B. THE DOCTRINE OF REDEMPTION.

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FREEDOM AND GRACE. PREDESTINATION. (ACCORDING TO THE DIF

FERENT CONFESSIONS.)

[Schweizer Glaubenslehre der Reform. Kirche, 1844, and Central Dogmen, 1854. Ebrard, Das Verhältniss d. reform. Dogmatik zum Determinismus, 1849, and Schweizer, in reply, in the Tübinger Zeitschrift, 1851. Heppe, Dogmatik der evangel. Ref. Kirche, 1861. J. B. Mozley, Doctrine of Predestination, 1855; comp. Christian Remembrancer, and Dublin Review, 1856. Moses Stuart, on Calvin and Arminius, in Biblical Repository, i., 1834. Bp. Davenant, De Prædestinatione, 1630, fol. Owen's works, vols. X., xi. Julius Mühler in Studien u. Kritiken, 1856; that Calvin's doctrine had a religious, and not a speculative basis. Calvin's Prädestinationslehre, in Schaff's Kirchenfreund, 1853. Bartels, Die Prädestinationslehre in Ostfriesland (John a Lasco), in Zeitschrift f. deutsche Theologie, 1860. J. A. L. Hebart, Die Prädest. lehre d. Concordienformel, in Zeitschrift f. d. Luth. Theologie, 1861. Philippi, Luther's Lehre von d. Prädestination, in Theol. Zeitschrift, 1860.]

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Notwithstanding the many religious conflicts to which the Reformation gave rise, Christians of all denominations agreed in the general belief, that the salvation of man depends on the gracious purpose of God.' But they differed on the questions, whether the Divine decree, which has reference to this point, is unconditional, or depends on the conduct of man, whether it is general or particular. The more rigid the views of theologians on the doctrine of original sin, and the moral inability of man, the more firmly they would maintain that the decrees of God are unconditional. Hence it is not surprising that Roman Catholics," Arminians,' and most of all the Socinians, endeavoured in a more or less Pelagian manner, to satisfy the claims of human freedom. On the other hand, both Lutherans and Reformed, following Augustine, rejected the notion of the freedom of the will, and denied all co-operation on the part of man. Nevertheless, it is a striking fact, that the Lutherans avoided the strict consequences of the Augustinian system, and asserted that the decrees of God are conditional; while the Reformed theologians. not only admitted the necessity of those consequences,' but, having once determined the idea of predestination, went beyond the premises so far as to maintain, that the fall of man itself was predestinated by God (Supralapsarianism.) But this view so far from meeting with general approbation, was at last almost entirely abandoned to make way for its opposite (Infralapsarianism).' As regards the extent of the offered grace, all the confessions, with the exception of the Reformed, held to universalism,10 in distinction from particularism; but even all Calvinists did not on this point proceed to the same length;" some of them adopted the stand

point of the universality of the provisions of grace. [The Westminster Assembly set forth the doctrines of sin and redemption, so as to harmonise the conflicting views about freedom and grace; the scheme of absolute predestination was here modified by the theory of the covenants.]"

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1 Compare the passages quoted by Winer, pp. 80, 81.

' Conc. Trid. Sess. vi., can. 4: Sicut quis dixerit, liberum arbitrium a Deo motum et excitatum nihil cooperari assentiendo Deo excitanti atque vocanti, quo ad obtinendam justificationis gratiam se disponat ac præparet, neque posse dissentire, si velit, sed velut inanime quoddam nihil omnino agere, mereque passive se habere: anathema sit.-Can. 17: Si quis justificationis gratiam nonnisi prædestinatis ad vitam contingere dixerit, reliquos vero omnes, qui vocantur, vocari quidem, sed gratiam non accipere, utpote divina potestate prædestinatos ad malum: anathema sit. The doctrine of the Roman Catholic Symbols was in so far decidedly opposed to the Pelagians, as the former maintained (Sess. 6, can. 3) that it is God who begins the work of conversion without any co-operation on the part of man; but they also asserted that afterwards the freewill must be added, and man co-operate in the work of sanctification. For further passages, see Winer, p. 84. Bellarmine advances the following proposition (in opposition to Pelagians, etc.), at the very commencement of his treatise: de Gratia et lib. Arbitr.: Auxilium gratiæ Dei non ita offertur omnibus hominibus, ut Deus expectet homines, qui illud desiderent vel postulent, sed prævenit omnia desideria et omnem invocationem. In ch. 2, he then proceeds to assert: Auxilium gratiæ Dei non æqualiter omnibus adest. Thus far he agrees with the Protestants. He even adds, in ch. 3: Nulla esset in Deo iniquitas, si non solum aliquibus, sed etiam omnibus hominibus auxilium sufficiens ad salutem negaret. He likewise in ch. 4, gives the practical caution (after the example of Augustine), not to doubt aforehand the salvation of any one, but to persevere in admonishing, etc. But in ch. 5, he converts this practical advice into the doctrinal theory: Auxilium sufficiens ad salutem pro loco et tempore, meditate vel immediate omnibus datur (a proposition which is somewhat limited and more fully discussed in the subsequent chapters). And then in the sequel (in Books ii. and iii) he endeavours to save the doctrine of free will. In his view, free will is not the condition of being free, but the power of choosing, and of forming purposes. It is neither actus nor habitus, but potentia, and, in specie, potentia activa. On the co-operation of the free will with the grace of God, he says, iv. c. 15: Hinc sequitur, ut neque Deus determinet sive necessitet voluntatem, neque voluntas Deum. Nam et uterque concursum suum libere adhibet, et si alter nolit concurrere, opus non fiet. Simile est, cum duo ferunt ingentem lapidem, quem unus ferre non posset; neuter enim alteri vires addit, aut eum impellit, et utrique liberum est onus relinquere. Quamquam Deus, nisi extrordinarie miraculum operari velit, semper concurrit, quando voluntas nostra concurrit, quoniam ad hoc se libere quodam modo obligavit, quando liberam voluntatem creavit. Ex quo etiam sequitur, ut, licet in eodem prorsus momento temporis et naturæ Deus et voluntas operari incipiant, tamen Deus operetur, quia voluntas operatur, non con

tra. Et hoc est, quod aliqui dicunt, voluntatem prius natura operari quam Deum, non prioritate instantis in quo, sed a quo.-Concerning Predestination, he expresses himself as follows, ibid., p. 657: Deus ab æterno determinavit omnes effectus, sed non ante prævisionem determinationis causarum secundarum, præsertim contingentium et liberarum, et rursus determinavit omnes effectus, sed non eodem modo: alios enim determinavit futuros se operante vel cooperante, alios se permittente, vel non impediente, etc.-Ib., p. 659: Deus, qui perfecte cognoscit omnes propensiones et totum ingenium animi nostri, et rursum non ignorat omnia, quæ illi possunt occurrere in singulis deliberationibus, et denique perspectum habet, quid majus congruum et aptum sit, moveat talem animum tali propensione et ingenio præditum, infallibiliter colligit, quam in partem animus sit inclinaturus.

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"The Arminians suppose a constant cooperation of the human will, awakened by divine grace, with that grace; but in their opinion the influence of the latter is by no means merely of a moral nature; it is the power of the Holy Spirit accompanying the Word of God (Confess. Remonstr., 17, 2, 5), which exerts an influence upon the mind, and is supernatural as regards its nature, but analogous to the natural power of all truth, as regards the mode of its operation." Winer, p. 86, where passages are quoted from the Confess., and Apol. Confess. Remonstr. [Comp. Stuart, in Bibl. Repos., i., as cited above.] Comp. also Episcopii Institutt., v., p. 5 ss. Limborch, Theol. Christ., Lib. iv., ab init., cap. 12, § 15: Concludimus itaque, quod gratia divina, per Evangelium nobis revelata, sit principium, progressus et complementum omnis salutaris boni, sine cujus cooperatione nullum salutare bonum ne cogitare quidem, multo minus perficere, possimus.-Cap. 14, § 21...... Gratia Dei primaria est fidei causa, sine qua non posset homo recte libero arbitrio uti. Perinde est, ac si duobus captivis carceri inclusis, et vinculis et compedibus arte constrectis, quidam superveniat, qui carcerem aperiat, vincula demat, et egrediendi facultatem largiatur, quin et manu apprehensa eos suaviter trahat et hortetur ut exeant: unus autem occasione hac commoda utatur, libertatemque oblatam apprehendat et e carcere egrediatur; alter vero beneficium istud liberationis contemnat et in carcere manere velit; nemo dicet illum libertatis suæ esse causam, non vero eum qui carcerem aperuit, eo quod aperto carcere, perinde uti alter, non egredi et in captivitate remanere potuit. Dices: Ergo liberum arbitrium, cooperatur cum gratia? Resp.: Fatemur, alias nulla obedientia aut inobedientia hominis locum habet. Dices: An cooperatio liberi arbitrii non est bonum salutare? Resp.: Omnino. Dices: Ergo gratia non est primaria causa salutis? Resp.: Non est solitaria, sed tamen primaria; ipsa enim liberi arbitrii cooperatio est a gratia tamquam primaria causa: nisi enim a præveniente gratia liberum arbitrium excitatum esset, gratiæ cooperari non posset. Dices: Qui potestatem habet credendi, non salvatur, sed qui actu credit: cum itaque prius tantum sit a Deo, posterius a nobis, sequitur, nos nostri salvatores esse. Respondeo 1. Quonium sine potestate credendi actu credere non possumus, sequitur eum, qui credendi potestatem largitus est, etiam actus fidei primariam esse causam. Unde et in Scriptura uni gratiæ plerumque fides et conversio nostra adscribi solet: quia ....solenne est, opera magna et eximia adscribi causæ principali, minus principalium nulla sæpe mentione facta. Quod et hic usu venit, ut homo

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beneficii divini memor agnosceret se nullas ex seipso ad tantum bonum consequendum vires habere. Non tantum enim quod possimus velle, sed et quod actu velimus, gratiæ debetur, quæ nos prævenit, excitat et impellit ad volendum et agendum, ita tamen, ut possimus non velle. 2. Certo sensu concedi potest, hominem sui ipsius servatorem esse, Scriptura ipsa ab ejusmodi loquendi ratione non abhorrente. Phil. ii. 12.

* Sebastian Frank, Servetus, and others, were the forerunners of this tendency; see Schenkel, Wesen des Protest. ii. 96, sq. But it was the Socinians whose views chiefly savoured of Pelagianism. Comp. Cat. Racov. qu. 422: Estne liberum arbitrium situm in nostra potestate, ut Deo obtemperemus? Prorsus. Etenim certum est, primum hominem ita a Deo conditum fuisse, ut libero arbitrio præditus esset. Nec vero ulla causa subest, cur Deus post ejus lapsum illum eo privaret. Other passages are given by Winer. Comp. also F. Socinus, Prælect. Theol. c. 5, and De libero Hom. Arbitrio deque æterna Dei Prædestinatione, scriptum J. J. Grynæo oblatum (Opp. i. pp. 780, 781). Joh. Crelli Ethica Christ. (Bibl. Fratr. Pol.) p. 262. The Socinians, like the Pelagians, supposed divine grace to consist especially in the external institutions of God, not excluding its internal effects upon the mind. Cat. Rac. qu. 428–30: Auxilium divinum duplex est, interius et exterius. (Exterius aux. div.) sunt promissa et minæ, quorum tamen promissa vim habent longe majorem. Unde etiam, quod sint sub novo fœdere longe præstantiora promissa, quam sub vetere fuerint, facilius est sub novo, quam sub vetere fœdere voluntatem Dei facere. (Interius auxil. div.) est id, cum Deus in cordibus eorum, qui ipsi obediunt, quod promisit (vitam æternam) obsignat.-Pag. 251 (in the revised edition): Spir. S. ejusmodi Dei afflatus est, quo animi nostri vel uberiore rerum divinarum notitia vel spe vitiæ æternæ certiore atque adeo gaudio ac gustu quodam futuræ felicitatis aut singulari adore complentur. For further passages see Winer. Socinus thought assisting grace necessary, because the will of most men is weakened (not on account of Adam, but because of their own frequent transgressions); comp. the treatise mentioned above. He rejected the doctrine of predestination, as destructive of all true religion; comp. Prælect. Theol. c. 6 ss. Fock, u. s. 662, sq.

As early as the disputation of Leipsic, Luther compared man to a saw, which is a passive instrument in the hand of the carpenter; see Möhler, Symbolik, p. 106. Comp. Comment. in Genes. c. 19: In spiritualibus et divinis rebus, quæ ad animæ salutem spectant, homo est instar statuæ salis, in quam uxor Patriarchæ Loth est conversa; imo est similis trunco et lapidi, statuæ vita carenti, quæ neque oculorum, oris aut ullorum sensuum cordisque usum habet.-But it was especially in his treatise: De Servo Arbitrio, against Erasmus, that he expressed himself in the strongest terms; the many instances in which God exhorts man to keep his commandments, appeared to him ironical, as if a father were to say to his child: "Come," while he knows that he cannot come (see Galle, Melancthon, p. 270, note; Schenkel, ii. 81, 8q.) In respect to predestination, see his letter to an anonymous person (No. 2622 in De Wette) (Seidemann), vi. p. 427: Per Christum certi facti sumus, omnem credentem a Patre esse prædestinatum. Omnem enim prædestinavit, etiam vocavit per evangelium, ut credat et per fidem jus

tificetur. ... Nam verum est, Deum aliquos ex hominibus aliis rejectis ad æternam vitam elegisse et destinasse antequam jacerentur fundamenta mundi. Sed quia Deus in abscondito habitat et judicia ejus occulta sunt, non licet nobis tantam profunditatem assequi.—Melancthon also advanced more rigid views in the first edition of his Loci, than in the subsequent ones. Comp. Galle, p. 247-326.--In accordance with these views the Confession of Augsburg asserts, c. 18: De libero arbitrio docent, quod humana voluntas habeat aliquam libertatem ad efficiendam civilem justitiam et deligendas res rationi subjectas. Sed non habet vim sine Spiritu Sancto efficiendæ justitiæ Dei seu justitiæ spiritualis, quia animalis homo non percipit ea, quæ sunt Spiritus Dei (1 Cor. ii. 14), sed hæc fit in cordibus, cum per verbum Spir. S. concipitur.--Similar principles were set forth in the symbols of the Reformed churches; comp. Conf. Helv. I. Art. 9, ii. 9: Proinde nullum est ad bonum homini arbitrium liberum, nondum renato, vires nullæ ad perficiendum bonum, etc. (for the other symbols see Winer, pp. 81, 82.)-The change which took place in the opinions of Melancthon gave rise to the synergistic controversy, see Planck, iv. p. 584, ss., Galle, p. 326, ss. [Comp. Gieseler, Church Hist. iv. pp. 444, sq.] It is declared in the Refutation which was published, Jena, 1557, p. 36, b. (quoted by Planck, p. 598): Fugiamus ac detestemur dogma eorum, qui argute philosophantur, mentem et voluntatem hominis in conversione seu renovatione, esse σúvɛpyov seu causam concurrentum, cum et Deo debitum honorem eripiat, et suos defensores, ut Augustinus inquit, magis præcipitet ac temeraria confidentia labefactet, quam stabiliat. The same doctrine is propounded in the Formula Concordiæ, p. 662: Antequam homo per Spir. S. illuminatur, convertitur, regeneratur et trahitur, ex sese et propriis naturalibus suis viribus in rebus spiritualibus et ad conversionem aut regenerationem suam, nihil inchoare, operari aut cooperari potest, nec plus quam lapis, truncus aut limus. On the further dogmatic statements, see Heppe, p. 426.

The Formula Concordiæ, p. 617-619, endeavors to avoid this difficulty, by drawing a distinction between prædestinatio et præscientia: Præscientia enim Dei nihil aliud est, quam quod Deus omnia noverit, antequam fiant. ....Hæc præscientia Dei simul ad bonos et malos pertinet, sed interim non est causa mali, neque est causa peccati, quæ hominem ad scelus impellat.... Neque hæc Dei præscientia causa est, quod homines pereant; hoc enim sibi ipsis imputare debent. Sed præscientia Dei disponit malum, et metas illi constituit, quousque progredi et quamdiu durare debeat, idque eo dirigit, ut, licet per se malum sit, nihilominus electis Dei ad salutem cedat.... Prædestinatio vero seu æterna Dei electio tantum ad bonos et dilectos filios Dei pertinet, et hæc est causa ipsorum salutis. Etenim eorum salutem procurat et ea, quæ ad ipsam pertinent, disponit. Super hanc Dei prædestinationem salus nostra ita fundata est, ut inferorum portæ eam evertere nequeant. Hæc Dei prædestinatio non in arcano Dei consilio est scrutanda, sed in verbo Dei, in quo revelatur, quærenda est.-Such definitions were the consequences of the controversy with the Calvinists. It was occasioned by the controversy of two theologians of Strasburg, John Marbach and Jerome Zanchius, the former of whom belonged to the Lutheran, the latter to the Reformed Church; see Planck, vi. p. 809. [Comp. the Doctrine about Predestination,