centuries alliances were formed to oppose the aggressive designs of Louis XIV and Louis XV; .and thus, as we must now proceed to note in detail, after 1792 coalitions were constituted to ward off the domination of the Continent by Revolutionary and Napoleonic France. I. THE FIRST COALITION AGAINST FRANCE, 1792-3 The French Revolution, which broke out in 1789, seemed at first to be purely a matter pertaining to the domestic affairs of the French people. It was regarded with interest by other peoples-with general disapproval by the Governments, with widespread sympathy by the masses-but without any anticipation that they them-· selves would be drawn into its vortex. Gradually, however, it was elevated and enlarged into a catastrophe of world-wide importance, partly by the universal significance of the principles which it embodied, and of the appeal which it made to all autocratically governed peoples, but mainly by reason of the incompetence with which it was handled by the Government of Louis XVI, and because of the efforts made by the French antagonists of the Revolution to secure external aid in its suppression. The French Revolutionists themselves, in fact, laid the foundation of the First Coalition against their Government when on April 20, 1792, the Girondist ministers compelled the reluctant Louis XVI to declare war upon his nephew, the King of Hungary and Bohemia. They had ground for resentment, it is true, in the Emperor's unconcealed hatred of and contempt for their régime, and in his known desire to send help to his sister Marie-Antoinette; but they were rendered eager for war rather by the revolutionary outbreak in the Austrian Netherlands. It was no more than natural that the revolutionary government of France should be eager to go to the assistance of a neighbouring people struggling to be free. Austria was already in alliance with Prussia by the Treaty of Berlin (February 7, 1792); and this alliance was renewed on July 25. But Frederick William II, though detesting the Revolution, was a half-hearted ally, his interest being concentrated upon the eastern border of his dominions, where Catherine of Russia was contemplating the second partition of Poland. Russia, it is true, might be regarded as a member of the Coalition. She signed a defensive alliance with Austria on July 12; and Catherine II vigorously denounced the revolutionary proceedings in France. Russia, however, took no action, and was known to be ready to seize the moment when Prussia and Austria should be involved on their western frontiers to pursue her own aims in Poland. It was this ambiguous attitude of Russia that rendered the actions of the Coalition so feeble and half-hearted. Sardinia entered the Coalition on July 25; and France declared war on her on September 10. Turin was a centre of émigré intrigue against the Girondist Government, and the territory of Savoy was coveted by Frenchmen in order to give them their natural frontier of the Alps. The opening phases of the struggle were fatal to the French monarchy. Louis XVI was deposed in August 1792 and executed in January 1793. A republican Government under a national Convention was established. This Government speedily enlarged the circle of its foes. On February 1, 1793, it declared war on Great Britain and on the Dutch Netherlands; these Powers had refused to recognize the new régime and had protested against the Republic's repudiation of treaties relating to the navigation of the Scheldt. On March 7, 1793, Spain, as a Bourbon monarchy, became involved in the conflict. The Empire, which, even after the fall of Mainz, was not formally at war with France, decreed a levy of 120,000 men on November 25, 1792; but the formal declaration of war was not ratified till April 30, 1793. Soon afterwards Portugal, Naples, Tuscany, and the Papal States came in. The First Coalition was complete. All Europe, with the exception of Sweden, Denmark, Switzerland, Venice, Genoa, and Turkey, was now arrayed against France. This First Coalition was, however, a very loose and imperfect form of union. It lacked cohesion and central control. The Governments who entered into it were generally weak and unpopular; the peoples of Europe as a whole rather sympathized with the emancipated French nation, which was struggling to realize and reorganize itself. Hence the Coalition, formidable in appearance, was in operation feeble. Under the blows of misfortune, freely administered in 1794, it began to crumble, and in 1795 it had virtually ceased to exist. First the Dutch Netherlands were overrun by the French armies and placed under French administration; secondly, Prussia, jealous of Austria, and with her treasury exhausted and her people tired of the war, made a separate peace with France by the Treaty of Basel on April 5, 1795; thirdly, Spain, alarmed at the growing naval and colonial power of Britain, came to terms with the Republic in July 1795. Tuscany had already made peace in February. In the autumn of that year only Britain, Austria, and Sardinia were maintaining any sort of resis tance to the victorious Revolutionaries. Early in 1796, as the result of an overwhelming attack by Napoleon Bonaparte, Sardinia was compelled to buy peace by the formal cession of Savoy and Nice (May 15, 1796), and on October 11 a treaty was signed between France and Naples. Britain and Austria, though nominally allies, henceforth waged separate campaigns, one on the sea, the other on land. The crushing defeat of Austria by Bonaparte in the campaigns of 1796-7 forced her to make peace at Campo Formio in October 1797. The Papal States had made peace in February 1797 and Portugal in August. Thus Great Britain remained alone in arms against France. The First Coalition was dissolved by the military might of the French, assisted by the treachery, selfishness, incompetence, and half-heartedness of the Allies themselves. For two years the French had leisure from strife in Europe. They used the period to carry through some sweeping changes in their own country, to organize their conquests into a series of subject republics, and to embark on the oriental adventure which came to grief in the Bay of Aboukir (1798) and before the walls of Acre (1799). Pitt, meantime, was busily engaged in trying to construct a second coalition.' II. THE SECOND COALITION AGAINST FRANCE, 1799 The desire of Pitt to secure allies for Great Britain in her protracted struggle with France was entirely in accord with the wishes of the Tsar Paul I, who had succeeded to the Russian throne in 1796. The Tsar, who detested the principles of the French Revolution, and was intensely irritated by Bonaparte's occupation of Malta in 1798—for shortly after the surrender, Paul had been elected Grand Master of the Knights of St. Johnwas much alarmed by the French invasion of Egypt and the general menace to the integrity of Turkey. 1 The leading treaties relating to the formation and dissolution of the first coalition will be found in Martens, Recueil des Traités, vol. v, and in G. de Garden, Histoire générale des Traités, Paris, 1848-87 vol. v. For a brief résumé of those relating to Great Britain, see T. H. Dyer, Modern Europe (3rd ed.), London, 1901, vol. v, pp. 109-110. Early in 1798 he had tried to get Austria and Prussia to join him in a combination hostile to France. Prussia persisted in her neutrality, but Austria entered into a treaty the precise date and details of which have never been divulged. On December 23, 1798, a Russo-Turkish alliance against France was concluded; and six days later an agreement was reached between Russia and Great Britain, which was developed on January 2, 1799, by Britain's accession to the Russo-Turkish pact.* 3 2 Meantime, Ferdinand of Naples, much perturbed by the French occupation of Rome, had been engaged in secret negotiations with Austria. These had culminated in a treaty concluded on May 19, 1798.5 This treaty was supplemented by agreements with Russia on November 29, 1798,6 with Great Britain on December 1, 1798, and with the Porte on January 21, 1799. Thus Naples became a full member of the Coalition. Portugal also gave her adhesion, but she played no active part in the ensuing war. The Second Coalition proved to be even more ephemeral than the first, for its main cohesive element was no more than the erratic will of the semi-insane autocrat Paul I. Paul soon became violently dissatisfied with the conduct of his allies; he blamed them for the severe sufferings of the Russian troops which he sent to aid in the expulsion of the French from Italy and Switzerland; he accused them of slackness, incompetence, and treachery; finally he withdrew from the Coalition in 1 Cf. Garden, Traités, op. cit. p. 147. 2 Martens, Recueil (2nd ed.), vol. vi, p. 532. 6 Martens, Recueil (2nd ed.), vol. vi, p. 524. |