The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field ManualUniversity of Chicago Press, 15 sept. 2008 - 472 pages When the U.S. military invaded Iraq, it lacked a common understanding of the problems inherent in counterinsurgency campaigns. It had neither studied them, nor developed doctrine and tactics to deal with them. It is fair to say that in 2003, most Army officers knew more about the U.S. Civil War than they did about counterinsurgency. The U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual was written to fill that void. The result of unprecedented collaboration among top U.S. military experts, scholars, and practitioners in the field, the manual espouses an approach to combat that emphasizes constant adaptation and learning, the importance of decentralized decision-making, the need to understand local politics and customs, and the key role of intelligence in winning the support of the population. The manual also emphasizes the paradoxical and often counterintuitive nature of counterinsurgency operations: sometimes the more you protect your forces, the less secure you are; sometimes the more force you use, the less effective it is; sometimes doing nothing is the best reaction. An new introduction by Sarah Sewall, director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, places the manual in critical and historical perspective, explaining the significance and potential impact of this revolutionary challenge to conventional U.S. military doctrine. An attempt by our military to redefine itself in the aftermath of 9/11 and the new world of international terrorism, The U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual will play a vital role in American military campaigns for years to come. The University of Chicago Press will donate a portion of the proceeds from this book to the Fisher House Foundation, a private-public partnership that supports the families of America’s injured servicemen. To learn more about the Fisher House Foundation, visit www.fisherhouse.org. |
À l'intérieur du livre
Résultats 1-5 sur 52
Page xi
... Iraq 228 Developing a Police Force in Malaya 234 Defusing a Confrontation 241 Patience, Presence, and Courage 243 Lose Moral Legitimacy, Lose the War 252 What is Different: Insurgent Perceptions of Military Logistics 256 Vietnam ...
... Iraq 228 Developing a Police Force in Malaya 234 Defusing a Confrontation 241 Patience, Presence, and Courage 243 Lose Moral Legitimacy, Lose the War 252 What is Different: Insurgent Perceptions of Military Logistics 256 Vietnam ...
Page xiii
... Iraq in the late summer of 2003, the Army was unprepared to fight it. The American Army of 2003 was organized, designed, trained, and equipped to defeat another conventional army; indeed, it had no peer in that arena. It was, however ...
... Iraq in the late summer of 2003, the Army was unprepared to fight it. The American Army of 2003 was organized, designed, trained, and equipped to defeat another conventional army; indeed, it had no peer in that arena. It was, however ...
Page xiv
... Iraq, “We put an Army on the battlefield that I had been a part of for 37 years. It doesn't have any doctrine, nor was it educated and trained, to deal with an insurgency ... After the Vietnam War, we purged ourselves of everything that ...
... Iraq, “We put an Army on the battlefield that I had been a part of for 37 years. It doesn't have any doctrine, nor was it educated and trained, to deal with an insurgency ... After the Vietnam War, we purged ourselves of everything that ...
Page xv
... Iraq developed, the Army hurriedly set out to remedy the situation. The Doctrine Division of the Combined Arms Center (CAC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, produced an interim Counterinsurgency Field Manual on October 1, 2004, designated ...
... Iraq developed, the Army hurriedly set out to remedy the situation. The Doctrine Division of the Combined Arms Center (CAC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, produced an interim Counterinsurgency Field Manual on October 1, 2004, designated ...
Page xvi
... Iraq. He took advantage of an Information Operations conference at Fort Leavenworth in December 2005 to pull together the core writing team and outline both the manual as a whole and the principles, imperatives, and paradoxes of ...
... Iraq. He took advantage of an Information Operations conference at Fort Leavenworth in December 2005 to pull together the core writing team and outline both the manual as a whole and the principles, imperatives, and paradoxes of ...
Table des matières
xiii | |
xxi | |
xlv | |
xlvii | |
xlix | |
li | |
Chapter 1 Insurgency and Counterinsurgency | 1 |
Integrating Civilian and Military Activities | 53 |
Chapter 8 Sustainment | 255 |
Appendix A A Guide for Action | 287 |
Appendix B Social Network Analysis and Other Analytical Tools | 305 |
Appendix C Linguist Support | 335 |
Appendix D Legal Considerations | 347 |
Appendix E Airpower in Counterinsurgency | 363 |
Source Notes | 373 |
Glossary | 379 |
Chapter 3 Intelligence in Counterinsurgency | 79 |
Chapter 4 Designing Counterinsurgency Campaigns and Operations | 137 |
Chapter 5 Executing Counterinsurgency Operations | 151 |
Chapter 6 Developing HostNation Security Forces | 199 |
Chapter 7 Leadership and Ethics for Counterinsurgency | 237 |
Annotated Bibliography | 391 |
Military References | 397 |
Index | 401 |
Autres éditions - Tout afficher
The U. S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual Department of the Army Aucun aperçu disponible - 2015 |
The U. S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual David H. Petraeus,James F. Amos,John C. McClure Aucun aperçu disponible - 2015 |
The U. S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual Department of the Army Aucun aperçu disponible - 2015 |
Expressions et termes fréquents
achieve actions activities agencies analysis approach Army assessment capabilities civil civilian COIN efforts COIN environment COIN force COIN operations commanders conduct contractors conventional coordination counterinsurgents cultural David Galula defense Detainee Treatment Act detainees doctrine economic effective enemy ensure equipment essential services establish ethnic example field manual gents GEOINT government’s groups HN forces HN government HN security forces host nation host-nation government HUMINT identify important improvised explosive devices insurgents intelligence interagency internal internally displaced person interpreters Iraq Iraqi leaders legitimacy LLOs logistic logisticians Marine Corps ment METT-TC military forces mission multinational officers operational environment organizations personnel planning police political populace popular support population programs requires role rules of engagement SIGINT situation social Soldiers and Marines strategic success surgents tactics Tal Afar target tasks teams tion U.S. Army U.S. forces U.S. Government U.S. military understanding units