Economic Origins of Dictatorship and DemocracyWhat forces lead to democracy's creation? Why does it sometimes consolidate only to collapse at other times? Written by two of the foremost authorities on this subject in the world, this volume develops a framework for analyzing the creation and consolidation of democracy. It revolutionizes scholarship on the factors underlying government and popular movements toward democracy or dictatorship. Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson argue that different social groups prefer different political institutions because of the way they allocate political power and resources. Their book, the subject of a four-day seminar at Harvard's Center for Basic Research in the Social Sciences, was also the basis for the Walras-Bowley lecture at the joint meetings of the European Economic Association and Econometric Society in 2003 and is the winner of the John Bates Clark Medal. Daron Acemoglu is Charles P. Kindleberger Professor of Applied Economics at The Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He received the 2005 John Bates Clark Medal awarded by the American Economic Association as the best economist working in the United States under age 40. He is the author of the forthcoming text Introduction to Modern Economic Growth. James A. Robinson is Professor of Government at Harvard University. He is a Harvard Faculty Associate at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs and a member of the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research's Program on Institutions, Organizations, and Growth. He is coeditor with Jared Diamond of the forthcoming book Natural Experiments in History. |
Avis des internautes - Rédiger un commentaire
Review: Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy
Avis d'utilisateur - Nvd - GoodreadsA mathematical treatment of which conditions lead to establishment of democracy as opposed to dictatorship as viewed from the perspective of relationships between different constituency groups. A ... Consulter l'avis complet
Review: Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy
Avis d'utilisateur - GoodreadsA mathematical treatment of which conditions lead to establishment of democracy as opposed to dictatorship as viewed from the perspective of relationships between different constituency groups. A ... Consulter l'avis complet
Table des matières
| 1 | |
| 15 | |
| 48 | |
PART TWO MODELING POLITICS 4 Democratic Politics 1 Introduction | 89 |
Aggregating Individual Preferences | 91 |
SinglePeaked Preferences and the Median Voter Theorem | 95 |
Our Workhorse Models | 103 |
Democracy and Political Equality | 115 |
Conclusion | 253 |
PART FOUR PUTTING THE MODELS TO WORK 8 The Role of the Middle Class | 255 |
The ThreeClass Model | 259 |
Emergence of Partial Democracy | 262 |
From Partial to Full Democracy | 267 |
The Middle Class as a Buffer | 273 |
Softliners versus Hardliners | 278 |
The Role of the Middle Class in Consolidating Democracy | 283 |
Conclusion | 117 |
Nondemocratic Politics 1 Introduction | 118 |
Power and Constraints in Nondemocratic Politics | 120 |
Modeling Preferences and Constraints in Nondemocracies | 131 |
Commitment Problems | 137 |
A Simple Game of Promises | 147 |
A Dynamic Model | 151 |
IncentiveCompatible Promises 8 Conclusion 89 89 91 92 99 113 117 118 118 120 128 133 144 151 | 161 |
OF DEMOCRACY 6 Democratization | 173 |
Preferences over Political Institutions | 176 |
Political Power and Institutions | 177 |
A Static Model of Democratization | 181 |
Democratization or Repression? | 186 |
A Dynamic Model of Democratization | 193 |
Subgame Perfect Equilibria | 201 |
Alternative Political Identities | 203 |
Targeted Transfers | 207 |
Ideological Preferences over Regimes | 211 |
Democratization in a Picture | 214 |
Equilibrium Revolutions | 215 |
Conclusion | 218 |
Coups and Consolidation | 221 |
Incentives for Coups | 224 |
A Static Model of Coups | 225 |
A Dynamic Model of the Creation and Consolidation of Democracy | 231 |
Alternative Political Identities | 246 |
Power in Democracy and Coups | 247 |
Consolidation in a Picture | 249 |
Defensive Coups | 251 |
Conclusion | 285 |
Economic Structure and Democracy | 287 |
Economic Structure and Income Distribution | 290 |
Political Conflict | 292 |
Capital Land and the Transition to Democracy | 293 |
Costs of Coup on Capital and Land | 296 |
Capital Land and the Burden of Democracy | 300 |
Conflict between Landowners and Industrialists | 307 |
Industrialists Landowners and Democracy in Practice | 312 |
Economic Institutions | 313 |
Human Capital | 316 |
Conjectures about Political Development | 317 |
Conclusion | 319 |
Globalization and Democracy | 321 |
A Model of an Open Economy | 325 |
Political Conflict Democratic Consolidation | 331 |
Political Conflict Transition to Democracy | 334 |
Financial Integration | 338 |
Increased Political Integration | 343 |
Alternative Assumptions about the Nature of International Trade | 344 |
Conclusion | 347 |
PART FIVE CONCLUSIONS AND THE FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY 11 Conclusions and the Future of Democracy | 349 |
Extensions and Areas for Future Research | 355 |
The Future of Democracy | 358 |
The Distribution of Power in Democracy | 361 |
Bibliography | 381 |
Index | 401 |
Autres éditions - Tout afficher
Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy Daron Acemoglu,James A. Robinson Aucun aperçu disponible - 2005 |
Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy Daron Acemoglu,James A. Robinson Aucun aperçu disponible - 2009 |
Expressions et termes fréquents
agent analysis apartheid Argentina assume avoid revolution Britain Chapter citizens collective-action problem commitment problem comparative statics concessions conflict consolidated democracy cost of repression costly countries coup coup constraint created credible Daron Acemoglu democ dictatorship discussion Downsian economic institutions election elites equilibrium policy example facto political power factor financial integration Freedom House fully consolidated function future game tree Gini coefficient given greater Guatemala human capital ideal point implies important income income redistribution increase inter-group inequality jure political power labor landowners majority median voter middle class Nash equilibrium nondemocracy nondemocratic regime P(qA parties payoff political institutions poor preferred tax rate prevent revolution promise Proposition reform relatively result revolution constraint rich set the tax single-peaked social society South Africa strategy subgame perfect equilibrium targeted transfers taxation threat of revolution trade transition to democracy voting VP(N VP(R
Fréquemment cités
Page 48 - And we define: the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote.
Page 33 - Inasmuch as the primary object of a government, beyond the mere repression of physical violence, is the making of the rules which determine the property relations of members of society, the dominant classes whose rights are thus to be determined must perforce obtain from the government such rules as are consonant with the larger interests necessary to the continuance of their economic processes, or they must themselves control the organs of government.
Page 177 - North defines institutions as: ... the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction.
Page 83 - By liberalization we mean the process of making effective certain rights that protect both individuals and social groups from arbitrary or illegal acts committed by the state or third parties.
Page 27 - If any persons suppose that this Reform will lead to ulterior measures, they are mistaken; for there is no one more decided against annual parliaments, universal suffrage, and the ballot, than I am. My object is not to favour, but to put an end to such hopes and projects.
Page 77 - there is no transition whose beginning is not the consequence - direct or indirect - of important divisions within the authoritarian regime itself, principally along the fluctuating cleavage between hardliners and soft-liners"14.
Page 34 - ... whose rights are thus to be determined must perforce obtain from the government such rules as are consonant with the larger interests necessary to the continuance of their economic processes, or they must themselves control the organs of government. In a stable despotism the former takes place; under any other system of government, where political power is shared by any portion of the population, the methods and nature of this control become the problem of prime importance— in fact, the fundamental...
