her and when circumstances give her the power to do it, this Declaration must be accepted as being at present binding on Great Britain.

But though it is binding it is not irrevocable. The act that was done in the dark without authority may be undone in the day with authority. It is absolutely within the competency of the Crown, either of its own proper motion, or moved thereto by an Address from the Houses of Parliament, to declare that the Declaration of Paris is no longer accepted by it as the rule of maritime warfare, and thus to revert to the common rights of all warfare. But until the act of the two Plenipotentiaries who assumed to sign on behalf of Great Britain in a matter beyond their powers shall have been undone by a formal denunciation of the Declaration, and the Declaration itself openly declared to be no longer binding, so long must it and will it be binding on Great Britain.

CHAPTER XVI.

OBJECTIONS TO THE RESUMPTION OF MARITIME RIGHTS BY GREAT BRITAIN CONSIDERED.

AN INFINITESIMAL GAIN-AN IMMEASURABLE LOSS. ONE advantage, indeed, Great Britain gains, under certain circumstances and in certain times, from the Declaration of Paris. She gains the carrying trade of any nations which may be belligerent and exposed to maritime attack, while she remains neutral. But this gain is very small. The carrying trade of other nations is already to a large extent carried on for them by British vessels, and that additional trade which she can gain from any one other state is therefore but a small and comparatively insignificant addition to that which she already has. What there is to be gained, however, she gains; but on the other side of the account must be put that which she must lose when she herself becomes belligerent. That loss may probably amount to a large part or even to the whole of her own carrying trade, which is more than all that she could gain from other nations during a century of wars. And there is this further about it, that, while the infinitesimally small gain Great Britain may make as a neutral is made in times of prosperity, she must sustain an immeasurably greater loss as a belligerent in times of extremity. There can be no advantage in this.

THE FALLACY OF THE ARGUMENT THAT THE CHANGES IN THE CONDITIONS OF SEAFARING RENDER the DECLARATION ADVANTAGEOUS TO GREAT BRITAIN.

Another set of arguments, if arguments they can be called, in favour of the Declaration of Paris, is founded upon the change in the conditions of naval warfare resulting from the employment of steam and armour. This change, it is said, places Great Britain at a disadvantage, as compared with other nations, in fighting a conflict at sea. It is only necessary to say in answer to this that Great Britain has profited far more than any other nation by steam and armour; that all other nations are compelled to take lessons from her in both, or even to come to her to provide them, and that, therefore, whatever advantage she may have had before their introduction is very greatly

increased since.

Those who affect to believe that the changes resulting from the use of steam have been disadvantageous to Great Britain can only entertain such a belief on condition of absolutely ignoring the facts. As might with certainty have been predicted, Great Britain has become far more marked in her superiority, relatively to the rest of the world, since the introduction of steam than ever she was before. Every material improvement in the construction of iron vessels and of marine engines has been first conceived and carried out in this country, which, in all the latest improvements is still far ahead of all other nations, and which in all future improvements must probably remain so. It was here that Steel was first introduced in 1876 as a substitute for Iron in shipbuilding; here that Steel has driven out Iron as

Iron drove out Wood; here that Steel can best if not alone be made for the purpose. Here, too, it is that triple and quadruple expansion have been introduced, together with numberless minor improvements which during the thirty-seven years that have elapsed" since 1863, have reduced the consumption of coal by three-quarters and quadrupled the efficiency of the marine engine. In consequence of these improvements the speed of Atlantic liners has been increased from the 8 knots of the "Britannia" in 1840, to the 22 knots of the "Oceanic" in 1899, and the time taken to steam across the Atlantic has been successively reduced from fifteen days in 1838 to nine days in 1874, and now, in 1900, to under seven days. These results are all due to improvements invented and carried out in Great Britain, and incapable at present of being worked out elsewhere. The ad

vantage therefore still lies with us; it lies more with us than ever it did; and the relative advantage is greater than ever it was. So true is this, that in the year 1887 our shipbuilders, while building 306,719 tons of shipping for Great Britain and her colonies, built, at the same time, as many as 70,479 tons for foreigners,' while in 1898 they built for Great Britain and her possessions 695,997 tons, and at the same time as many as 174,611 tons for foreigners, thus supplying nearly one fourth of the whole immense tonnage built, to foreign nations, who, in spite of bounties and every kind of artificial encouragement to their own shipbuilders, were unable to get these vessels built elsewhere than in Great Britain.

These facts suffice to show that all the advant

1 Tables showing the Progress of British Merchant Shipping, issued by the Board of Trade, 4th June, 1888. See, too, c. 9315 of 1899.

ages of all the changes that have been made in the methods of navigating the seas have been, to a largely predominating extent, on the side of this country, and that each successive improvement has left her farther ahead than ever of any and all other countries. The contrary could, indeed, only have been ever believed by those whose desire to believe it was stronger than their knowledge of the facts was complete.

THE FALLACY OF THE SACRED PRIVATE PROPERTY ARGUMENT.

There are indeed some who have not hesitated to assert that Great Britain would gain by carrying still further the renunciation of belligerent maritime rights; and who assert that it would be to her advantage to accept and adopt the principle that all "private property" whatever (including even contraband of war) shall be exempt from capture at sea; that is to say, shall be exempt from all effects of warfare.1 This is indeed a logical conclusion for those to leap to who feel that the Declaration of Paris cannot be defended as it stands. But it is a conclusion none the less monstrous in itself. Those who advance it may properly be required to consider the nature of war, and to say how or upon what possible principle there can be at one and the same time a national war and a commercial peace; upon what possible ground exemptions can be claimed for private property at sea not extended to it on land; and upon what conceivable theory of the State it should be required to permit even its own subjects to

1 Edinburgh Review for October, 1876, and Mr. Lindsay's lecture U. S. Institute, 1877.