Deliberation and Decision: Economics, Constitutional Theory and Deliberative Democracy
Deliberation and Decision explores ways of bridging the gap between two rival approaches to theorizing about democratic institutions: constitutional economics on the one hand and deliberative democracy on the other. The two approaches offer very different accounts of the functioning and legitimacy of democratic institutions. Although both highlight the importance of democratic consent, their accounts of such consent could hardly be more different. Constitutional economics models individuals as self-interested rational utility maximizers and uses economic efficiency criteria such as incentive compatibility for evaluating institutions. Deliberative democracy models individuals as communicating subjects capable of engaging in democratic discourse. The two approaches are disjointed not only in terms of their assumptions and methodology but also in terms of the communication - or lack thereof - between their respective communities of researchers. This book provides a comprehensive overview of the recent debate between the two approaches and makes new and original contributions to that debate.
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Deliberative Institutional Economics or Does Homo Oeconomicus
Mind the Gap
What Do We Learn by Asking Whether Homo Oeconomicus Argues?
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Aaken accept action aggregation agreement alternatives analysis approach argue argument assumption bargaining behavior beliefs Bovens and Rabinowicz Brennan Buchanan Cambridge Cambridge University citizens collective decision common concept concerned consensus consent theory constitutional assembly constitutional choice Constitutional Economics constitutional economists constraints context decision-making deliberative democracy Deliberative Institutional Economics Deliberative Opinion Polls deliberative theory democratic discourse and deliberation Discourse Ethics Discourse Theory discursive dilemma discussion Dryzek Elster empirical example Frey Habermas homo oeconomicus hypotheses ideal important individual interests issues legitimacy legitimate liberal moral nomics normative notion opportunity costs outcomes paper participation Pettit Philip Pettit positive preferences propositions public sphere question ratic rational Rawls real discourse reflexive modernity relevant rules sets of judgments situation Social Choice Social Choice Theory social order society sources of order substantive Suchanek theoretical tion tional tive truth-tracking Tschentscher utility Vanberg Voigt voters welfare economics
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