divides things into those which are according to reason; those things, which are contrary to reason ; and those things, which are above reason. And these things, when revealed, he makes to be the proper matter of faith. [See Essay on Human Understanding, Book IV. Chap. xvII. s. 23, and Chap. XVIII. s. 7. 9.] He frequently sets himself to point out the shortness of human understanding, and how unable we are to comprehend or explain things, of which yet we have an undoubted certainty. Of these he gives various instances. Among other things he instances in the very notion of body; which is incumbered with some difficulties very hard, and perhaps impossible to be explained or understood by us. The divisibility in infinitum of any finite extension, involving us, whether we grant or deny it, in consequences impossible to be explicated, or made in our apprehension consistent. And he would fain know what substance exists, that has not something, which manifestly baffles our understandings. [See Essay on Human Understanding, Book II. Chap. XXIII. and Book IV. Chap. III. See also his works, Vol. I. Page 557. 559, 560, 561. 572.] He allows, therefore, that it cannot be a reasonable foundation for rejecting a doctrine proposed to us, as of divine revelation, that we cannot comprehend the manner of it; especially, when it relates to the divine essence; and declares, concerning himself, "I gratefully receive and rejoice in the light of divine revelation, which sets me at rest in many things, the

manner of which my poor reason can by no means make out to me. I readily believe whatever God has declared, though my reason find difficulties in it, which it cannot master." [Ibid. p. 361. 573.]

Pyrrho said he had now done, and declared that he would not have dwelt so much upon the sentiments of such great men, if some learned and ingenious persons had not laid so much stress upon them.

Theophilus answered, when an argument is brought from the sentiments of some wise, great, and good man, whose authority we reverence and hardly dare oppose, the logicians call it Argumentum ad veracundiam, an address to our modesty. And one would not be very forward in directly contradicting or opposing men eminent for wisdom and piety. But yet this argument may be carried too far, and prevent all farther inquiries and improvements whatever. We justly reverence the names of men of piety and learning in former ages. But, you know, I have already declared that "their notions are nothing to us, any further than they are supported by reason and Scripture. We call no man master upon earth. We allow no man to have dominion over our faith. Churches and councils, fathers and moderns, learned men and celebrated divines have erred, and their determinations are not to be implicitly received."

The church of Rome says, "what, are you wiser than your fathers ?" And they quote great names and many authorities. But Protestants do not much re

gard such arguments against Scripture and common sense. And even Papists themselves are not much moved by such fathers, or authorities, as contradict their sentiments. Mr Boyle and Mr Locke were truly great and good men. But they were not infallible. I I suppose, in some particulars, they were both mistaken. And persons, who in this point shelter themselves under their authority, would not in all points be determined by their opinions; or declare that they believe, in every particular, as those great men believed. And, if they had in this point been mistaken, or talked confusedly, it would not therefore be true, or more clear and evident, that we can believe what we cannot understand. I would, indeed, as soon be determined by their authority, as that of most men that can be named. But Amicus Socrates, amicus Plato, sed magis amica est veritas.

All this I have said upon the supposition, that Mr Boyle or Mr Locke had differed from me, and said, that we must believe things which we cannot understand.

Whereas I do not apprehend, that they have said any such thing, or differ from me upon this head. They have neither of them said more than this, viz. that we must believe some things, which we cannot adequately comprehend, or that have properties and ways of operation, for which we cannot intelligibly account, or that there are some difficulties relating to them, which we cannot solve. Now, wherein does

this differ from what I have already said, unless in the manner of expression? Have I not said, that, "Where our ideas are clear, there our faith may be clear. Where our ideas are obscure or confused, there our faith must necessarily be obscure or confused. Where our ideas are adequate, there our faith may be adequate. Where our ideas are short, or partial, there our faith must be partial, or extend only to part of a thing. But where we have no ideas at all, there we can have no faith at all?”

I have likewise freely allowed, that we may understand or believe a thing, without understanding the mode or manner, relations and circumstances of it. But, where our ideas end, there our faith must end. And can you allege anything from Mr Boyle, or Mr Locke, that contradicts this? How often has Mr Locke, in particular, intimated that it is impossible to judge of, or assent to, anything without having some idea of it? And he concludes his Chapter of Faith and Reason thus; "To this crying up of faith, in opposition to reason, we may I think in a good measure ascribe those absurdities that fill almost all the religions, which possess and divide mankind. For men, having been principled with an opinion, that they must not consult reason in the things of religion, however apparently contradictory to common sense, and the very principles of all their knowledge, have let loose their fancies and natural superstition, and have been by them led in so strange opinions, and

extravagant practices in religion, that a considerate man cannot but stand amazed at their follies, and judge them so far from being acceptable to the great and wise God, that he cannot avoid thinking them ridiculous and offensive to a sober, good man. So that in effect religion, which should most distinguish us from beasts, and ought most peculiarly to elevate us, as rational creatures, above brutes, is that wherein men often appear most irrational, and more senseless than beasts themselves. Credo, quia impossibile est, I believe, because it is impossible, might in a good man pass for a sally of zeal, but would prove a very ill rule for men to choose their opinions or religion by." From hence you plainly see, that this great and good man is on my side of the question, and has, in other words, asserted and defended what I am now contending for.

Pyrrho, with a smile, said, you will have things your own way. But let us not conclude the conversation upon this subject, till we have considered of what advantage it may be to mankind, to have this matter set in a clear light.

Theophilus was well pleased with that proposal. For he had a very great aversion to all dry and barren speculations, which may serve to amuse men, but cannot profit them.

I know, says he, some will look upon this as a dry and useless subject; but, to more judicious and considerate persons, it will appear to be a subject of vast extent and great usefulness.