judgment, it must direct and guide our actions as much as truth itself. Now the sway of truth is, by directing our actions according to our judgment; and if that be misinformed, or be misguided, the effect must be the same as of truth, as flowing from the same principle. Now as it is a contradiction to be fully persuaded of any point, and to repent of it at the same time, it will follow, that because the error is unknown, it therefore cannot be repented of. And who is there in ten thousand, or in a great many times that number, that doth not die in abundance of errors about one thing or other, which yet he takes to be so many real truths? Who is there that strives to make his peace with God, for such things, which he has endeavoured to free himself from, but yet continues in them, not through any fault of his own? Sin being voluntary, and our own act, we repent of it, and ask God's pardon for it. But error in judgment, when we do our endeavours sincerely to attain truth, is not an action; in that we are passive, and consequently it is not our own deed, nor imputable to us, more than other things, which we can neither prevent their happening, nor remedy after they have happened.

Every man may therefore say, what the incomparable Mr Chillingworth says, "If men suffer themselves neither to be betrayed into their errors, nor kept in them by any sin of their will; if they do their best endeavours to free themselves from all errors, and yet fail of it through human frailty; so well am I per

suaded of the goodness of God, that if in me alone should meet a confluence of all such errors of all the protestants of the world, that were thus qualified, I should not be so much afraid of them all, as I should be to ask pardon for them. For, to ask pardon for simple and purely involuntary errors, is tacitly to imply that God is angry with us for them; and that were to impute to him the tyranny of requiring brick where he gives no straw, of expecting to gather where he' strewed not, to reap where he sowed not; of being offended with us, for doing what he knows we cannot do."

For these reasons it is that I conclude, that involuntary error cannot be punishable; and such must be reckoned not only errors that have been critically examined by every particular person, but such as have been searched by the rule of common human prudence and discretion. Those must not always be reckoned voluntary, which arise from the common springs of error, though these are too often reckoned such, viz. authority, preconceived hypotheses; or even predominant passions themselves; much less are those to be reckoned guilty of voluntary errors, who want either abilities or opportunities to search after truth. Such only are voluntary as can be avoided by that care and application of mind, which the importance of the subject requires; or such as we embrace or continue in through negligence, sloth, and such like

causes.

You will not, I know, admit it for truth, without good proof, that errors, springing from the causes just now mentioned, are not criminal. I shall therefore consider them distinctly, and see if there be any sin or evil in errors so occasioned; and if there be, in what that sin consists.

First, then, that error is not always criminal, or punishable, which springs from authority. The bulk of mankind, it is certain, have not abilities or time sufficient to inquire after abstruse truths, and therefore must either have no notions at all, or must take up with the notions of others. Some are guided by, and see entirely with the eyes of such whom they judge to be their friends. Others there are who think nothing true but what is to be found among the ancients, and think it an infallible note, that Aristotle in philosophic matters, some or other of the Fathers in religious ones, have said it. Some resign their minds to the church blindly, and without examination; others take up with the current opinions, and imagine error could never spread itself so wide, and captivate such and such great persons. In short, these are all, to their respective guides, just what Sancho was to Don Quixote; they are fully persuaded of enchantments, giants, and adventures, which their masters dream of; they bring themselves into frequent difficulties to justify them; and then expect no less than islands or earldoms as the rewards of their follies.

To shew you that the errors of such are not always criminal, let it be considered, that authority is allowed

to be not only a means of information, but is a ground of persuasion too in several cases. For instance; in assenting to a divine revelation, the authority of God is a sufficient ground of our belief, because no truth is more certain, no maxim is more evident than this, that the God of truth cannot, will not, lie. His authority is grounded on his veracity, and integrity, and ability; and in depending upon him we cannot err. But then in other cases, where only men are concerned, their authority is proportionable to their veracity, integrity, and powers. If any one therefore depends upon these, he may frequently be deceived. And if he be, it is plain that the error is not for want of will to know the truth, but want of power to attain it. The canal through which it was to pass is stopped, and therefore it is impossible to get at it. There are numberless persons who cannot read, and these must necessarily depend on others for information in their religion. If these are under errors, and their errors are criminal, the crime can fall on those only from whom they receive instruction. Prudence and discretion will sometimes oblige us to depend on the authority of others, where possibly they, and consequently we, may be mistaken. To punish us for such errors, would be the same as to require us to act imprudently and indiscreetly; which a God of infinite wisdom cannot expect from us; nor will he be so rigid a taskmaster as to require brick without straw from us. Besides, were all errors criminal, which spring from authority,

it is certain that a means of information, and a ground of persuasion, would be rendered not only dangerous, but inconsistent with prudence and discretion. For it would be imprudent to hazard damnation upon crediting any body; and yet it is impossible to withhold assent, when there seems to us to be greater degrees of probability for what is said, than against it. If only some errors which spring from this fountain are criminal, then it is plain that the faultiness of them must be caused by something else besides authority, viz. from negligence or carelessness, or some such circumstance of error.

Secondly; nor is that error always criminal, which proceeds from preconceived hypotheses, or positions, which being false, are admitted for true. Such preconceptions being erroneous, it is in vain to expect anything from them but errors; and if the hypotheses are not criminal, that which flows from them directly cannot be so. He that searches after truth ought as critically as he can to examine the principles he goes upon, and must take great care that every step is fairly deduced, or else he will quickly find that it is not the light of truth, but an ignis fatuus, which he pursues. But yet how few, if any, are guarded against preconceptions. It is often nothing but inadvertency, when any one takes up with prepossessions; but then, as sure as inadvertency is very consistent with sincerity, so sure it is that a God of goodness and justice cannot punish them when joined together. Some