Deliberation and Decision: Economics, Constitutional Theory and Deliberative DemocracyAnne van Aaken, Christian List, Christoph Luetge Ashgate, 2004 - 264 pages Deliberation and Decision explores ways of bridging the gap between two rival approaches to theorizing about democratic institutions: constitutional economics on the one hand and deliberative democracy on the other. The two approaches offer very different accounts of the functioning and legitimacy of democratic institutions. Although both highlight the importance of democratic consent, their accounts of such consent could hardly be more different. Constitutional economics models individuals as self-interested rational utility maximizers and uses economic efficiency criteria such as incentive compatibility for evaluating institutions. Deliberative democracy models individuals as communicating subjects capable of engaging in democratic discourse. The two approaches are disjointed not only in terms of their assumptions and methodology but also in terms of the communication - or lack thereof - between their respective communities of researchers. This book provides a comprehensive overview of the recent debate between the two approaches and makes new and original contributions to that debate. |
Table des matières
Deliberative Institutional Economics or Does Homo Oeconomicus | 3 |
Mind the Gap | 33 |
What Do We Learn by Asking Whether Homo Oeconomicus Argues? | 42 |
Droits d'auteur | |
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Aaken accept action aggregation agreement alternative analysis approach argue argument assessment assumption bargaining over beliefs behavior Bovens and Rabinowicz Brennan Buchanan Cambridge Cambridge University citizens collective decision common concept concerned Condorcet conflict consensus consent theory constitutional assembly constitutional choice Constitutional Economics constitutional economists constraints context decision-making deliberative democracy deliberative theory democratic Discourse Ethics Discourse Theory discursive dilemma discussion Dryzek Elster empirical epistemic perspective example Habermas heuristic homo oeconomicus hypotheses ideal interests issues justificatory legitimacy legitimate majority voting meta-level moral nomics normative notion outcomes paper participation payoff Pettit Philip Pettit political positive possible propositions question rational rational choice theory Rawls relevant right reasons rules sets of judgments single-peakedness situation Social Choice social choice theory social order society structure substantive level Suchanek theoretical theory of consent tion tional tive truth-tracking Tschentscher utility Vanberg Voigt voters welfare economics