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THE

INNOCENCY

OF

INVOLUNTARY ERROR

ASSERTED AND VINDICATED.

IN A LETTER TO A FRIEND.

SIR,

You expressed the other day a great deal of concern, not without some mixture of indignation, that I should assert and vindicate a position, which you thought monstrous and detestable, viz. That no heresy is so destructive of religion as a wicked life; no schism so damnable as a course of sin. I then urged some arguments to you, which you owned contained in them a shew at least of reason, and an air of probability; but yet you were apprehensive, that I might have used some art or disguise in my words, which then you could not see through so clearly; and therefore you desired me to lay my reasons together, and give you an opportunity of weighing them distinctly

by yourself. I here send them to you; expecting only and desiring a sincere love of truth, and a readiness to embrace her however negligently or inartificially dressed up; assuring you from one who knew the worth of Truth and Wisdom, that she is more precious than rubies, and all the things that thou canst desire are not to be compared to her.

To evince the truth of the assertion, first in general, let the words be only considered, and the thing will be evident. Religion consists in an habitual disposition of the mind to perform our duties from a belief in God, and a desire to make ourselves acceptable to him. Now it is plain, that a course of sin is directly contrary to such a temper; nay, it is a contradiction, to pretend to a disposition of mind to please God, and yet to act generally so as will displease him, that is, to lead a wicked life, or to live in a course of sin. Now if heresy or schism be not a contradiction to an habitual disposition of mind to please God, then I had good ground to assert and vindicate the position before laid down. By heresy is meant usually an error in fundamentals. Put the case now of any heresy, Arianism for instance, which some pretend is reviving, or Socinianism, or any other that you please. It is very possible for men to be persuaded of the truth of any one of those opinions, though it be deemed heretical, consistent with a hearty desire to perform their duties, and to please God. For where, pray, is the inconsistency? They believe in God,

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and do their duties from a sense of him, and a desire to make themselves acceptable to him; you yourself cannot deny but that they who do thus are more moral men than those who live in a course of sin. They think themselves obliged to act to the best of their knowledge, according to the rules which God has laid down; which, if one may judge by the sinner's practice, he doth not. They with diligence and industry search and endeavour to find out the will of God, and steadily keep all those laws which they understand the purport of, which a wicked liver never strives to do.

This you think may be allowed. But the Arian or Socinian pays not the honour, or the worship, which God has prescribed. And since no religion can be acceptable, which is contrary to the will of God, they that are guilty of such crimes shall suffer.

You know my opinion so well on these points, that I need not tell you, I neither vindicate nor approve of the one or the other. But yet, supposing that the Arian, or Socinian, does not pay the worship which is by God commanded, yet each of them observes the will of God to the best of his knowledge; whereas the sinner does not do this. The reputed heretic gives not so complete a worship as is supposed to be prescribed; but then he fails through mere ignorance, in a point which is attended with such difficulties as are to him insuperable; whereas the sinner fails in plain duties, and acts contrary to his knowledge. And so much at least as it is better to pay all that

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one knows, or can learn to be due to a creditor, than
to refuse what one knows to be due, so much is that
which is called heresy better than sin.

The same answer will justify the other part of the assertion of schism.

Thus much may suffice in general as to the assertion; but because I would willingly go to the bottom

of this question, and treat it with as much care as can; I will endeavour to root up the foundation

I

of

your prejudices, by representing to you the innocency

of error.

Error is the assent of the mind to a proposition as true, which is not so. If this extends no farther than the mind, it is what I call simple error. If a man proceeds upon this false bottom to regulate his practice, such error is then called a prrctical error. How far errors fall under the cognisance of man, or of a much higher tribunal, that of God, will appear from the ensuing discourse. In order to which I shall deavour to show beyond dispute, that no errors, if involuntary, are or can be punishable.

en

FIRST. In all perceptions the mind is wholly passive; and the perceptions of things being in numberless instances quite different from what things are really in themselves, unless we are capable of bringing together and comparing a great many intermediate ideas to rectify these mistakes, we must necessarily fall into abundance of errors. Try to persuade countryman that the sun is a great many times bigger

8*

a

than the earth, or that it is a great many thousand miles distant from us, and he will think you attempt only to impose upon him, and endeavour to persuade him out of his senses. In these and ten thousand such like cases, men are as necessarily under errors, as they are necessary in their perceptions, and they cannot help continuing in this sort of mistakes, for want of proper means to rectify them; and therefore in these cases they are no more to blame for not removing them, than a stone is to blame for moving when it is impelled.

SECONDLY. Error always consisting in a mistake of the judgment, it must be in its own nature involuntary; and if involuntary error be punishable, then wherever there is error there is guilt, and consequently all men must be guilty before God on that account. For where is the man that doth not entertain some errors, either concerning things which really do exist, or in deductions which he draws from them? Who is there that is so well versed in nature, as to be master of all her mazes, and certain that he knows, I say, knows all her secrets? Or who is there that ever repented or asked God's pardon for mistakes of this nature? And yet if errors be criminal, it is certain that all crimes unrepented of are damnable.

But it is allowed that a man may be mistaken in many things of this nature, without any crime or fault, But where God has concerned himself in the discovery of anything, there it is thought to be criminal to err, or to be ignorant.

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