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A.D. 1842.

TOTAL DESTRUCTION OF THE ARMY.

day the men belonging to the Shâh's troops began to desert in great numbers.

185

and were received with apparent kindness; food
was immediately supplied them, and they enjoyed
a refreshing sleep for the first time since they had
left Cabul.

Akbar Khân had assured them that food and an
escort should be sent to the famishing troops.
But none came; and all through the next day
(12th) they were exposed to constant attacks from
the Afgháns, by one of whom Capt. Skinner was
treacherously killed. At night, leaving the sick
and wounded behind, the survivors set once more
forward; but the Ghiljyes were on the alert, and
in the Jugdulluk defile, a massacre similar to that
in the Tungee Tareekee ensued. Brig. Anquetil,
Col. Chambers, Major Thain, and thirteen other
officers were among the slain. Next day (13th)
the survivors made their way to Gundamuk, but
here the tragedy was completed by a rush of the
Afghans sword in hand. Capt. Bellew and about a
dozen other officers with some troopers had ridden
off for Jellalabâd, but of the whole number only
one, Dr. Brydon, reached that place. Never, per-

At break of day on the 10th, the whole mixed multitude were again in motion, every one, as usual, pressing forward to the front as the only place of safety. The advance, consisting of the 44th and some troopers, managed at length to get to the front, and reached a narrow gorge (not more it is said than ten feet wide) named the Tunghee Tareekee, or Dark Pass, on the height to the right of which the Afghâns had taken their post, whence they poured incessant volleys into the gorge. The advance pushed through, though with great loss, and reached Kubbar-e-Jubbar about five miles off, where they were at length joined by some stragglers, from whom they learned that of all the troops which had marched that morning from Khoord to Câbul, there remained now only themselves. The whole of the main and rear columns had been cut off, for the men had flung away their arms and fled, and the Afghâns rushing on them sword in hand had massacred them without mercy. The whole British force now consisted of 50 artillery-haps, since war began among mankind, has the men with one howitzer, 70 men of the 44th, and 150 troopers. There still remained about 4000 of the camp-followers.

The general sent Capt. Skinner to remonstrate with Akbar Khân on this breach of treaty. But he declared, whether truly or not, that it was totally out of his power to restrain the Ghiljyes in their present state of excitement; and he proposed as the only resource, that the troops should lay down their arms and place themselves under his protection, and he would convey them safe to Jellalabad; but the camp-followers as being so numerous must be left to their fate. To these terms the general could not bring himself to consent, and the march was resumed. Numbers of the campfollowers, and some wounded officers, had gone on before; and when the troops came to a narrow defile about five miles off, leading into the Tezeen valley from the heights named the Huft Kotul, they found it strewed with dead bodies. The defile was three miles long, and its heights were covered with Ghiljyes; and but for the dauntless valour and energy of Brig. Shelton, who commanded the rear-guard, the whole of the troops would have been destroyed. At four in the day they reached the ground where they were to bivouack for the night. Not less than 12,000 persons had perished within the last four dreadful days.

Capt. Skinner being sent to Akbar Khân, brought back the same answer as before. As it was of the utmost importance to be able to get through the strong pass of Jugdulluk before the enemy should have time to occupy it, the troops, abandoning their last gun, set out at seven in the evening for that place twenty-one miles distant. Owing to the darkness, they did not sustain as much loss as usual, and in the morning (11th) they reached Kuttur-Sung within ten miles of Jugdulluk. But now every inch of the road was contested, and though Shelton with the rear-guard performed prodigies of valour, the fire of the juzails was murderous. At five o'clock, Capt. Skinner who had been sent to Akbar Khân, returned with a request from that chief for the general to meet him at a conference, and a demand for Brig. Shelton and Capt. Johnson as hostages for the evacuation of Jellalabâd. They all went,

destruction of an army been more complete; and
it is lamentable to think that it was entirely caused
by the disgraceful incapacity, ignorance, and wil-
fulness of those to whose care it had been com-
mitted.

Widely different was the conduct of the real
soldier who commanded in Jellalabâd. Though
without money, short of both provisions and ammu-
nition, and with a force scarcely adequate to the
defence of the place, he refused to obey the order
to evacuate it, and calmly awaited the attack of
all the forces the Afgháns might be able to bring
against it. A brigade had been assembled under
Col. Wylde to relieve him; but it proved unable to
effect the passage of the Khyber Pass, and it was
found necessary to abandon the fort of Ali Mus-
jeed.

As

In Kandahår it had at first been attempted to
obtain the aid of the neighbouring chiefs by money,
and a lac of rupees was thus fruitlessly expended,
for they all went off and joined the enemy.
they had assembled in force near the city, Gen.
Nott led out his men (Jan. 12) to attack them.
He found them posted with a morass in front, and
while the British troops were at a distance, they
kept up a fire with their matchlocks; but on their
nearer approach they broke and fled with precipi-

tation.

Such were the closing events of the unfortunate
administration of Lord Auckland. How far he
was personally to blame for what occurred, it is
not easy to ascertain; but his great error seems to
have been the sanctioning the profitless project
of restoring Shâh Shûjah. On the last day of
February his successor, Lord Ellenborough, landed
at Calcutta.

One more disaster befell the British arms in
Afghanistân. Col. Palmer, who commanded in
Ghuznee, had applied to the authorities at Câbul
for permission to repair the works and lay in pro-
visions, but to no purpose. At length, just when
it was too late, he ventured to act on his own
responsibility. On the 20th November came, as
we have seen, the first fall of snow, and on the
same day the enemy made their appearance.
the next week they retired on hearing of the
advance of troops from Kandahår. They soon,

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however (Dec. 7), returned in greater numbers. Policy suggested to turn the inhabitants out of the town; but an unfounded idea of their being faithful to the British, and the reflection on the cruelty of turning so many poor people out to perish in the snow, made the idea be dismissed at once. The consequence was, that they dug a hole through the wall (16th), and admitted their countrymen, and the garrison after a night and a day's hard fighting, had to retire into the citadel. The weather now proved extremely severe, the snow often fell to a depth of two feet, firing was exceeding scarce, and provisions very scanty, the sufferings of the men who were natives of India were almost beyond endurance. A kind of truce, therefore, was made with the enemy (Jan. 15), by which the fort was to be surrendered on the arrival of Shems-ud-din Khân. This person did not arrive till the middle of February, and Col. Palmer continued to amuse him for some time longer. At last the patience of the Afghâns was exhausted, and the garrison marched out (March 6), under the security of a treaty signed and sworn to by all the chiefs that they should be escorted in safety to Peshawur, with their arms, baggage, &c. They were to remain in a part of the town under the citadel till the road to Câbul should be clear. But they soon had a specimen of the usual Afghân faith; the very next day their quarters were attacked, and many of them slain by the Ghazees. This continued till the 10th, during which time Shems-ud-din repeatedly sent, offering the officers his protection if they would leave the Sepoys to their fate. This they steadily refused to do; but the men themselves, thinking they had no other chance of escape, resolved to dig a hole through the wall, and try to reach Peshawur, which they fancied not to be more than fifty or sixty miles off through the mountains. They asked their officers to accompany them, and on their refusal made the attempt, but with the success that might have been anticipated. They got bewildered in the fields, and in the morning they were cut to pieces or made prisoners. The officers had mean time surrendered, and on renewed oaths of kind usage, but they were, of course, illtreated and plundered. The treatment, however, varied according to the intelligence that came from Jellalabad or Kandahâr, and the hopes or fears of their guards.

Before Lord Auckland resigned the government, he had been making preparations for the relief of Jellalabad, and immediately after Col. Wylde's repulse, a force of some magnitude was assembled for that purpose at Peshawur, to move under the command of Gen. Pollock; but it was not till April that that officer was able to march for the Khyber Pass. Meanwhile Gen. Sale had succeeded in putting the works of Jellalabâd in a condition to resist any attempt of the Afghâns, when there occurred (Feb. 19) one of those earthquakes which are common in that country, and which levelled in an instant the greater part of the works. The garrison, undismayed, instantly commenced the labour of restoration, and by the end of the month the town was again in a state of defence. Akbar Khân, who was now only seven miles off, could find no solution of this phenomenon but magic. He soon after invested the place, and kept up a strict blockade. Various gallant sallies took place, and at length (April 7) a brilliant attack was made on

his camp. Three columns, two of 500 men each and one of 360 led by Cols. Dennie and Monteith and Capt. Havelock, issued from the town early in the morning. They found the enemy, 6000 in number, drawn out before their camp, their right resting on a fort, their left on the Câbul river; some works were filled with marksmen. Capt. Havelock's column succeeded in piercing the enemies' left; the central one directed its efforts against a square fort in the line which was obstinately defended, and here the gallant Dennie fell mortally wounded. The rear of this fort being gained, orders were given for a general attack on the enemies' camp. The Afgháns made every effort, by a sustained fire and by charges of cavalry, to check their advance, but in vain; their line was penetrated on all sides, their guns were captured, and their camp set on fire; and their whole force was soon in full retreat. Nine days after this victory (16th) Gen. Pollock and his forces reached Jellalabâd. By the judicious employment of flanking companies to storm the heights, he had threaded the formidable Khyber Pass without any loss of men or baggage.

Gen. Nott still retained Kandahår. Leading out a part of his troops (March 7) he drove the enemy over the rivers Turnak and Urgundab, and then (9th) put them totally to the rout. During his absence an attempt on the city was defeated with great loss to the assailants. In the end of the month, Brig.-gen. England, who was advancing from Sinde, having reached Quetta in safety, was as he moved on from that town so vigorously opposed by the enemy in the passage of a narrow defile, that he was obliged to fall back to Quetta with a loss of 98 men killed and wounded.

In this month also occurred an event, which, though of no great consequence in itself, tended to relieve the British government from some embarrassment, namely, the death of Shah Shujah. As he was riding from the Bala Hissar to his camp at Siah Sung with the eldest son of Nawab Zemân Khân", the latter shot him with a doublebarreled gun.

There was now a victorious British force at Jellalabad, and another at Kandahar, which could be easily reinforced from Sinde. The Afghans, it was clear, could not withstand the British troops in the field, and they never could remain long at unity among themselves. The fine weather, moreover, was at hand, and provisions would be more easily procured. It is of absolute necessity in the East to make a display of power, as forbearance is sure to be ascribed to impotence. All, therefore, we should suppose, pointed out the policy of the return of the British to Câbul, and making the Afghâns conscious of their power. But such had not been the policy of Lord Auckland. Overwhelmed, as it would appear, by the turn affairs had taken at Câbul, his only thought had been how to get the remaining troops out of that fatal country; and it was for this sole purpose that the forces of Generals Pollock and England had been assembled. The policy of his successor was not different; in all his letters and orders to Sir Joseph Nicholls, the commander-in-chief, to Generals Pollock and Nott, the theme is the speedy evacuation of Afgliâ

7 On the outbreak of November 2, the Afghans had proclaimed this person Shah, and struck money in his name.

A. D. 1842.

ADVANCE OF GENERALS. POLLOCK AND NOTT.

nistân, provided the prisoners had been recovered. | Against that course these two officers remonstrated in strong terms; and it was at first conceded, that the troops should not commence their march for India till the autumn, and at length, in the month of July, a reluctant consent was given to their advance on Cabul, if they felt themselves strong enough to do it in safety. From all which it appears quite plain, that the restoration of our military glory in the eyes of the people of the East, was due solely to those two distinguished officers, both of whom belonged to the Company's service.

The

As soon as Gen. Pollock had obtained permission to act on the offensive, he had sent out a force under Brig. Monteith, which destroyed five-andthirty forts in the vicinity of Jellalabad. On the 23rd August, he marched from that place for Gundamuk. On his arrival there (23rd), he learned that the enemy were in some force at a fort and village two miles off; and next morning he led a part of his troops against them, but they fled after a slight resistance. The troops remained nearly a fortnight at Gundamuk, and then (Sept. 7) resumed their march for Jugduluk, in two divisions, under Sir Robert Sale and Gen. McCaskill. first division, on coming to a pass on the road, found the heights, which formed a kind of amphitheatre on the right, held by the enemy, who were thus enabled to fire into the column across a deep ravine, and do some injury. Some troops were sent to dislodge them, before whom they retired without fighting, to the summit of a steep lofty mountain. But hither they were followed, though with great labour and difficulty, and they retired as usual. The first division then advanced to Tezeen, where it was joined by the second. A halt was made for a day, to refresh the cattle belonging to the latter; and the enemy ascribing this, of course, to the fear of advancing, commenced attacking the pickets on the left flank, and when repelled there, on the right, but with as little success. Next day (13th), when the army commenced its march, all the hills round the valley of Tezeen were occupied by the enemy, and their horse appeared in the plain. Troops were sent to dislodge them from the heights, and they advanced boldly to meet them; but they could not withstand the bayonet, and their horse were scattered by the charge of the British cavalry. At the fatal Huft Kotul, leading out of the valley, the Afghâns offered a determined resistance, but they were driven from position to position, and the whole British force, emerging from the pass, marched unopposed to Khoord Cabul. The Afghâns are said to have had on this occasion 16,000 men in the field, led by Akbar Khan in person. The British loss was only thirty-two killed and 130 wounded. On the 15th, Gen. Pollock encamped at Câbul; and next day, amid the roar of artillery, the shouts of the troops, and the sound of martial music, he planted the banner of England on the Bala Hissar.

We are now to trace the march of Gen. Nott to the same place. In May, he had been joined by Gen. England, and by the garrison of Khelat-eGhiljye, which he had been ordered to withdraw. While the troops sent for this last purpose, under Col. Wymer, were away, the enemy to the number of 10,000 occupied some hills near Kandahår; but Gen. Nott, with only 1000 infantry, 250 ca

187

valry, and twelve guns, marched out against them, and carried their positions in less than an hour. When Gen. Nott got permission to move, his confidence in his troops was such, that he resolved to take only a part to Câbul, the rest retired with Gen. England, by way of Quetta, to Sinde. On the 9th Aug. Gen. Nott commenced his march, with a large stock of ammunition and provisions for forty days. They met with little annoyance till the 28th, when a party sent out to protect some grass-cutters, whom the enemy had fallen on, came in the ardour of pursuit on an Afghân army, by whom they were driven off with considerable loss. As the attack on the grass-cutters had proceeded from an adjacent fort, a party was sent against it. Some persons came out to sue for forbearance, and an officer and some men were directed to enter, and see if their statements were true. But as they approached the fort, they were greeted with a shower of balls, and the troops then rushed in and slaughtered all in the place, which proved to be full of armed men. Shems-ud-din, of Ghuznee, being now in the vicinity of the British camp in great force, Gen. Nott led out one-half of his troops against him (30th). After a cannonade on both sides the British advanced to the attack, and the enemy at once broke and fled. The troops at length (Sept. 5th) appeared before Ghuznee, and were preparing to make an assault the next day; but when the morning came it was found that the citadel had been evacuated in the night. As it had been determined to destroy this place, fourteen mines were sprung under the walls of the citadel, and the gateways and principal buildings of the town were fired 9. On his further march to Câbul, Gen. Nott dispersed a force of 12,000 Afghâns, and he reached that city on the 17th, two days after Gen. Pollock.

A few days after the arrival of Gen. Nott, a force was sent under Gen. McCaskill against Istalif, a place about twenty miles north-west of Câbul, strongly situated on the side of a mountain. The Afghans reposed great confidence in its strength, but it proved unable to resist the British. A great portion of it was destroyed, and the same was the fate of Charikar; and thus terminated the military operations in Afghânistân.

The recovery of the prisoners was now the only matter of importance. After the fatal 9th of January, they had been conveyed to the vicinity of Jellalabâd, where they had been detained in a fort, at a place named Buddeeabad, while Akbar Khan was engaged in his operations against that town. After his defeat, on the 7th April, they were removed, and taken to different places on the way to Câbul. During these removals, Gen. Elphinstone breathed his last, and his body was sent to Jellalabâd for interment. On the 24th May,

On this occasion, he said, in a letter to Gen. Pollock, "I would at any time lead 1000 Bengal sepoys against 5000 Afghans. My beautiful native regiment," he adds, "are in perfect health and spirits."

9 The tomb of the celebrated Sultan Mahmood was at Ghuznee (above, p. 10), and as it was reported that its doors had belonged to the temple of Sômnât (p. 9), Lord Ellenborough directed that they should be brought as a trophy to India. This absurd act has been commented on and ridiculed abundantly. We may just observe, that that temple had ceased to exist for ages, and that a great portion of the British troops in Afghânistân were Mussulmans.

they arrived at a fort in a valley, about three miles from Câbul, and there they remained till the 25th August, when they were obliged to set out for Bamian, it being Akbar Khân's declared intention-as Gen. Pollock refused to evacuate the country on condition of their being released-to send them to Kooloom, to be distributed as slaves among the Usbeg chiefs. Their conductor, named Saleh Mohammed Khân, was an Afghân, who had been a subahdâr in one of Shah Shûjah's regiments, but who had deserted to Dost Mohammed in 1840. On the 3rd September, they reached the valley of Bamian, where they remained till the 11th, when a positive order for their immediate departure for Kooloom came from Akbar Khân. All hope of deliverance seemed now at an end, and they were resigning themselves to their fate, when Major Pottinger came to say that Saleh Mohammed had offered to deliver them to the British general, on being assured of 20,000 rupees in cash, and 1000 rupees a month for his life. With this offer they gladly closed, and they all signed their names to the requisite documents.

Still they were by no means out of danger, for Akbar Khan was hourly expected to arrive, on his way to Kooloom, and Saleh Mohammed's troops could not be relied on. On the other hand, the Huzareh tribe, that inhabited the valley of Bamian where they were, being mostly Sheeahs, were strongly in their favour, and declared their readiness to take up arms on their side against Akbar. Major Pottinger boldly nominated a new governor to the province, in the name of the British government, and made grants to the different chiefs; and the two little forts which they occupied were secured as well as was possible. On the 16th, hearing that Akbar Khan was a fugitive in Kohistan, they ventured to commence their flight. Next day, when resting after the descent of a mountain, they beheld a party of horse, emerging from a pass into the valley. proved to be a body of 600 Kuzzilbash horsemen, who, accompanied by Sir Richmond Shakespear, had set out from Câbul to deliver them, and had travelled ninety miles in two days. No time was lost in advancing, and on the 20th they met at Argundee Gen. Sale and his brigade, who had been sent to meet and protect them. We need not say that the meeting was a most joyful one 1.

These

It only remained now to withdraw the troops from Afghanistan, and to renounce all connexion with that country. Dost Mohammed and his family were, accordingly, set at liberty; and on the return of the army, the Governor-general indulged his taste in a grand military pageant at Ferozepore, where was a great display of painted elephants and triumphal arches, with waving banners and the roaring of artillery. The old doors of Mahmood's tomb, also, performed a part in this military pantomime. It had also been intended, in imitation of the Romans, to parade Dost Mohammed and his family in the procession, but the good sense of the Governor-general, or of his friends, saved the English name from this stain 2.

1 Including Ladies Macnaghten and Sale, there were thirteen ladies with nineteen children, eight of whom belonged to the widow of Capt. Trevor. Lady Sale acknowledges that, according to Afghân ideas of elegance and comfort, they had on the whole been well treated by Akbar Khân.

2 As Lord Auckland commenced with adopting the phra

Thus terminated in pageantry a useless and calamitous war, entered into, as we have seen, without necessity and without the requisite degree of information, and conducted in a manner calculated to disgrace the British name, had it not been for the talents of a Sale, a Nott, and a Pollock, who spurned at the idea of quitting a country as fugitives which they had entered as conquerors. The expense also proved by no means inconsiderable; for it is asserted that this effort to keep off the Russian bugbear cost the Indian government not less than seventeen millions sterling.

CHAPTER XVI.

Transactions in Sinde-Sir C. Napier sent thither-Attack on the Residency - Battle of Meeanee-Reduction of Sinde-Observations on that Transaction-Affairs of Gwalior-Battle of Maharajpoor-Conclusion of Treaty-Sir Henry Hardinge Governor-general- Death of Runjeet Sing-Affairs of the Punjab-Campaign of the SutlejBattle of Moodkee-of Ferozshuhur- of Aliwal-of Sobraon-Treaties-CONCLUSION.

AFTER the close of the Afghân expedition, the attention of the government was directed to Sinde, a country with which the British had hitherto had few relations.

In 1786, the dominant tribe in Sinde, named Kulbooras, had been displaced by another tribe named Talpoora. Meer Futteh Ally, the chief associated his three brothers in the government of this tribe, fixed his abode at Hyderabad, and with himself. He assigned two other portions of the country to two of his relations, and hence arose the states named Khyrpoor and Meerpoor, in the former of which the system of a plurality of rulers prevailed as at Hyderabad. These rulers title, as we have seen, was the usual oriental one of Sinde are usually named the Ameers. Their of superior might, and was therefore as good as

those of most rulers in India.

The transactions of the British with the Ameers, were of little moment till 1832, when the English merchants having begun to fancy that a great and lucrative trade might be opened with the nations of Central Asia by means of the Indus, a treaty was, as we have seen, concluded with the Ameers for opening the navigation of that river to the British under certain conditions, two of which were, that they should convey no military stores through the country, and put no armed vessel on the Indus. Some years later (1836), Sinde being menaced by Runjeet Sing, the British government appeared as mediators; and by a treaty concluded with the Ameers (1838) they agreed to the residence of a British minister with an escort in their country.

concluded, and as Sinde had formerly paid tribute About two months after the tripartite treaty was to Câbul, Shah Shujah agreed to give up all claim to this tribute, which he had never received, for such a sum as would be determined by the British government. To this arrangement the Ameers, seology of the French republic, so Lord Ellenborough continued it. His imitation of Buonaparte's bulletin is but too well known for his fame.

A. D. 1842-43.

BATTLE OF MEEANEE, REDUCTION OF sinde.

however, had not given their consent, and when informed of it they produced a written release from Shah Shujah. The resident confessed himself perplexed by the appearance of this document; but Lord Auckland declared that it was not incumbent on the British government " to enter into any formal investigation of the plea adduced by the Ameers," that is, that right or wrong they were to be made to give money for the Câbul expedition. This was followed by a demand of a passage for part of the troops through their country, in contravention of the treaty of 1832. It was now also discovered that one of the Ameers was in correspondence with the court of Persia, and great indignation was expressed at this "duplicity," in violating the "close alliance" maintained with the British government, an alliance, if it may so be called, forced on the Ameers. To punish this conduct, nothing would content Lord Auckland short of their signing a subsidiary treaty, by which as large a military force as should seem fit to the Governor-general should be stationed in their country; and as they were "to derive vast advantages" from its presence, they were to bear a part of the expense of its maintenance. The Ameers remonstrated, and referred to the former treaties; but the troops of Sir J. Keane were approaching in one direction, and those of Sir Willoughby Cotton in another, and might was right, so they were obliged to affix their seals to a treaty amended and altered at the Governor-general's pleasure.

Such were the dealings of Lord Auckland with the Ameers of Sinde, and in our candid opinion, no transaction on the part of the British in India, so repugnant to the principles of justice, had taken place since the days of Warren Hastings. Lord Ellenborough had now to act on his views of justice, and the law of nations with respect to these princes, who, there is no doubt, when they heard of the disasters at Câbul had hoped to be delivered, and, as it was asserted, had engaged in correspondence with parties hostile to the British, but who certainly had done nothing more. Lord Ellenborough was going at first to threaten them with the confiscation of their territories; but he finally determined only to require territory in lieu of the tribute which they were to pay on account of the "vast advantages" derived from the subsidiary force, and he sent Major-gen. Sir Charles Napier to exercise the chief military and civil authority in Sinde.

Sir C. Napier having reported that the Ameers levied tolls on the river contrary to the treaty, and expressed his opinion that as "the more powerful government would at no distant period swallow up the weaker," it would be better to come to the result at once, "if it could be done with honesty ;" the draft of a treaty was forwarded to him, and he was left to look to the honesty of the transaction himself. By this treaty, certain portions of territory were pointed out to be assigned to the British, and another portion was to be given to the Khân of Bhalpûr, their faithful ally; the Ameers were to provide fuel for the steamers on the Indus, and if they failed, the Company's servants might cut timber on their territories; finally, the right of coining, the great mark of sovereignty in the East, was to be taken from them, and the coin was to bear on one side, "the effigy of the sovereign of England." The

189

justice of these harsh measures was based on the authenticity of letters said to have been written by two of the Ameers; and as that was denied, and it is well known how common and how skilful forgery is in the East, that justice is certainly very problematic. Before this treaty had been accepted by the Ameers, Sir Charles Napier began to act as if it was really in force, and threatened them with amercement if they attempted to collect revenue or impose taxes in the districts they were to lose.

In order to prevail on the Ameers to divest themselves of their power, Major Outram, who had been resident at Hyderabad, was summoned thither from Bombay, and he succeeded in inducing them to set their seals to the instrument of their degradation. But the Beloochees were not satisfied at this humiliation of their chiefs, and the Ameers assured Major Outram, that if Sir Charles Napier continued to advance on Hyderabad, there would be an outbreak. He did however continue his march; and the consequence was, that an attack was made on the residency (Feb. 15, 1843,) by large masses of horse and foot; and it was only by getting on board a steamer, that the resident and his escort escaped, though with the loss of the greater part of their property.

They reached the camp of Sir C. Napier in safety, and the troops moved on to Meeanee, within six miles of Hyderabâd on the west side of the river (17th), where they found the forces of the Ameers occupying a strong position. They attacked them at once, and after an obstinate conflict put them to flight. The British loss was 62 killed and 195 wounded, among whom were a great many officers; that of the enemy was said to have been 5000 men. After the battle, six of the Ameers surrendered, and Sir C. Napier entered Hyderabad as a conqueror (20th). Shortly after (March 24th) he marched out to attack the Ameer of Meerpoor, who was still in arms. He found him with a large force strongly posted behind a deep water-course, where he attacked and defeated him with a loss to the British of 267 killed and wounded. He then advanced and took possession of Meerpoor, and a detachment under Major Woodburn secured the strong fort of Omercote in the desert. The remaining Ameers were gradually reduced to submission, and removed to the Company's territories, and Sinde has remained a British possession.

The

Such is a slight sketch of the history of the occupation of Sinde by the British; a transaction, as appears to us, at variance with all the principles of justice. Its true origin we believe to have been the vague notion that was entertained of the vast and lucrative markets that might be opened for our manufactures by means of the Indus; and we know that when the spirit of gain is evoked it cannot be laid by the wand of justice. arguments by which it is defended are feeble and unsatisfactory. It is said, for example, that the Ameers had gained their power by the sword. How else is power gained in the East? How did we gain our own! They had possessed it for sixty years, and we had made treaties with them as the rightful rulers of the country. Our own Indian empire, too, is not so very ancient. Their position, it is added, was not "that of a native prince succeeding a long line of ancestors, the object of the hereditary affection of his subjects." Is that our

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