it gave to the new German Empire that external security which was necessary for the working out of the numerous internal questions raised by the sudden transformations of the previous eight years.

XV. THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE, 1882

Bismarck's ideal was to maintain an equal friendship with both Vienna and St. Petersburg. But, during the decade that followed the conclusion of the Dreikaiserbündniss, this ideal became increasingly difficult of realization. Russia and Germany differed radically in their attitudes towards France; Russia and Austria had irreconcilably conflicting interests in the Balkans. The first serious strain upon the friendship of the three emperors came in 1875, when the rapid recovery of France from the blows of 1870-1, and the formidable increase of her military power, caused the German General Staff sufficient anxiety to incline them to a new war. Warning of the impending danger to the peace of Europe reached the ears of Alexander II, who (in conjunction with Queen Victoria) brought such pressure to bear upon the German Emperor as to prevent the projected attack.

Three years later, Bismarck found himself compelled to choose definitely between Austria-Hungary and Russia. The conclusion of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-8 saw the summons of a European Congress to discuss the settlement of Balkan problems at Berlin. Although Bismarck professed to act as an 'honest broker' free from distorting prejudices and distracting interests, he used his influence to lessen the fruits of Russia's victory and to increase the prizes of Austria's inactivity. The Russian representatives went away from Berlin furious at the frustration of their hopes and alienated from both Germany and Austria. In these circumstances Germany

D

and Austria concluded in secret a defensive alliance specially intended to guard them from an attack by Russia. This alliance, signed at Vienna on October 7, 1879, remained operative down to 1918. Its existence was publicly announced for the first time in November 1887, and its terms were made known on February 3, 1888.1 The Austro-German alliance of 1879 was the solid and probably unbreakable core' of the Triple Alliance of 1882. This alliance was completed by the accession of Italy. That Italy should thus join herself in an unequal yoke with her ancient enemy, Austria (who still held in her grasp the Italia Irredenta of Trentino and Istria), was remarkable, but not unintelligible. Italy dreaded a great ultramontane effort to recover Rome for the Papacy; and an alliance with Austria seemed the surest means of preventing it. Further, she was alarmed at the spread of revolutionary Socialism; and Austrian aid seemed to be the surest safeguard against its perils. Finally, she was eager to extend her power and to open up markets for her produce on the southern shore of the Mediterranean, and she was intensely irritated by the French occupation of Tunis (a region which she had marked out for herself) in 1881. Thus to check the French, the Clericals, and the Socialists she forgot her old enmities, abandoned her natural friendships, and on May 20, 1882, joined the Central Empires. The Triple Alliance was originally entered into for five years. It was renewed in 1887, 1891, 1896, 1902, and 1912.2

Two years after the conclusion of the Triple Alliance,

viz. on March 21, 1884, the alliance of the Three Emperors was renewed, as a result of their meeting at Skiernewicze, Austria, Germany, and Russia entering into a secret agreement that, in the event of any of them being attacked, the others should maintain a benevolent neutrality. This pact was revived, between Russia and Germany alone, in the secret treaty of November 18, 1887, known as the Rückversicherungsvertrag.1

XVI. THE TRIPLE ENTENTE, 1907

Both the Dual Alliance of 1879 and the Triple Alliance of 1882 were defensive only. They were not incompatible with the treaty which Bismarck made with Russia in 1887. German policy, however, which remained on the whole pacific so long as the Emperor William lived, and during the brief reign of his son, the Emperor Frederick (March-June 1888), became warlike and provocative on the accession of the present Emperor, William II. After the dismissal of Bismarck in 1890, a Weltpolitik was developed markedly different from that of the old Chancellor. The Emperor refused to renew the Russian agreement; he cultivated the friendship of the Turkish Sultan; he eagerly fostered German colonial, commercial, and maritime expansion; he alarmed all his neighbours by his militant speeches and his military preparations.

In these circumstances the neighbours of Germany, who had been kept in impotent separation by Bismarck's skilful but unscrupulous diplomacy, began to draw on the side of the Western Allies. Three clauses of the treaty, viz. 3, 4, and 7, were revealed by Austria in the Vossische Zeitung, 27 May 1915, and were published in translation by The Times, 1 June 1915. They are reprinted in O'Regan's German War, pp. 28-29, and in Austria Hungary, &c., No. 1 of this series, p. 122. On the Reinsu rance Treaties, cf. pp. 77-79 of the same.

1 See C. Grant Robertson, Bismarck, London, 1918, Appendix B.

together in instinctive desire for mutual defence. First Russia and France came to terms. Important steps in the gradual rapprochement were (1) the Russian Loan taken up by French financiers in 1888; (2) the visit of the French fleet to Cronstadt in 1891, together with the return visit of the Russian fleet to Toulon in 1893; (3) the visit of the Tsar Nicholas II to Paris in 1896, followed by the return visit of the French President, Faure, to St. Petersburg in 1897. On this last occasion the fact was revealed that an actual alliance had been concluded between the French Republic and the Muscovite Empire. The treaty was drafted in 1891, and the Military Convention was signed in December 1893.1

At the time when this Dual Alliance was announced to the world, Great Britain was on bad terms with both France and Russia. As to France, there were old-standing causes of friction in respect of Egypt, Morocco, Newfoundland, and Senegambia. As to Russia, serious conflicts had threatened in regard to rival claims in Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet. With Germany, on the other hand, British relations were good, in spite of the fact that the famous 'Kruger telegram' of the Kaiser (1896) had surprised and alarmed the nation. The Boer War, however, which broke out in 1899, confirmed the suspicion that Germany, once so friendly to Britain, had become violently hostile; and responsible statesmen realized that Britain's 'splendid isolation' was in fact extremely perilous. The result was that a settlement of all causes of dispute was effected with France in 1904;2 and that an agreement was reached with Russia in regard to Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet in 1907.3

1 See The French Yellow Book L'Alliance Franco-Russe, 1918. See treaties, signed 8 April 1904, in Parliamentary Papers, 1904, France, No. 1.

3 See treaty, signed 31 August 1907, in Parliamentary Papers, 1907, Treaty Series, No. 34.

None of the treaties of 1904 and 1907 had direct reference to European affairs. They merely removed old sources of friction in other parts of the world. Nevertheless they cleared the way for the establishment of an Entente Cordiale of far-reaching efficacy. The new spirit of friendship and co-operation between Britain, France, and Russia was manifested in the Balkan crisis of 1908, and in the Agadir crisis of 1911. It was evident that, opposed to the Triple Alliance, there had come into existence a new 'diplomatic group' which, though bound by no formal ties, was held together by the menace of German militarism.

XVII. THE BALKAN LEAGUE, 1912

In these conditions of unstable equilibrium, any disturbance of the European balance was fraught with extreme danger. The first actual breach of the peace was made by Italy in 1911. Protesting against the treatment of her subjects in Tripoli, she declared war upon Turkey, and after a year of conflict forced the Sultan to make peace by the cession of Tripoli.1 The whole episode was distasteful to the Central Empires. On the one hand it seemed to indicate the crumbling of the Triple Alliance; on the other it resulted in a serious weakening of the Turkish power, which both AustriaHungary and Germany had been for some time assiduously fostering. The reason why Turkey, who was far from being beaten in Tripoli, made her sudden and complete surrender in October 1912 was that she had just received an ultimatum respecting Macedonia from Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece, acting in unison. The Governments of these countries-and particularly M. Geshoff in Bulgaria,

1 Treaty of Lausanne, 18 October 1912; see Martens, Nouveau Recueil, 3rd Series (1907-14), vol. vii, pp. 3 sqq.