Bradshaw to clear the hill, and this they did in most gallant style, losing one Yao killed and one Sikh wounded. Lieutenant CoapeSmith pushed on, and advanced obliquely up the hill, in order to cover the main body, and had to fight his way from boulder to boulder.

Being shortly afterwards attacked from our right flank, I dispatched Sergeant-Major Devoy, with eighteen rifles, across the stream below us on our right, with orders to clear a low hill on the far side of it. This he did in capital style, with no losses, although the fire was heavy and the enemy numerous. Major Bradshaw had in the meanwhile, on arrival at the top of the hill, left a picket there, and had then descended the far side of the hill, while Lieutenant Smith had followed the ridge that trended to the left, keeping up a brisk fire on the retreating enemy.

After proceeding about 2 miles from camp, we crossed a good stream and reached a hillock, which the enemy evacuated on seeing the approach of Lieutenant G. de H. Smith above them on their right, and Sergeant-Major Devoy on their left.

This hill had a hollow in the centre, with great boulders surrounding it, which thereby afforded excellent cover from the surrounding heights. I determined to bring up the camp here, as this hillock was at the base of the last steep ascent to Mangoche, and this ascent was very strongly held by the enemy, so to assault it I should require all our available forces and the 7-pr.

I accordingly left Major Bradshaw in charge of the hillock, and halted Lieutenant G. de H. Smith in the position he had captured, and sent Mr. Gordon-Cumming with his Yaos to relieve SergeantMajor Devoy and his gunners whose ammunition was all expended, and with twenty rifles proceeded to bring up the remainder of the men and the porters.

This was accomplished without mishap. In the meanwhile Lieutenant G. de H. Smith's party had been subjected to a very heavy fire from the enemy above him, several of whom had rifles, and Havildar Major Nihal Singh had been mortally wounded, and two Sepoys and one Atonga wounded severely. So he sent down asking for doolies and reinforcements to be sent him by Lance Naick Purtap Singh, who ran the gauntlet of a heavy fire all the way into camp. I therefore determined to withdraw this force, and sent Lieutenant Coape-Smith with a party of men up with doolies to his assistance. Lieutenant Coape-Smith managed in a most skilful manner, by taking advantage of the ground, to ascend a ravine and get in rear of the force that was attacking Lieutenant Smith. Immediately he arrived on the scene Lieutenant Smith advanced, and the enemy, being between two fires, fled with heavy loss. The two parties then returned to camp. As the enemy kept up a steady

fire on our position during the latter part of the afternoon and wounded one Atonga, I determined to shell the hill up above where most of the enemy seemed to be collected. Sergeant-Major Devoy, with the 7-pr. mountain-gun and 9-pr. war-rockets, made some excellent practice, and after that the fire slackened.

Having arranged to attack the hill at daybreak the following morning, I divided my force into three parties.

Captain Cavendish, with sixty Atonga, was to proceed up a spur on the right, Lieutenant Coape-Smith, with sixty rifles, including twenty-five Sikhs, was to proceed up the spur on the left where Lieutenant G. de H. Smith had been, and the main body under myself, divided into two parties under Lieutenant G. de H. Smith and Major Bradshaw, with reserve under Mr. Gordon-Cumming with gun detachment and hospital. The porters were to remain in camp under Her Majesty's Commisssioner and Mr. J. F. Cunningham. No firing took place during the night.

At 4:45 on the 28th October Lieutenant Coape-Smith left camp, followed at 5 A.M. by Captain Cavendish, and at 5-20 a.м. I started with the main body.

Having ascended some way, Major Bradshaw came into contact with the enemy, but pushed on rapidly, driving them before him.

We heard a lot of firing on our right. It appears that Captain Cavendish's party came across a picket of the enemy, which they surprised, and were thus able to get right amongst the enemy, whom they put to flight and drove right over the crest of the hill without any loss to themselves, although the enemy lost heavily.

Lieutenant Coape-Smith met with but little opposition. It seemed as if the enemy had withdrawn most of their forces who had been present on the hill the day before. Having cleared the crest of the plateau of Mangoche, we all met on the far side and found. that Zarafi's town was still 8 miles distant.

I sent Major Bradshaw with fifty men along the crest of Mangoche Mountain, supported by Lieutenant Coape Smith's party. I took the centre, and sent off Captain Cavendish down by the road in the plains to the right.

After proceeding 2 miles or so we cleared the crest of a ridge and saw Zara fi's town below us in the distance. It was full of men, who were taking up positions behind boulders on the outskirts of the town, while women and children, with loads on their heads, were streaming away towards the north-east. At the next spur we noticed that the men had evacuated their town, which we entered without opposition about noon. Her Majesty's Commissioner arrived about 1 P.M. with the porters and baggage guard. They had had some shots fired at them by isolated parties of men. The 29th was employed in following up our success by sending

out parties in all directions, burning the other towns of the enemy.

On the 30th October Lieutenant Hamilton arrived with sixty men from Captain Stewart, so I sent off Sergeant-Major Bandawe with 200 native troops in pursuit of Zarafi, who, it was reported, had retreated towards Lake Chinta.

The following morning, the 31st October, I left Mangoche for Lisiete Hill, about 30 miles from Mangoche, to attack Chindamba (Makandanji), who was the father-in-law of Zarafi, and had assisted him in his fight with us. It was reported that a great number of Zarafi's people had retreated there under Kadawire, Zarafi's son, the column consisting of six officers and 193 rifles and a 7-pr.

After descending Mangoche the road led us along a high plateau covered with thick forest devoid of water, until we reached a small stream after seven hours' marching. We met water again after marching 25 miles. As we were then quite close to Lisiete Hill J halted the column and went with Lieutenant G. de H. Smith and four men to reconnoitre. We proceeded on and on without meeting any signs of cultivation or villages until we reached the base of the hill, where we saw open fields. The guide told us that Chidamba's towns were on the hill behind the spur we were then on. was getting dark, I returned, reaching camp at 8 P.M.

So, as it

We broke up camp at 2 A.M., and reached the base of the hill at 4 A.M. I had already detached Captain Cavendish with forty rifles to hold the road to Makanjira, as I was informed by the guides that would be the road by which the enemy would flee. The advance up the hill was very slow, as we momentarily expected to come upon the villages round each spur and rise, and again the hill was very steep in places (over 45 degrees). We reached the top of the hill, some 2,300 feet above the top of the plateau, at 6 A.M., and a sentry of the enemy was surprised and shot, but not before he had sufficient time to give the alarm. The ground over the other side of the hill was a gentle slope covered with villages. By noon we had taken all the villages and also destroyed them. Captain Cavendish had managed to intercept and release a number of fugitive slaves. Having, halted for two hours, we retraced our steps and halted for the night at 9:30 P.M., after a 35-mile march, by the side of a good

stream.

We reached Mangoche at 12:30 P.M. on the 2nd November.

Sergeant-Major Bandawe's party arrived at Mangoche shortly after the Chindamba expedition returned. He had not been able to overtake Zarafi, who, with a few men, had fled for Mtereka's on the Lujenda River in Portuguese territory.

Our casualties in the Zarafi expedition were :

1 Sikh mortally wounded (died same day).

1 Sikh severely wounded.

1 Sikh wounded.

1 Yao killed.

5 Atonga wounded.

9 killed and wounded.

The enemy lost about sixty men killed, but many more must have been wounded, only the Yaos always carry their wounded off the field, therefore it is impossible to estimate the losses of the enemy accurately.

On the 29th October Major Bradshaw, when on the top of Mangoche Mountain with his men, found the 7-pr. mountain-gun which had been captured by Zarafi in 1892 hidden away in the jungle, covered over with leaves, &c. It was in excellent order.

Leaving Captain Cavendish behind at Mangoche, with forty rifles, to build a fort there and to quiet the country, the remainder of the force left Mangoche on the 3rd November for Fort Johnston, arriving at the latter place the same evening at 7 P.M., after a march of 27 miles. On arrival there I found that Captain Stewart had received news that Major F. Trollope (a volunteer officer), with some twenty-seven Atonga irregulars and his own boys, had managed to intercept about 500 of Zarafi's people who were trying to cross the Shiré at Mvera, and had disarmed all the men, and that he was expecting another lot of 600 fugitives down, and requesting that assistance might be sent him. Accordingly Captain Stewart, with twenty-two rifles, had started for Mvera in the gun-boat Dove, with Cominander Cullen, R.N.R.

On the 4th November we halted at Fort Johnston. Her Majesty's Commissioner informed me that it would be necessary to attack Mponda at once and to drive him out of Mauni, and to capture him and his slave raiding Chiefs, Chingara, Kasanka, Liganga, &c. I therefore determined to cross the River Shiré as soon as it was dark, at the bar, and march straight on to Mauni. I divided my force into three columns:

The main body, under my command, consisting of—

With 1-7-pr. and 25 gunners under Sergeant-Major Devoy.

The right column, under Lieutenant-Commander Rhoades, consisting of

The left column, under Mr. Gordon-Cumming, consisting of

Officer
Rifles

1

94

The main body was to march straight on Mauni and attack it, while the columns on the right and left were to circle round and to intercept fugitives, or to make flank attacks if the main body was hard pressed.

We left Fort Johnston on the 5th November at 6:30 P.M., and reached the bar about 8 P.M. It took us nearly one and a-half hours crossing the river, although it was very shallow. We then marched on, and reached Mauni without opposition about 7 A.M. on the 6th November. The place was deserted just before our arrival. I immediately sent out parties in all directions, and a great number of slaves were found hiding in the neighbourhood. Mr. GordonCumming and Lieutenant-Commander Rhoades also brought in several, together with some Headmen and sub-Chiefs captured. We captured a number of guns, gunpowder (200 lb.), goats, and cattle.

On the 7th instant I sent off a party of men under Lieutenants Hamilton, G. de H. Smith, and Mr. Gordon Cumming, with 158 rifles, to attack Liganga's and Zimba's villages, on the lake shore, and then to proceed against Kasanka's and Kampande's villages, near Livingstonia.

I returned to Fort Johnston on the 10th November, having burnt all the villages on the top and at the base of Mauni.

Immediately on my arrival at Fort Johnston I dispatched a party of men (fifty rities) to arrest Chingara and Namputa.

The following day Lieutenant Hamilton arrived with his force. He had succeeded in surprising Zimba's and Liganga's villages, and making prisoners Liganga, Nkwechi, and Ndula, besides several other men, all of whom were conveyed to Fort Johnston for trial. He also sent and brought in a great number of women and children, many of whom were subsequently found to be slaves who had been raided or purchased quite recently. He had also dispatched a party of Makua to Kasanka to burn his village. This they did not do, but they managed to arrest and convey to Fort Johnston Kasauka. Chingara and Namputa were also brought into Fort Johnston on the 12th, having been arrested by the party of men. I sent for them.