The Other Side of the Table: The Soviet Approach to Arms Control |
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The Other Side of the Table: The Soviet Approach to Arms Control Michael Mandelbaum Affichage d'extraits - 1990 |
Expressions et termes fréquents
ABM Treaty accord achieve agreed American Andrei Andrei Gromyko Arbatov arms control atomic ballistic missile Blacker bombers Brezhnev leadership concessions crisis Cuban missile crisis Cynthia Roberts decision defense deploy deployment Detente and Confrontation Disarmament discussion East-West economic Europe foreign policy Garthoff Geneva Gorbachev leadership Gromyko Ibid ICBMs initiatives interests Interim Agreement International IRBM issue July Kennedy Khrushchev Kissinger Kremlin launchers limited test ban ment Michael Mandelbaum MIRVed Moscow national security NATO Nixon nuclear explosions nuclear forces nuclear tests nuclear war nuclear weapons on-site inspections Party political position Pravda programs Radio Liberty reduce SALT SALT II scientists Seaborg Soviet arms control Soviet foreign Soviet leaders Soviet leadership Soviet nuclear Soviet officials Soviet policy Soviet strategic Soviet Union strategic arms strategic forces strategic nuclear summit superpower Test Ban Treaty threat tions U.S. and Soviet U.S.-Soviet relations underground United University Press USSR verification Vladivostok warheads Washington West Western York
Fréquemment cités
Page 4 - All the business of war, and indeed all the business of life, is to endeavour to find out what you don't know by what you do ; that's what I called 'guessing what was at the other side of the hill.
Page 21 - We are both caught up in a vicious and dangerous cycle in which suspicion on one side breeds suspicion on the other and new weapons beget counterweapons.
Page 28 - This treaty does not halt American nuclear progress. The United States has more experience in underground testing than any other nation ; and we intend to use this capacity to maintain the adequacy of our arsenal. Our atomic laboratories will maintain an active development program including underground testing, and we will be ready to resume testing in the atmosphere if necessary.
Page 209 - Contributors DAVID E. ALBRIGHT is senior text editor of the journal Problems of Communism. Previously, he worked as research associate and editor at the project on The United States and China in World Affairs at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York.
Page 170 - Arnold L. Horelick and Myron Rush, Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), pp.
Page 6 - We have by now sharply cut, and it seems will continue sharply to cut and even discontinue, the manufacture of bombers and other obsolete equipment. In the navy, the submarine fleet assumes great importance, while surface ships can no longer play the part they once did. In our country, the armed forces have been to a considerable extent transferred to rocket and nuclear arms. These arms are being perfected and will continue to be perfected until they are banned.
Page 19 - Union has been involved in an unwarranted attempt to gain for itself a unilateral advantage in the nuclear field. This means that there is naturally no chance whatsoever — and I want to make this very clear — of any pre-treaty commitment by the United States not to conduct any nuclear tests of any character in any environment which it deems essential for the national security of itself and its associates.
Page 6 - Almost the entire air force is being replaced with rockets. We have now cut sharply, and will continue to cut sharply, even perhaps discontinue production of bombers and other obsolete equipment. In the navy, the submarine fleet assumes great importance, while surface ships can no longer play the part they once did. In our country, the armed forces have to a considerable extent been transformed into rocket forces.10 A brazen statement!
Page 171 - Albert Carnesale and Richard N. Haass, eds., Superpower Arms Control: Setting the Record Straight (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1987), 223-73 at 238.
Page 32 - Beginning in 1957 (not without the influence of statements on this subject made throughout the world by such people as Albert Schweitzer, Linus Pauling, and others ) I felt myself responsible for the problem of radioactive contamination from nuclear explosions.

