good only; Satan the original author of all evil in our world.— The ancient doctrine of a good and evil principle practically Page His correct account of the sense in which the will is fixed ac- cording to the last dictate of the understanding.-His just views of the nature of the necessity which is opposed to li- berty. He leaves this, and proceeds to establish moral cau- sation, or philosophical necessity.-He cannot establish moral obligation by his philosophy, and has recourse to Scripture.— His work not on liberty and necessity, but a refutation of prevalent errors, and most triumphant. He clearly establishes the general principle of freedom in his Note A. BROWN AND EDWARDS ON VOLITION.-B. ASSOCIATION. E. LOCKE ON VOLITION AND MORAL NECESSITY.-E. (p. 173) ERRATA. Page 20, line 14 from top, for very read every 50, line 11 from top, for inquire read inquires 97, line 9 from top, for. read :- - 209, line 1 from top, for trust read truth 235, line 11 from bottom, for inconvenience read inconveniences INTRODUCTION. NATURE OF CAUSATION. THE subject of Causation is so intimately connected with that of Liberty and Necessity, or rather the one subject is so directly the basis of the other, that it may not be amiss to present a short account of it, by way of introduction - to the subsequent Essay. And as one can scarcely give any account of the relation of Cause and Effect without noticing the opinions of so distinguished a writer as Dr. Brown, particularly as his arguments have not yet, so far as we have seen, been fairly and candidly met, we shall now offer some remarks on the theory which this accomplished philosopher attempted to establish. Of the dispute between Dr. Brown and Mr. Hume concerning the origin of the idea of power and causation we shall by and by be better able to form an opinion; but before proceeding to the principal subject of inquiry, it may not be improper to determine the meaning of the terms B "The words pro power, property, or quality. perty and quality," says Dr. Brown, “admit of exactly the same definition, expressing only a certain relation of invariable antecedence and consequence in changes which take place in the presence of the substance to which they are ascribed. They are strictly synonymous with power: or, at least, the only difference is, that property and quality, as commonly used, comprehend both the powers and susceptibilities of substances."* The The terms power and property are, in vulgar language, frequently employed indiscriminately; but they are strictly synonymous only so far as they express the same thing, in like manner as the king of Hanover and the king of Great Britain at present mean the same person. words refer to the same thing, but they express it in different relations; and many affirmations therefore might be truly made respecting the one, which would be false regarding the other. The terms power and susceptibility express only, let it at present be admitted, a certain relation of invariable antecedence and consequence in changes that take place in the presence of the substance to which they are ascribed; but it is not so with the words property and quality. A property or quality is something which is con Inquiry into the Relation of Cause and Effect, p. 18. ceived to have a permanent existence in its subject independently of our perception of it; and which becomes a power when considered in relation to the effects which it produces in other substances. The same thing which is a power in relation to its effects, is a property or quality when considered as inherent in a substance, and entering into the constitution of its nature. The powers of the fire or the candle which warm and enlighten us, are properties when left to burn alone in an empty chamber and when considered by us merely as existing things without reference to their effects; and become powers only when considered as the causes of the sensations of light and heat. All properties then, it is plain, are first known to us as powers, which again are, to a great extent, known to us only by their effects. Stretching out the hand towards a piece of matter, it resists our motion, and the power by which it does so, is termed solidity. We smell it, and it affects the olfactory nerves in a certain manner, and the power is named smell. We open our eyes upon it, and we experience the sensation of colour, and the power by which the sensation is produced is, for want of another term, called by the same name. When we consider these and all the other powers of matter as united in one subject, and existing whether we perceive them or not, we have then the idea of so many properties of body; and the various aggregates of properties with which we are acquainted constitute, to our conception, all the substances which are known to exist in nature. Dr. Brown is careful to guard us against the scholastic misapprehension, that powers and properties are any thing distinct from the substances themselves to which they belong. "The powers, properties, or qualities of a substance are not to be regarded as any thing superadded to the substance or distinct from it. They are only the substance itself, considered in relation to various changes which take place when it exists in peculiar circumstances. . . . There are not substances, therefore, and also powers and qualities, but substances alone. We do not add greenness to the emerald, or yellowness to gold, or blueness to the sky, or darkness to the vapoury masses which occasionally overshadow it; but the emerald, the gold, the sky, the clouds, affect our vision in a certain manner. They are antecedents of sensations which arise in us."* The cause of the strong tendency which is felt to consider properties as some way or other independent of their subjects, and an addition to the substances to which they belong, is apparent. Though no property can exist without a substance in which it is inherent, substances can ex • Ibid. p. 27. |