very unjustly, that the apostle either viewed the day of judgment as nigh at hand, or else believed, that the soul would remain insensible, until that period.

I close this lecture with a few remarks.

When we survey, or cherish these bodies, which we now possess, let us anticipate the changes, for which they are destined. They will soon be sown in dishonor. Of all portions of matter, they will be most offensive and most unpleasant to the sight. To use the language of Isaiah: the worm shall be spread under them, and worms shall cover them. Still shall these bodies, in myriads, rise immortal from the ground. They shall burst forth into new and endless existence.

While this consideration is most joyous to all the disciples of Him, who is the resurrection and the life, it is fraught with alarm and terror to the impenitent. At present, whatever pain is violent, cannot be of long duration. The human frame is soon overcome by its intensity.

But the bodies of the wicked will be raised immortal and indissoluble and thus prepared for all the sufferings, which a righteous God has reserved for them. There will then be no hopes of annihilation to allay the fears of those, who now set themselves against the moral government of the most High. Their existence and their misery will be alike interminable.

LECTURE XLVII.

ETERNITY OF FUTURE PUNISHMENT.

It is my design, in submission to divine Providence, to deliver, during the present term, a few lectures on the duration of future punishment.

In our inquiries, whether this duration be temporary or endless, few persons, accustomed to contemplate the subject, will deny, that the Scriptures are the chief source, from which arguments are to be obtained. The reason is obvious. By the light of nature we are left in great uncertainty, as to the general doctrine of a future state. Without revealed religion, it could never be placed beyond reasonable doubt, that the soul of man survives the body. I do not deny the plausibility, and the real value of those arguments independent of revelation, which have been brought in favor of this doctrine. I do not question their sufficiency to render the doctrine in a good degree probable, and clearly to show, that the contrary is not certain. But, to render a doctrine probable, is one thing, and clearly to prove it is another. Now, if the future existence of the soul cannot be clearly proved without revelation, much less can its eternal existence. If eternal existence could be proved, it would not hence follow, that there will be any happiness; as all claims to this are forfeited by sin. But were the future existence of happiness ascertained, the terms, on which it might be secured, would still be unknown. While all these questions remain unanswered without supernatural instruction, it can hardly be imagined, that the light of nature will enable us to ascertain, either the degree, or duration of future punishment. Nothing, therefore, can be more absurd, than to discard the Scriptures, with a

view to support the doctrine of universal salvation. If that doctrine be not found in the Bible, it is found no where. Many inquiries of extreme importance and difficulty must be settled by the unbeliever in revelation, before he comes to the question of eternal, and universal happiness.

I would further observe, that the subject in hand is far too important and solemn to be treated with declamation, instead of argument. If the doctrine of endless punishment be evidently false, as those, who declaim against it, would have us believe, to prove its falsity by argument can surely require no great labor. When this is done, declamation will be more in season.

An additional remark is this,-should the doctrine of eternal punishment appear supported by Scripture, it will, by no means, be a sufficient reason for rejecting it, that the idea, which it suggests, is gloomy; or that we may not be able to see the good purposes, which it will accomplish under the divine government. I readily grant, that the thought of endless existence in misery is terrific and overwhelming. But it must be remembered, that many events in the present state, the existence of which cannot be denied, are extremely different from the ideas, which human creatures would have previously formed. To our limited understanding it would appear, that from a system, produced by an infinitely powerful, and benevolent God, all natural and moral evil ought to have been excluded. Yet the lives of some individuals appear to be an unbroken series of disappointment, disaster, and suffering. Cities are sometimes desolated by pestilence, ingulfed by an earthquake, or overwhelmed by inundation. Wars have, within a few years, laid waste the fairest countries of Europe. Collect in your imagination all the evil, which has resulted to the human race, in the different ages and nations of the world, from poverty, sickness, wounds, fear, anger, despair, malice, and revenge; from more general calamities, such as tyranny, anarchy, famines, contagious diseases, and national feuds; you perceive at once what an immense mass of wretchedness might thus be formed. No person, I think, will hesitate to grant, that authentic history presents to the mind, a

vast variety of gloomy ideas; and that the actual state of the world is, and ever has been extremely different from what might have been anticipated, considering the character of its author. But notwithstanding this, no theist imagines, that there is, in truth, any inconsistency between the present seemingly disjointed state of things, and the natural and moral perfections of God. No one doubts, that in some way or other, the permission of moral, and the positive infliction of natural evil, is reconcilable with perfect wisdom, benevolence, and power; and, by consequence, that the only reason, why these things appear to us inconsistent with supreme benevolence and wisdom, is our ignorance of the divine system of government, and our inability to see the connexion between its various parts.

Few, it is believed, deny the endless duration of future punishment from finding any deficiency of Scripture evidence on the subject. Allowing, that there is, independently of revelation, no improbability in the doctrine, few persons, I should imagine none, would deny, that the Scriptures teach it. But if there is previously a rational, and strong presumption against it, it must also, doubtless, be presumed, that those passages which have been thought to establish the doctrine, have been incorrectly explained.

On this supposition, two things would demand consideration; 1. The clearness, and force of those passages. As the Scriptures were given by inspiration of God, they must be true in the sense, in which they were spoken. And if the sense, in which they have been understood, be so clear, as to admit no reasonable doubt, the previous presumption vanishes before it. This world is in a state, it has been observed, in various respects, different from what might have been anticipated. Previously to its creation, there would have been, to creatures of our limited powers, a very strong presumption against the existence of natural and moral evil, especially in that enormous degree, in which we find them actually existing. But since disorder and sufferings do exist in the world, all previous presumption, however strong, goes for nothing. Now let it be sup

posed, that at a time before creation began, Deity gave to some beings, whose capacities were no greater than ours, a revelation, containing some account of the world, soon to be made. In this revelation would of course be foretold the vices and the sufferings of men. If the language, describing these evils, were explicit and forcible, and could have no other meaning, consistently with the general tenor of the revelation, and the meaning of terms, as there used, such declarations ought, by all means, to prevail against a previous presumption.

2. When we speak of presumptions either for or against an opinion, it is important to inquire, whether we have so much knowledge of the subject, as to be judges, on which side probability lies. To a child it might appear extremely improbable that a human magistrate would sentence any one to prison, to the post, or the gallows. Yet a better knowledge of the subject would lead him to perceive, that such punishment might be not only consistent with benevolence, but the result of it. And it will readily occur to every considerate person, that the inability of a child to judge of the measures of a civil magistrate is incomparably less, than the inability of men to judge of the proceedings of God.

With a view to disprove the doctrine of eternal punishment, it is common to make appeals to parental feelings. As these would be extremely injured by the idea of perpetual punishment inflicted on a child, it is argued, that such punishment must be averse to the nature of that Being, whose benevolence is far superior to that of men.

Whether this kind of reasoning can be relied on, will appear by applying it to certain facts. It is, for instance, inconsistent with paternal tenderness, to imprison a child for life, or sentence him to be executed. Yet the doing of either of these, under particular circumstances, argues no want of correct feelings in a magistrate. All men would unite in allowing, that no man could be fit for a magistrate, who should refuse to punish the assassin or highway robber. A prince should doubtless be the father of his people; but to support this character,