5 fined faith, on the one hand, as cognitio, and on the other, as affectus.' And lastly, the distinction made by Peter Lombard between credere Deum, credere Deo, and credere in Deum3 shows that he too acknowledged a difference in the usage of the term "faith." Only the last kind of faith was regarded by the scholastics as fides justificans, fides formata. The most eminent theologians both perceived and taught that this kind of faith must of itself produce good works. Nevertheless, the theory of the meritoriousness of good works was developed, in connection with ecclesiastical practice. Though the distinction made by Aquinas between meritum ex condigno and meritum ex congruo, seemed to limit human claims, yet it only secured the appearance of humility. But the evil grew still worse, when the notion of supererogatory works, which may be imputed to those who have none of their own, became one of the most dangerous supports of the sale of indulgences." There were, however, even at that time, some who strenuously opposed such abuses.* 6 * De Fide Orth. iv. 10: Η μέντοι πίστις διπλῆ ἐστιν· ἔστι γὰρ πίστις ἐξ ἀκοῆς (Rom. x. 17). 'Ακούοντες γὰρ τῶν θείων γραφῶν, πιστεύομεν τῇ yàp διδασκαλίᾳ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος. Αΰτη δὲ τελειοῦται πᾶσι τοῖς νομοθετη θεῖσιν ἱπὸ τοῦ Χριστοῦ, ἔργῳ πιστεύουσα, εὐσεβοῦσα καὶ τὰς ἐντολὰς πράττουσα τοῦ ἀνακαινίσαντος ἡμᾶς........ Ἔστι δὲ πάλιν πίστις ελπιζομένων ὑπόστασις (Hebr. xi. 1), πραγμάτων ἔλεγχος οὐ βλεπομένων, ἡ ἀδίστακτος καὶ ἀδιάκριτος ἐλπὶς τῶν τε ὑπὸ θεοῦ ἡμῖν ἐπηγγελμένων, καὶ τὴς τῶν αἰτήσεων ἡμῶν ἐπιτυχίας. Ἡ μὲν οὖν πρώτη τῆς ἡμετέρας γνώμης ἐστὶ, ἡ δὲ δευτέρα τῶν χαρισμάτων τοῦ πνεύματος. On the difference between these two terms, compare Liebner, p. 435. [Hugo St. Victor: De Sacramentis, liber 1, part x. cap. 3: Duo sunt, in quibus fides constat: cognitio et affectus, i. e., constantia vel firmitas credendi. In altero constat quia ipsa illud est; in altero constat, quia ipsa in illo est. In affectu enim substantia fidei invenitur; in cognitione materia. Aliud enim est fides, qua creditur, et aliud, quod creditur. In affectu invenitur fides, in cognitione id, quod fide creditur.] 3 Sent. L. iii. Dist. 23, D: Aliud est enim credere in Deum, aliud credere Deo, aliud credere Deum. Credere Deo, est credere vera essa quæ loquitur, quod et mali faciunt. Et nos credimus homini, sed non in hominem. Credere Deum, est credere quod ipse sit Deus, quod etiam mali faciunt [this kind of faith was sometimes called the faith of devils, according to James ii. 19]. Credere in Deum est credendo amare, credendo in eum ire, credendo ei adhærere et ejus membris incorporari. Per hanc fidem justificatur impius, ut deinde ipsa fides incipiat per dilectionem operari.-The same holds true of the phrase, credere Christum, etc. Comp. Lit. C. 4 * Generally speaking, the scholastics made a difference between subjective and objective faith, fides qua, and fides que creditur (Peter Lombard, 1. c.) As a subdivision, we find mentioned fides formata, which works by love. Faith without love remains informis, see Lombard, 1. c.: Thomas Aquinas, Summ. P. ii. 2, Qu. 4, Art. 3 (quoted by Münscher, ed. by von Cölln, p. 175.) So, too, a distinction was made between developed and undeveloped faith (fides explicita et implicita); the latter is sufficient, see Summa, ii. Qu. 1, Art 7: Qu. 2, Art. 6 and 7. 5 ↳ Thus Peter Lombard said, 1. c.: Sola bona opera dicenda sunt, quæ fiunt per dilectionem Dei. Ipsa enim dilectio opus fidei dicitur.-Faith would therefore still be the source of good works; comp. Lib. ii. Dist. 41, A. where every thing which does not proceed from faith (according to Rom. xiv. 23) is represented as sin.-The views of Thomas Aquinas were not quite so scriptural; Summ. P. ii. 2, Qu. 4, Art. 7, he spoke of faith itself as a virtue, though he assigned to it the first and highest place among all virSuch notions, however, led more and more to the revival of Pelagian sentiments, till the forerunners of the Reformation returned to the simple truths of the Gospel. This was done e. g., by Wessel (see Ullmann, p. 272, ss.) and Savonarola (see Rudelbach, p. 351, ss.) On the other hand, even the Waldenses laid much stress upon works of repentance. Thomas à Kempis did not start from the central point of the doctrine of justification in such a measure and manner, as did the above: see Ullmann ubi supra. [Comp. Chalmers, Essay prefixed to the Imitation.] tues. 6 • Alanus ab Insulis also opposed the notion of the meritoriousness of works in decided terms, ii. 18 (quoted by Pez, i. p. 492): Bene mereri proprie dicitur, qui sponte alicui benefacit, quod facere non tenetur. Sed nihil Deo facimus, quod non teneamur facere...... Ergo meritum nostrum apud Deum non est proprie meritum, sed solutio debiti. Sed non est merces nisi meriti vel debiti præcedentis. Sed non meremur proprie, ergo quod dabitur a Deo, non erit proprie merces, sed gratia.-Some theologians regarded faith itself as meritorious (inasmuch as they considered it to be a work, a virtue— obedience to the Church.) Thomas Aq. P. ii. 2, Qu. 2, Art. 9.-On the distinction made between different kinds of merita, see P. ii. 1, Qu. 114, Art. 4, quoted by Münscher, edit. by von Cölln, p. 145. Men have only a meritum ex congruo, but not ex condigno. Christ alone possessed the latter. [The meritum de condigno, strict merit, can not possibly be attained by a creature-on this ground man could not make himself worthy of grace. The meritum de congruo, or, imputativum, presupposes that grace is connected with certain conditions, in which man may have a part to perform, by which he may earn this grace.] : The development of the doctrine of a thesaurus meritorum, thesaurus supererogationis, belongs to Alexander of Hales (Summa, Pars. iv. Quæst. 23, Art. 2, memb. 5). To this was added the distinction made by Thomas Aquinas between consilium and præceptum, see Summ. P. ii. Qu. 108, Art. 4, quoted by Münscher, edit. by von Colln, p. 177. [Præceptum importat necessitatem consilium autem in optione ponitur ejus cui datur.... Supra præcepta sunt addita consilia....Consilia vero oportet esse de illis per quæ melius et expeditius potest homo consequi finem prædictum.] On the historical development of indulgencies, see † (Eus.) Amort, Historia.... de Origine, Progressu, Valore et Fructu Indulgentiarum, Venet., 1738, fol. Gieseler, Church Hist. (N. Y. ed.), ii. 196, 518, iii. 162, 393. Ullmann, Reformat. vor d. Ref. i. 203. Hirscher, Die Lehre vom Ablass, Tüb., 1844. [G. E. Steitz, d. römische Busssacrament, Frankf., 1853.-Clement VI. in the Con stitutio Unigenitus, 1343, for the jubilee of 1350, granted large indulgences, founded on this treasury of grace, and stated the whole doctrine explicitly.Innocent III., in 1213, issued indulgences for the crusaders, in very broad terms, saying to all who took part-plenam suorum peccaminum de quibus veraciter fuerint corde contriti et ore confessi, veniam indulgemus, et in retributione justorum salutis æternæ pollicemur augmentum.-Albertus Mag. Sent. iv. d. 20, 16, defines: Indulgentia sive relaxatio est remissio pœnæ injunctæ ex vi clavium et thesauro supererogationis perfectorum procedens... In hoc enim thesauro habet ecclesia divitias meritorum et passionis Christi et gloriosæ virginis Mariæ et omnium apostolorum et martyrum et sanctorum Dei vivorum et mortuorum. Thomas Aquinas, III. in Suppl. 25, a. 1, gives the rationale of the matter: Ratio autem, quare valere possint, est unitas corporis mystici, in qua multi in operibus pœnitentiæ supererogaverunt ad mensuram debitorum suorum, et multi etiam tribulationes injustas sustinuerunt patienter, per quas multitudo pœnarum poterat expiari, si eis deberetur; quorum meritorum tanta est copia quod omnem pœnam debitam nunc viventibus excedunt; et præcipue propter meritum Christi....Sic prædicta merita communia sunt totius ecclesiæ. Comp. Schmid, Lehrb. d. Dogmengesch. 122.] Thus the Franciscan monk, Berthold, in the thirteenth century, zealously opposed the penny-preachers who seduced the souls of men (see Kling, pp. 149, 150, 235, 289, 384, 395; Grimm, p. 210; Wackernagel, deutsches Lesebuch i. Sp. 664). On the struggles of Wycliffe, Hus, and others, see the works on Ecclesiastical History. Concerning the treatise of Hus: De Indulgentiis, compare Schröckh, xxxiv. p. 599, ss. Besides, the actual exercises of penance on the part of the Flagellantes, and those who tormented themselves, formed a practical opposition to the laxity of principle. See Gieseler, 1. c. SIXTH DIVISION. THE DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH AND THE § 187. THE CHURCH. to EVEN in the preceding period, the idea of the Church had become confounded with its external manifestation, and thus the way was prepared for all the abuses of the Romish hierarchy, and the development of the papacy. The relation in which the ecclesiastical power stands to the secular (or the church to the state), was often illustrated by the comparison of the two swords, which some supposed to be separated, while others thought them united in the hand of Peter.' It belongs, properly speaking, to the province of Canon Law, develop and define those relations; but, inasmuch as adherence to the decisions of ecclesiastical authorities on such matters was supposed to form a part of orthodoxy, and as every species of dissent appeared not only heretical, but as the most dangerous of all heresies, it is obvious that they are not to be passed over with silence in the history of doctrines. That which exerted the greatest influence upon the doctrinal tendency of the present age, was the dogma of the papal power and infallibility, in opposition to the position that the council is superior to the Pope. The mystical idea of the church, and the notion of a universal priesthood, which was intimately connected with it, was propounded, with more or less definiteness, by Hugo of St. Victor, as well as by the forerunners of the Reformation, Wycliffe, Matthias of Janow, Hus, John of Wesel, Wessel, and Savonarola. The antihierarchical element referred to, and together with it the antiecclesiastical, manifested itself nowhere so strongly as in the fanatical sects of the middle ages, whose principles also led them sometimes to oppose not only Christianity, but also the existing political governments. On the other hand, the Waldenses and Bohemian brethren endeavored, in a simple way, and without fanaticism, to return to the foundation laid by the apostles: overlooking, however, the historical development of the Church.5 3 2 4 1 This is more fully shown in the work entitled: Vridankes Bescheidenheit,* edit. by Grimm, Gött. 1834, p. lvii.-Bernard of Clairval already interpreted the words of Luke xxii. 36-38, in a figurative sense; Epist. ad Eugen. 256 (written A. D. 1146); in agreement with him, John of Salisbury (Polic. iv. 3) asserted, that both the swords are in the hands of the Pope, but yet the Pope ought to wield the secular sword by the arm of the Emperar. On the other hand, the Emperor Frederic I. referred the one of the two swords to the power of the Pope, the other to that of the Emperor (see the letters written A. D. 1157, 1160, 1167, in the work of Grimm). The Emperor Otto maintained the same, in opposition to Pope Innocent III. Since it was Peter (according to John xviii. 10) who drew the sword, the advocates of the Papal system inferred, that both the swords ought to be in one hand, and that the Pope had only to lend it to the Emperor. Such was the reasoning, e. g., of the Franciscan monk, Berthold. On the contrary, others, as Freidank, Reinmar of Zweter, and the author of the work entitled: Der Sachsenspiegel, insisted that the power was to be divided; in a note to the Sachsenspiegel, it is assumed that Christ gave only one of the two swords to the Apostle Peter, but the other, the secular one, to the Apostle John. The opposite view was defended in the work called "der Schwabenspiegel." Further particulars are given by Grimm, 1. c. [Compare also Gieseler ii. § 55, note 13.]-There were also not wanting those who advocated the freedom of the church in opposition to the secular as well as the spiritual domination. Thus John of Salisbury maintained the principle: Ecclesiastica debent esse liberrima: see his 95th Epistle and the collection of Masson (in Ritter, Gesh. d. Phil. viii. 50, Note). 2 Compare e. g. the bull issued by Pope Boniface VIII. A. D. 1302 (in Extravag. Commun. Lib. i. Tit. viii. cap. 1.), and the decision of the Synod of Basle, Sess. i. the 19. Jul. 1431, in which the opposite doctrine was set forth. (Mansi T. xxix. Cod. 21: both in Münscher, edit. by Von Cölln, p. 316-18.) 3 According to Hugo of St. Victor (de Sacram. Lib. ii. P. iii. quoted by Liebner, p. 445, ss.), Christ is the invisible head of the Church, and the multitudo fidelium is his body. The Church, as a whole, is divided into two halves (walls), the laity and the clergy (the left side and the right side). As much as the spirit is above the body, so much is the ecclesiastical power above the secular. On that account, the former has the right not only to institute the latter, but also to judge it when it is corrupt. But since the ccclesiastical power itself is instituted by God, it can be judged only by God when it turns from the right path (1 Cor. vi.) Hugo also acknowledged the Pope as the vicarius Petri. He conceded to him the privilege of being served by all ecclesiastics, and the unlimited power of binding and loosing all things upon earth.- Wycliffe made a much more precise distinction between the idea of the Church, and the external ecclesiastical power, *The passage in Vridank reads (p. 152): Zwei swert in einer scheide |