times the prepossession is so strong that no arguments will make any impression upon the mind; and it is very possible for a man to imagine, that he sees a connexion between two propositions, when there really is none; as on the contrary, not to perceive it where there is. Ideas, which have been long combined together, and which we have constantly associated in our minds, are found to be sometimes inseparable by all our care. When this is the case, we ought not to deem it obstinacy, or froward waywardness, if we are not able to convince a man of some mistake he labours under; but we should leave it to time, and further care to cure him of his errors. The instances are very numerous of learned men, who never could be convinced of certain mistakes.

The idea of God proves his existence, is a position so far from true, that nothing seems to me a plainer paralogism; and yet how many are there who contend for its evidence, as being one of the shortest and most direct conclusions imaginable? Should an atheist be convinced of the being of a God, from that argument, would any one affirm that he would be liable to punishment for his error? Suppose any one seduced by the ambiguity of the word God, in the sacred writings, should maintain an absolute coequality of the persons of the ever blessed Trinity; this would be, if I mistake not, direct Tritheism; or suppose any one should assert the words one God, speaking of the three persons of the Trinity, to signify one individual

essence or substance under different personal characters; this would be the error of Sabellius. Suppose, I say, one early educated in, and strongly prepossessed in favour of either of these notions, should maintain them, or believe them to be true, where would be the dishonesty, or insincerity of this? He may notwithstanding have a cordial love for God, and his Christ; he may be strictly religious, and live temperately, soberly, and godly; and if these are the things which alone are required by God in order to a Christian's salvation, why should we imagine that he will damn us for our notions, when it is so often out of our power whether we will believe them or not? In short, an hypothesis may be received as true, which may be false; or as false, which may be true; without any wilfulness, insincerity, or resolution to maintain it, right or wrong. One may not see the error for want of abilities, or be so bewildered in the intricate ways that lead to truth, as after a tiresome search to sit down with error, and embrace a shadow instead of a substance. These, and such like involuntary cases, we should not confound with voluntary practices; or imagine that if the one be criminal, the other must imply a share of guilt.

The crime in the present case, be it more or less, is wholly in negligence, or want of that application which ought to have been employed, and not in the error itself, which was consequent upon education, or early prejudice.

Thirdly; in cases where there is want of abilities to know an error, or want of opportunity, I need not prove that truth is out of our power to come at it, and consequently that we are necessarily under error, and therefore not liable to punishment. I will add,

Fourthly; that even predominant passions hindering us in the search after truth, do not always render errors punishable. Truth it is certain is often no more in our power than perception is; nor can we help assenting to what we think has the best, and clearest, and most proofs. We cannot assent to any truth, but such as we judge to be so, according to the evidences we have. If any passion therefore predominates, and hurries us away before we can reflect, we cannot but err; and then it is our misfortune, it is our frailty, it is our infirmity, and we are unhappy in it; but it is not our fault or crime; we become the objects of goodness, not of anger, or severity. Here would I recommend to every man a careful examination of his actions; and if he finds them tending to the hurt of others, to suspect some latent negligence, or carelessness in himself; for passions which we can control will not excuse us in injurious actions. Reason and religion were given us in order to regulate our wills, and to make us happy here, by promoting love and charity, and universal benevolence. But if we suffer, through our own faults, our passions to take fire, and break in upon these duties, we become responsible to the great judge of all our actions.

You will say, perhaps, that it is needless to guard against evil actions, since they flowing necessarily from the judgment, must be as innocent as the judgment is.

I readily allow, that all such actions as necessarily follow from an involuntary error, must be as innocent as the error is. But in general this is not the case of human actions. The duties of justice and charity to our neighbours, of temperance to ourselves, and of piety to God, are so express and plain, that it is hard not to be convinced of the common obligation, which all are under to them. They are so evident, that if at any time any man is so disposed as to think evil good, and good evil, he cannot but suspect a fault in himself and his own mind, just as when we are unable to perceive light at noonday, we may justly conclude that the organs of sight are indisposed. actions therefore should always be considered, and always be guarded carefully; and if they tend any how to barbarity, or injustice, or what usually appears as evil, it will be a good ground for suspicion, and for a more careful examination of such principles as direct them. But to proceed.

Our

You will be apt to ask here, if any sort of error can be criminal? Will a man be justified before God, who is guilty of heresy, because, forsooth, he is passionate, or because he follows a great many who have gone before him in the same track, or because he takes up with whimsical notions, which are acknowledged false

hoods? Is not this to make a chaos and confusion amongst mankind? Is there no difference between erroneous persons and others? Is there none between orthodoxy and heresy? Is it all one, if a man be an Arian, Socinian, a Macedonian, or let him have what notions he pleases, provided they are involuntary?

I shall turn the edge of this popular clamour, for I cannot allow it the name of an argument, in a few words.

As,

First; all voluntary errors (and I have told you what are voluntary) are criminal, because they are contempts of God, who has given us proper means to search after truth. It is the improvement of our souls we are as much as we can to mind; and wilfully to refuse and neglect that, is to act contrary to the purpose of God, in vesting us with such faculties. But what a difference is there between this conduct and our falling into errors through infirmity, or by necessity? Let voluntary errors therefore be as criminal as you please, but then you must remember to lay them to the charge of only such as are guilty of them, and you must be very sure who are such; for be assured that it is not your bare charge will make them so.

Secondly; an heretic will not be justified because he is passionate, or because he follows a multitude, or has great authorities for his errors, but because his errors are involuntary. He doth his best to rid himself of that slavery, which ties down his mind to error, but finds himself unable to gain the mastery. He can