1846 for the university, having resided in the United States of America during the years 1851 to 1852, the greater part of which period employed in the commercial house of John Mason & Co., at Philadelphia, Pa., and subsequently having been United States consular agent at Arecibo, Porto Rico, from 1857 to 1860, begs leave to offer his services to the United States Government and to point out a most suitable harbor in the neighboring island of St. John, for the purpose of establishing a naval depot and station. Having resided in St. John for the last three years as a planter, he begs leave to accompany a sketch of it, and to call the United States Government's attention in particular to that part denominated Coral Bay, at the southeast end of that island, in every way adapted for such purpose, being by nature a very spacious and bold water bay with sandy bottom, with easy entrance and egress from and to the south, and in every respect a better and safer anchorage than even the renowned harbor in the sister island, St. Thomas; being, besides, one of the healthiest, if not the healthiest, locality in the West Indies, as never a case of yellow fever has been heard of there. The small islet at its entrance called "Buck Island," with the prominent high points on either side at the entrance to Coral Bay, afford every facility for making this bay, with comparatively trifling outlays, the greatest stronghold in the West Indies, and the surrounding high hills form a natural defense against heavy winds and weather, the inner part being landlocked, and almost in every part with upward of 6 fathoms of water close in to shore. The undersigned feels assured that a closer investigation by engineers and naval officers, which could be easily undertaken from here under the plea of a pleasure trip without creating any further suspicion, would only tend to confirm the facts which he has here stated. The island of St. John having for the last fifteen years been of no benefit to the Danish Government, as the revenues arising from sugar and rum taxes chiefly have every year decreased to such an extent that it has for many years past been a burden to this island, which has had to make up the deficit, and for this reason it would be likely an acquisition for the United States under favorable terms, as well as a blessing for that at present almost abandoned island. There are many other advantages to be derived by the United States for acquiring this island as a naval station, which your humble exponent will take great pleasure in explaining, should his proposition meet with acceptance and favor, being animated to bringing the same to your consideration by the mere desire of being serviceable to the United States, whose flag he entertains the fond hope of seeing wave over this entire hemisphere. Most respectfully, Hon. WILLIAM H. SEWARD, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C. C. H. BITHOME. Mr. Yeaman to Mr. Seward. [Confidential.] No. 67.] LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES, SIR: This morning I received a note from General Raasloff, informing me that Count Frijs desired to see me this evening. At the appointed time I was received by the count at his house, General Raasloff being present. The object of the interview was to acquaint me with the conclusions of the Danish Government upon the subject of your confidential proposition to General Raasloff of July last. The count informed me that your offer had been promptly communicated to the Danish Government, and had been repeatedly and duly considered; that the Government had uniformly been, and were still, of the opinion that the terms offered could not be accepted; and that the Government had concluded to comply with what they supposed to be your desire, that they should make a counter proposition. He said they would cede the group of three islands to the United States for $15,000,000; or, in the alternative, the two islands of St. Thomas and St. John for $10,000,000, and Santa Cruz for $5,000,000, with the option of taking the two former and rejecting the latter; that as to Santa Cruz, the Government could not sell without the consent of France; and he was of the opinion that if there was any difficulty on that point, so that it could not be ceded to the United States, it would not be sold to France but be kept by Denmark; that the ratification by the Rigsdag of such a cession is constitutionally necessary; and, after that, the Danish Government will require that the consent of the people of the islands shall be had; that the Rigsdag will probably adjourn in the latter part of June, to meet regularly in October, and, if it were deemed material, an extra session could be had; that the negotiation, if opened, will be conducted at Copenhagen; and that he deems it important to both parties that any negotiation should be concluded and ratified as soon as possible after being opened, to avoid objections and remonstrances from other powers. In regard to the negotiation being had at this capital, he explained that the proposal was made with the utmost possible respect for the United States, and had the manifest advantage of effecting the arrangement where it could be immediately submitted to the Rigsdag; and, moreover, the Danish Government had not at present any agent in Washington to whom such business could be confided. I asked if this course was suggested on account of its supposed advantages, and was to be only so suggested to my Government, or as a condition put by his Government. He said I was especially requested to mention it to my own Government, as a part of the proposition to treat, that the negotiations should be at Copenhagen. For reasons heretofore explained to you I had not addressed him a note on the subject, as the contingency had not arisen in which I deemed your instruction to that effect applicable, nor has he communicated with me in writing. I state, at his request, what he verbally communicated to me in the presence of General Raasloff as the conclusion and the proposition of his Government on this subject. I have to-day forwarded by letter a telegram to Mr. Adams, at London, embracing the substance of this dispatch, and requested him to forward it in cipher, this legation not having the means of communicating directly with you in that form. I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, Hon. Wм. H. SEWARD, Secretary of State, Washington. GEO. H. YEAMAN. Mr. Seward to Mr. Yeaman. No. 38.] DEPARTMENT OF STATE, SIR: By the telegram in cipher of this Department of the 23d instant, which Mr. Adams was directed to forward to you in writing from London, you were informed of the terms and conditions upon which the United States would accept a cession of the Danish West India Islands. If by the time that this instruction shall reach you the Danish Government shall be prepared to accept those terms and conditions, the accompanying full power will enable you to enter upon and conclude the negotiations of a convention upon the subject. A draft of a convention is also transmitted. It is expected that in the instrument as ultimately signed there will be no material variation from this draft. The cession must include all the islands owned by Denmark in the quarter referred to. The sum to be paid therefor by the United States must not exceed $7,500,000 in gold. The convention must be signed and ratified on behalf of Denmark on or before the 4th of August next. These terms and conditions are indispensable. If they should be refused by Denmark you will declare the negotiation at an end. It is not believed that the consent of the people of the islands is necessary. You will notice that provision is made in the draft for the withdrawal of any of the inhabitants of the islands. If they choose to remain there they may either become citizens of the United States, or, if they should prefer not to forswear their natural allegiance, they may stay and will enjoy that protection which is by treaty stipulated in behalf of Danish subjects elsewhere in the United States and which they might also claim pursuant to public law. "The treaty will be ratified by the United States before May next. The ratifications are to be exchanged here. We expect the title to be wholly unincumbered. The possession must be delivered to us on the payment of the money, and we shall expect that the cession include all the public, fixed property, civil, military, and naval. If you should conclude such a convention, you are authorized to send it hither by a special messenger, who will receive for the service $6 a day and his necessary traveling expenses, payable in gold. If the overture above referred to should be substantially declined, it must at once be withdrawn by you. Should Denmark delay reply, we must be deemed at liberty to withdraw from the business at any time. I am, sir, your obedient servant, GEORGE H. YEAMAN, Esq., etc., Copenhagen. WILLIAM H. SEWARD. Draught of the treaty accompanying the above. The United States of America and His Majesty the King of Denmark, being desirous of confirming the good understanding which exists between them, have for that purpose appointed as plenipotentiaries the President of the United States, George H. Yeaman, accredited as their minister resident to his said Majesty, and His Majesty the King of Denmark. And the said plenipotentiaries having exchanged their full powers, which are found to be in due form, have agreed upon and signed the following articles: ARTICLE I. His Majesty the King of Denmark agrees to cede to the United States by this convention all the Danish West India Islands, namely, the island of St. Thomas, the island of Santa Cruz, and the island of St. John. ARTICLE II. In the cession of territory and dominion made by the preceding article are included the right of property in all public lots and squares, vacant lands, and all public buildings, fortifications, barracks, and other edifices which are not private individual property. Any Government archives, papers, and documents relative to the territory and dominion aforesaid which may be now existing there shall be left in the possession of the agent of the United States, but an authenticated copy of such of them as may be required will be at all times given by the United States to the Danish Government, or to such Danish officers or subjects as may apply for them. ARTICLE III. The inhabitants of the ceded territory, according to their choice, reserving their natural allegiance, may return to Denmark within two years, but if they should prefer to remain in the ceded territory they shall be admitted to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens of the United States, and shall be maintained and protected in the full enjoyment of their liberty, property, and religion. ARTICLE IV. Immediately after the payment by the United States of the sum of money stipulated for in the fifth article of this convention, His Majesty the King of Denmark shall appoint an agent or agents for the purpose of formally delivering to a similar agent or agents appointed on behalf of the United States, the territory, islands. property, and appurtenances which are ceded as above, including any fortifications or military posts which may be in the ceded territory. Any Danish troops which may be in the territory or islands aforesaid shall be withdrawn as soon as may be reasonably and conveniently practicable. ARTICLE V. In consideration of the cession aforesaid, the United States agree to pay at the Treasury in Washington, within three months after the exchange of the ratification of this convention, to the diplomatic representative or other agent of His Majesty the King of Denmark, duly authorized to receive the same, seven million five hundred thousand dollars in gold. The cession of the territory and is ands herein made is hereby declared to be free and unincumbered by any reservations, privileges, franchises, grants, or possessions by any associated companies, whether corporate or incorporate, Danish or any other, or by any parties except merely private individual property holders; and the cession hereby made conveys all the dominion, rights, franchises, and privileges now belonging to Denmark in the said territory and islands. When this convention shall have been duly ratified by the President of the United States, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, on the one part, and on the other by His Majesty the King of Denmark, the ratifications shall be exchanged at Washington, within from the date thereof, or sooner if possible. SIR: On the 28th day of May I received from Mr. Adams a note of the 25th giv ing me a translation of your last dispatch to me in sipher, received by him on the evening of the 24th, and I have the honor herewith to inclose a copy of a note which I addressed to Count Frijs on the same day your telegram was received by me. I deemed it better, for the sake of certainty, that my communication should be in writing. It also appeared to me better that this Government should not have any room for supposing that I had any power or discretion in reserve, and that it would facilitate a conclusion to offer at once all I was empowered to offer, and to express the several points in the form of ultimata, as you had so expressed them to me. The next day after the delivery of the note, Count Frijs, on diplomatic conference day, intimated to me that I should have an early answer, and that the French priority on Santa Cruz seemed a difficulty, under the form of my note. General Raasloff also on the same day expressed the same opinion, observing that I would have an early answer, and expressing his own very distinct, but private, unofficial opinion that the response would be negative. Since then the military law pending in the Rigsdag, and which had become a test ministerial question, has been passing through its several critical stages in the Rigsdag, where the members of the cabinet sit and discuss measures, and has so entirely absorbed the attention of the ministry that I thought it would be useless to ask for an immediate consideration of the offer. The ministry have now been sustained by a majority in the Folkesthing more decided than anybody had expected, and there is no doubt of the passage of the law through the Landsthing. All present apprehension of a change of ministry has ceased. I did not at first perceive the precise connection and meaning of the expression in your telegram, "Denmark may take it at her cost before, not atter, she ratifies." But aking it to refer to the consent of the people of the islands, it would seem to be a measure which this Government could adopt or not at its option; and as, if done at all, it was to be done before the treaty was ratified, its performance need not be stipulated for in the treaty. Moreover, the requirement of an absolute ratification before the 4th of August next would practically exclude any such measure. For these reasons I made no allusion to it in my note, but have been careful to call attention to it by verbal mention to General Raasloff the next day. He observed that he did not deem it material and that the alternative presented by you of giving the people two years to elect their nationality, though not so acceptable to this Government as a direct vote upon the question of cession, was a tolerably fair substitute, and he thought there would be no further difficulty on that point, though confident there would be as to the price. |