say as St Paul does, Rom. vii. 18. To will is present with me, but how to perform that which is good I know not. Wherever it can be shown that heresy or schism is a known voluntary act, there to be sure it is criminal, and no doubt that God justly may and will take cognisance of it. But when it is involuntary, and arises from a man's mistaking the truth, schism or heresy is so far from being damnable, that I cannot but think it is highly commendable, because it evidences honesty, sincerity, love of God, and of truth, and regards not the praise of men. Such men will certainly meet with favour at the last day from a God of goodness, how great soever their errors may be, because they embraced them, and pursued them, as believing them to be his will, and used their best care to find out the truth. It is not the mere following multitudes, that excuses men; but it is the doing their best to know the will of God, which takes off the imputation of sin and guilt. Therefore,

Thirdly; a man may be branded with the ignominious characters of an Arian, Sabellian, or what you please; but if he be honest and sincere, and hath done his best to rid himself of those notions, and yet he cannot but think them true, that is, agreeable to revelation and reason, I can see no reason but that one heaven may receive him, as well as it may the most orthodox. But this will still appear more clear, if we consider that,

All persons under the misfortune of error are either,

First; such as err involuntarily in purely speculative matters.

Or,

Secondly; such whose involuntary errors have no necessary connexion with practice, but yet they may accidentally have an influence upon it. Or,

Thirdly; such whose involuntary errors have a necessary connexion with practice, but they do not see it. Or,

Lastly; such as err voluntarily, and practice according to their errors.

First, such as err in purely speculative matters, (I speak of persons who have endeavoured to know the truth, but cannot attain unto it,) such, I say, are as free from crime or fault, as it is possible for such as are orthodox in those points to be. For he that with sincerity searches after truth, is under a necessity of assenting to such propositions as seem to him to have the greatest degree of probability on their sides. It is out of our powers not to think that truest, for which the arguments appear to us to be strongest; and it is our duty to let evidence, or the greatest degree of probability prevail, and to give a ready ear to that. In the various speculations concerning the unity of the Trinity, it is granted by all that they are in the dark, as to many particulars; and that in those cases, where God has not revealed his mind, it is ridiculous and absurd for man to presume positively to determine. It is plain too, that very honest, and very sincere, and very pious men, have erred, or are suspected to have erred,

in their notions upon this point; from whence it is plain that revelation has not very clearly and distinctly laid down the things which have been so much canvassed.

Now if it be a good principle, (and what protestant is there that ever called it in question?) that the Scriptures are clear in all fundamental points, then it follows, that if this be not clearly laid down, it cannot be a fundamental point how the Three are One. The errors which arise about that, either arise from want of sufficient revelation, which men endeavour to supply by, or to reconcile to reason, that other light which God has kindled in every man's breast in order to enlighten his ways, or else from some violent prejudice or other, which good men are not able to surmount. Now he that studies sincerely this or any other point, with design to honour his great Creator, by searching and examining what he has revealed, by endeavouring to find out what he has discovered; in a word, he that doth his best to know his master's will, and to find out his meaning, and yet errs; to dare to say that such a man sins, and shall be punished for it hereafter, is little less than blasphemy. For it is a consequential denial of God's goodness and justice, to affirm him resolved to punish us for involuntary errors, or for not knowing what we cannot with all our pains and industry attain the knowledge of. "To say, that when a place of Scripture," says the incomparable Mr Chillingworth, c. 2. s. 104, "by reason of ambiguous

terms, lies indifferent between divers senses, whereof one is true, and the other is false; that God obliges men under the pain of damnation not to mistake through error and human frailty, is to make God a tyrant; and to say, that he requires us certainly to attain that end, for the attaining whereof we have no certain means; which is to say, that, like Pharaoh, he gives no straw and requires brick, that he reaps where he sows not, that he gathers where he strews not; that he will not be pleased with our utmost endeavours to please him, without full, and exact, and never failing performance; that his will is, we should do what he knows we cannot do; that he will not accept of us according to that which we have, but requireth of us what we have not; which, whether it consisteth with his goodness, with his wisdom, or with his word, I leave it to honest men to judge."

I cannot forbear transcribing from him the following instance, which is so exactly parallel to the matter in hand. "If I should send a servant to Paris, or Rome, or Jerusalem, and he, using his utmost diligence not to mistake his way, yet, notwithstanding, meeting often with such places where the road is divided into several ways, whereof one is as likely to be true, and as likely to be false as any other, should at length mistake, and go out of the way; would not any man say, that I were an impotent, foolish, and unjust master, if I should be offended with him for doing so? And shall we not tremble to impute that to God, which we

should take in foul scorn, if it were imputed to ourselves? Certainly, I, for my part, fear I should not love God, if I should think so strangely of him."

For any one therefore to imagine it zeal for God to persecute men for errors in speculation, which we are not able to correct, what is it but to betray an ignorance of God and of his attributes? It is calling God a tyrant, to say that he will punish them; and it is making men the devil's agents, for them to punish them; it is pride, malice, and uncharitableness; it is promoting the power and designs of Satan, and encouraging that scandalous and diabolical vice hypocrisy; it is suppressing truth itself; it is putting a stop to industry; in a word, it is neither entering one's self, nor letting others, (as much as we can help it,) enter into the kingdom of heaven.

When therefore I see a man of pride and haughtiness, of insolence, art, and cunning, one that never speaks his own real sentiments, but only what may make an auditory think him entirely in theirs; one that recommends concord and unanimity, and in order thereto endeavours to persuade others to leave off all hard words, yet instantly rises up and uses them himself; one that is fearful lest another should bear away the prize of elocution, or outstrip him in honours, interest, or favour; one that is aiming to be head of a party, and throwing out ill names, insinuations, and reproaches liberally upon an adversary, for the very things he has been guilty of himself; one that acts al