of God, are ready to submit their judgments to it. But then he who lies under an erroneous conscience doth not know the will of God; for if he knows it, how is he erroneous? If he doth not know it, it is impossible for that to be his guide or rule.

You will say, a man ought, in such circumstances, to suspend his actions. That is, a man ought to suspend his actions when his conscience tells him that it is his duty to do them; which is but little different from a contradiction.

But what must a man do in such unhappy circumstances, when the laws of God are contrary to one's conscience?

The answer is obvious; he must follow his conscience, let the consequence be what it will. Should he break the laws of God, not known or understood, by following his erroneous conscience, he would as certainly be free from guilt before God, as, were he literally to keep the laws of God, but yet act against his conscience, he would be guilty of a flagrant crime. This perhaps may seem a paradox; but yet if there be a rule in any case of distinguishing between what is a sin and what is not one, it is easy to do so by the rule in the present case. As,

First; that is a crime, which is committed with a base, vile, and dishonest mind and intention; but he that acts with an erring conscience against the unknown, or not understood will of God, acts with a sincere and honest mind; therefore to follow one's con

falsehood a lie;

science in such cases, even against the will of God, is not a crime. Secondly; the moral evil of any action is not to be judged of from the bare fact itself, but from the circumstances attending it. Every killing of a man is not murder; nor is every nor is every sort of taking away another man's goods theft and robbery. If killing a man, considered only as to the fact, were malum in se, then it would have been absolutely impossible that, in any circumstances, one might have taken away the life of another; or that God should ever have commanded Abraham to slay his son Isaac; because God would have commanded the performance of an act absolutely inconsistent with goodness; which would be a contradiction. We find that God himself excused even the killing of a man, if it were done through ignorance; but the soul that doth ought presumptuously, the same reproacheth the Lord, and that soul shall be cut off from amongst his people. Numb. xv. 30. It is then murder, when knowingly and designedly, against law, we take away the life of a man; it is theft, when we design the depriving another of what is his own, and illegally execute our designs; and so of other sins. Facts therefore done through mere involuntary error and unaffected ignorance, being always looked upon as free from crime, and such as are done with design being looked upon as criminal, it is evident that conscience is to be followed, and he is always guilty of the least crimes, who recedes the least from that.

Will an erroneous conscience therefore excuse all faults? Or will he that follows that be free from the imputation of sin? Will error, like charity, cover the multitude of sins? Or in what consists the crime of erroneous persons?

The crime consists in what I have more than once observed, in the negligence of such as are betrayed into error; which negligence is more or less punishable, as the will of God has been plainer or more discoverable by men. Punishable, I say, but not by man, unless the errors betray them into such acts as are inconsistent with the civil interests of mankind. For since the fault lies only in negligence, what man alive can tell what industry, pains or labour has been used to attain the truth? God, the searcher of hearts, can easily discover this; and therefore we are assured, Rom. i. 20. that the Gentiles are without excuse, for their follies and sins in idolatry, because that which may be known of God is manifest in, or to, them; for the invisible things of Him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead; so that they are without excuse.

But then if the fault of negligence be removed, if diligence and industry be applied, and yet the be insurmountable, it is plain the error is involun it is necessary, because out of our power to it; and therefore the persons, under such m as free from crime, or the imputation of

innocent, as any orthodox persons are; and I see not how God could either be good or just, if he laid it to their charge. Wherever there is crime there must

be concurrence of will.

He that follows an erro

neous conscience, may be guilty of sin, if his error be voluntary; but if he can be charged with neither negligence nor affected ignorance, nor any wilfulness, he cannot have any crime.

It is time now to look back, and to view the ground we have gone over. It is evident, I believe, first, that no involuntary errors are punishable. Therefore, secondly, that those persons whose errors are involuntary in purely speculative matters are not punishable. Nor, thirdly, such, whose involuntary errors have only accidental connexions with practice. Nor, fourthly, such, whose involuntary errors have a necessary connexion, so long as the connexion is not seen by them. The only punishable errors are such as are voluntary, and proceed from negligence; and in this case too, to speak properly, it is the negligence, and not the error which is punishable. Lastly, it has been proved, that an erroneous conscience obliges us to follow its dictates, and that it is no crime to break the laws of God through unaffected ignorance, and always one to act against one's conscience.

Let me now a little touch those theological scarecrows, as they are commonly used, and as Mr Hales, in his tract of Schism, calls them, Heresy and Schism. From what has been said, it follows, that that heresy

cannot be damnable, which consists in the belief of any false notion embraced after search and careful inquiry, be it what it will; whether it be in a specu⚫lative matter, or in such points as have either accidental or necessary connexion with practice; and the reason is in all these cases, error is involuntary, and therefore is not punishable. It cannot be criminal, unless it proceed from wilful negligence in searching after the will of God, and inquiring into his laws. For if a great deal of pains and care has been used to know the mind of God, and yet we cannot attain it, it is not our fault, and consequently we cannot be chargeable. "For if God," says Mr Chillingworth, "would have had his meaning in these places certainly known, how could it stand with his wisdom to be so wanting to his own will and end as to speak obscurely? Or, how can it consist with his justice, to require of men to know certainly the meaning of those words, which he himself hath not revealed? Suppose there were an absolute monarch, that in his own absence from one of his kingdoms, had written laws for the government of it, some very plainly, and some very ambiguously and obscurely, and his subjects should keep those that were plainly written with all exactness; and for those that were obscure, use their best diligence to find his meaning in them, and obey them according to the sense of them which they conceive; should this king either with justice or wisdom be offended with these subjects, if by reason of