Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory

Couverture
OUP Oxford, 6 août 2009 - 340 pages
Some mental events are conscious, some are unconscious. What is the difference between the two? Uriah Kriegel offers the following answer: whatever else they may represent, conscious mental states always represent themselves (whereas unconscious ones do not, at least not in the right way). The book develops this 'self-representational' approach to consciousness along several dimensions - including phenomenological, ontological, and scientific - and defends it from common and uncommon criticisms.
 

Table des matières

1 The SelfRepresentational Theory of Consciousness
1
2 Conceptual Preliminaries
23
3 A Representational Account of Qualitative Character
59
4 A SelfRepresentational Account of Subjective Character
101
5 SelfRepresentationalism and the Phenomenology of Consciousness
166
6 SelfRepresentationalism and the Ontology of Consciousness
200
7 SelfRepresentationalism and the Science of Consciousness
233
8 SelfRepresentationalism and the Reduction of Consciousness
266
Phenomenal Consciousness and Subjective Consciousness
300
References
315
Index
331
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À propos de l'auteur (2009)

Uriah Kriegel is Professor of Philosophy and Cognitive Science, and Associate Director of the Center for Consciousness Studies, at the University of Arizona. He has published numerous articles on the nature of consciousness and related topics.

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