Peck et al. e. Jenness et al. tain and judge of that plea as of any other. It had full and complete jurisdiction over the parties and the subject-matter of the suit; and its jurisdiction had attached more than a month before any act of bankruptcy was committed. It was an independent tribunal, not deriving its authority from the same sovereign, and, as regards the District Court, a foreign forum, in every way its equal. The District Court had no supervisory power over it. The acts of Congress point out but one mode by which the judgments of State Courts can be revised or annulled, and that is by this court, under the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act. In certain cases, where one of the parties is a citizen of another State, he has the privilege of removing his suit to the courts of the United States. But in all other respects, they are to be regarded as equal and independent tribunals. It is a doctrine of law too long, established to require a citation of authorities, that, where a court has jurisdiction, it has a right to decide every question which occurs in the cause, and whether its decision be correct or otherwise, its judgment, till reversed, is regarded as binding in every [*625 other court; and that, where the jurisdiction of a court, and the right of a plaintiff to prosecute his suit in it, have once attached, that right cannot be arrested or taken away by proceedings in another court. These rules have their foundation, not merely in comity, but on necessity. For if one may enjoin, the other may retort by injunction, and thus the parties be without remedy; being liable to a process for contempt in one, if they dare to proceed in the other. Neither can one take property from the custody of the other by replevin or any other process, for this would produce a conflict extremely embarrassing to the administration of justice.2 In the case of Kennedy v. The Earl of Cassilis, Lord Eldon at one time granted an injunction to restrain a party from proceeding in a suit pending in the Court of Sessions of Scotland, which, on more mature reflection, he dissolved; because it was admitted, if the Court of Chancery could in that way restrain proceedings in an independent foreign tribunal, the Court of Sessions might equally enjoin the parties from proceeding in chancery, and thus they would be unable to proceed in either court. The fact, therefore, that an injunction issues only to the 1 APPLIED. Andrews v. Smith, 19 Blatchf., 104. FOLLOWED. Stout v. Lye, 13 Otto, 68. LIMITED. Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall., 716. QUOTED. Orton v. Smith, 18 How., 266; Randall v. Howard, 2 Black, 589; Amador Canal &c. Co. v. Mitchell, 59 Cal., 178. CITED. Hammock v. Loan and Trust Co., 15 Otto, 82. 2 APPROVED. Freeman v. Howe, 24 How., 457. QUOTED. Taylor v. Car ryl, 20 How., 596. Peck et al v. Jenness et al. parties before the court, and not to the court, is no evasion of the difficulties that are the necessary result of an attempt to exercise that power over a party who is a litigant in another and independent forum. The act of Congress of the 2d of March, 1793, ch. 66, § 5, declares that a writ of injunction shall not be granted "to stay proceedings in any court of a State." In the case of Diggs v. Wolcott, 4 Cranch, 119, the decree of the Circuit Court had enjoined the defendant from proceeding in a suit pending in a State court, and this court reversed the decree, because it had no jurisdiction to enjoin proceedings in a State court.3 It follows, therefore, that the District Court had no supervisory power over the State court, either by injunction or the more summary method pursued in this case, unless it has been conferred by the bankrupt act. But we cannot discover any provision in that act which limits the jurisdiction of the State courts, or confers any power on the bankrupt court to supersede their jurisdiction, to annul or anticipate their judgments, or wrest property from the custody of their officers. On the contrary, it provides that "all suits in law and equity then pending, in which such bankrupt is a party, may be prosecuted and defended by such assignee to its final conclusion, in the same way and with the same effect as they might have been by such bankrupt." Instead of drawing the decision of the case into the District *Court, the act sends the assignee in bankruptcy *626] to the State court where the suit is pending, and admits its power to decide the cause. It confers no authority on the District court to restrain proceedings therein by injunction on any other process, much less to take property out of its custody or possession with a strong hand. An attempt to enforce the decree set forth in the rejoinder would probably have been met with resistance, and resulted in a collision of jurisdictions much to be deprecated. In fine, we can find no precedent for the proceeding set forth in this plea, and no grant of power to make such decree or to execute it, either in direct terms or by necessary implication, from any provisions of the bankrupt act; and we are not at liberty to interpolate it on any supposed grounds of policy or expediency. The plea cannot, therefore, be sustained, and the judgment of the Superior Court of New Hampshire must be affirmed. 3 FOLLOWED. Watson v. Jones, 31 Wall., 719. CITED. Dial v. Reysnold, 6 Otto, 341. Colby v. Ledden. ORDER. This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record of the Superior Court of Judicature of the State of New Hampshire, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is now here ordered and adjudged by this court, that the judgment of the said Superior Court of Judicature be and the same is hereby affirmed, with costs and damages at the rate of six per centum per annum. ABRAHAM COLBY, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR, v. JAMES LEDDEN. The decision of this court in the preceding case of Peck v. Jenness affirmed. THIS, like the preceding case of Peck v. Jenness, was brought up from the Superior Court of Judicature of the State of New Hampshire, by a writ of error issued under the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act. Ledden was an inhabitant of the Province of New Brunswick, and Colby of the State of New Hampshire. The attachment was issued in 1837. The case was similar, in its principal circumstances, to that of Peck v. Jenness, and was argued together with it. C. B. Goodrich, for the defendant in error. passage of [*627 As to the principal question, I rely upon the argument *submitted in the case of Peck v. Jenness. The attachment in this case was made before the the bankrupt statute. It cannot with much reason be said, that the right which the defendant below acquired by his attachment, legal when made, can be taken from him by subsequent legislation. Every objection, however, can be made in this case, which can be taken in relation to any attachment. The debt is discharged here, to the same extent as any other debt. As to the objections, that the statute requisites have not been complied with which are essential to constitute an attachment, I submit that the State court is the exclusive judge in this particular, and that its judgment is not open to review is this court. Mr. Justice GRIER delivered the opinion of the court. This case was argued with the case of Philip Peck et al v. Shawhan et al. v. Wherritt. John S. Jenness et al., and the record presents the same questions which have just been decided in that case. For the reasons there assigned, the judgment of the Superior Court of New Hampshire is affirmed. ORDER. This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record to the Superior Court of Judicature of the State of New Hampshire, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is now here ordered and adjudged by this court, that the judgment of the said Superior Court of Judicature in this cause be and the same is hereby affirmed, with costs and damages at the rate of six per centum per annum. JOHN L. SHAWHAN, DANIEL SHAWHAN, GEORGE H. PERRIN, BENJAMIN BERRY, CATHARINE SNODGRASS, AND ISAAC MILLER, APPELLANTS, v. PERRY WHERRITT, AsSIGNEE OF THE BANKRUPT ESTATE OF BENJAMIN BRAN DON. A decree of the District Court of the United States, sitting in bankruptcy, whereby a person proceeded against, in invitum, was declared to be a bankrupt, is sufficient evidence, as against those who were not parties to the proceeding, to show that there was a debt due to the petitioning creditor; that the bankrupt was a merchant or trader within the meaning of the act; and that he had committed an act of bankruptcy. The first section of the bankrupt act declares that the making of any fraudulent conveyance, assignment, sale, gift, or other transfer of lands, tenements, goods, or chattels, is the commission of an act of bankruptcy. No creditor can, by instituting proceedings in a State court, after the commission of an act of bankruptcy by his debtor, obtain a valid lien upon *628] the property conveyed by such fraudulent deed, if he has notice of the commission of an act of bankruptcy by the debtor. It passes to the assignee of the bankrupt for the benefit of all the creditors.2 A lien thus acquired is not saved by the proviso of the second section of the bankrupt law. That proviso does not protect liens which are inconsistent with the second and fifth sections of the act, and these sections declare such a lien to be void. THIS was an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Kentucky. On the 6th of April, 1842, Benjamin Brandon executed the following deed: 1 APPLIED. Boyd v. 306. DISTINGUISHED. 11 Bank. Reg., 333. Olvey, 82 Ind., 2 CITED. Buchanan v. Smith, 16 Wall., 307; Michaels v. Post, 21 Id., 428. Shawhan et al. v. Wherritt. "This indenture, made and entered into this 6th day of April, 1842, between Benjamin Brandon, of Harrison county and State of Kentucky, of the one part, and William A. Withers, of the county and State aforesaid, of the other part, witnesseth That the said Benjamin Brandon, for and in consideration of one dollar, to him in hand paid, and for the further consideration hereinafter mentioned, hath given, granted, bargained, sold, released, conveyed, and confirmed, and by these presents do give, grant, bargain, sell, release, convey, and confirm unto the said William A Withers, his successor or successors, for ever, all the estate, real, personal, and mixed, of whatever nature or kind it may consist, (except such property only as by law not subject to execution,) said estate hereby conveyed consisting of a tract of about 336 acres of land, situated in the State and county aforesaid, and the same tract on which said Brandon now resides, and on which is a steammill and distillery, the boundary of which land is more particularly designated in the several deeds which said Brandon holds for said land; also, five negroes, two wagons and teams, about 400 head of hogs, about 15,000 pieces of cooper's stuff, all his stock of horses, cattle, and sheep, his household and kitchen furniture and farming utensils, his debts and choses in action, of every kind and description; it being the intention of said Brandon, by this deed, to convey to the said Withers and his successors, for ever, all his estate, real, personal, and mixed, and choses in action, with the exceptions hereinbefore expressed, whether the same be particularly mentioned and set forth in this instrument or not. To have and to hold all the estate, real, personal, and mixed, and choses in action, hereby conveyed to the said William A. Withers and his successor or successors, for ever, in trust, for the following purposes, namely:-To collect the debts and choses in action due, payable, or owing to said Brandon, and to sell the real estate hereby conveyed, either all together or in lots, as said trustee may think most advisable, at public auction, to the highest bidder, on the *following payments namely, one third of the purchase-money to be [*629 paid in hand, and the residue in one and two years; and the slaves and personal estate to be sold at public auction to the highest bidder, on a credit of twelve months; and after making to said trustee a just and reasonable compensation for his trouble and expenses in executing this trust, to pay all the money which he may receive as trustee aforesaid, either by the collection of debts or choses in action, from the proceeds of the sale of the trust estate, to all the creditors of said Brandon, ratably, proportionably to the amount of their respective |