SERMON XXIII.

THE SOUL NOT MATERIAL.

GENESIS i 7-And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and man became a living soul

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my last discourse, I considered the creation of man, these two heads:

1st. The character of the Creator; and,

2dly. The nature of the Being which was created.

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Under the latter head, I observed, that man, the Being which was created, was composed of two entirely distinct parts, commonly termed the body and soul. Of the latter, I also observed, that it was a simple, uncompounded, immaterial substance: being in this respect, as well as in others, made in the image, or after the likeness, of God. This assertion, I regard as being the amount of that, which is contained in the text. I am well aware, that the text itself has been variously construed. Instead, however, of considering these different constructions, I shall attempt to settle the true meaning, by appealing directly to an interpreter, whose opinions will not be disputed. The Apostle Paul quotes this passage in the following manner: For thus it is written, the first man, Adam, εγένετο εις ψυχήν ζωσαν, was made or became a living soul. This quotation determines, in my view, absolutely, that the text is accurately rendered into our language by the translators.

The doctrine, which I consider as contained in the text, has also been abundantly disputed. Three entirely different opinions have been formed on this subject.

The first is, that which I have already advanced; viz. that man is an Immaterial substance, an Intelligent, Voluntary being; the subject of attributes, the author of actions, and destined to im mortality.

The second is, that man is a Material, thinking, voluntary being ; differing in nothing, but his modification and its effects, from other material substances. Some of those who hold this scheme, believe him immortal; while others limit his existence to the present world.

The third is, that man is neither of these, but a mere succession, or Chain, as the abettors of it express themselves. of Ideas and Exercises.

That something is true with regard to this subject, must be admitted; and that all these schemes cannot be true. I would wil lingly have avoided the discussion of a subject so metaphysical; but, when I observe the importance which it has assumed in

modern times; and especially when I see theological doctrines of very high import derived from the two last of these schemes, as their proper consequences; I feel myself obliged to give the subject a place in this system of discourses.

In the discussion, upon which I am entering, I shall pursue the following plan: viz.

I shall attempt to disprove the two last of these doctrines, and in that way, to establish the first. One of the three is undoubtedly true. If the two last are false, the first is of course true.

I. Then, I assert that the soul is not material.

It will be necessary, in order to exhibit the truth of this proposition in the most convincing light, to prove the falsehood of the opposite doctrine, in all the forms in which it has been maintained. This, therefore, I shall attempt.

1st. Atoms, in their original state, do not think.

Our senses give us the amplest evidence of this fact; so ample, that no man ever disbelieved it, who was not an idiot, or a maniac. At the same time, the proposition admits of a direct demonstration. Thought is in its nature perfectly simple and indivisible. But, if each atom were a thinking being, millions of thoughts would exist in such a compound of them, as man.

2dly. Atoms do not think in any Aggregate, or under any Organization.

(1st.) That a mere Accumulation of atoms cannot think, unless the original atoms were possessed of thought, is self-evident. If they do not think, when separate, we are intuitively certain, that mere juxta-position cannot give them the power of thought.

(2dly.) Atoms cannot derive thought from any Relative Position. Suppose one atom placed above, beneath, or on either side of another: it is intuitively certain, that, if they did not think before they were thus posited, neither of these positions, nor any other, can have the least influence towards producing thought in either of them. What is thus true of two, is equally true of every supposable number.

3dly. Matter cannot derive thought from Attenuation.

The attenuation of matter is made up wholly of the distance and the minuteness, of its particles. That distance has no influence on this subject, has been already shown. That the minuteness of the corpuscles has no influence on it, is clear from this fact: that the original atoms, which have been proved to be unpossessed of thought, are the most minute divisions of matter, which are possible. That the distance and minuteness compounded, do not influence it, is certain, because, if thought depends on neither of these, it cannot depend on both united: for nothing, repeated ever so often, is still nothing. It is also evident to our senses from the facts, that air, heat, and light, approximate no nearer to thought, than stones, lead, or earth. When, therefore, men speak of the soul as a material substance, eminently refined, tenuous, subtile, or

etherial, they speak without meaning: for all these are still the descriptions of mere attenuations of matter, or matter attenuated; and it is clearly certain, that no attenuation of matter can have the least efficacy towards enabling it to think.

4thly. Thought cannot be the result of the Chymical properties of

matter.

It is not inherent in any of the elements, which chymistry has hitherto discovered. All these are mere collections of Atoms; and are, therefore, absolutely incogitative: no one of their attributes having the least resemblance to thought.

It cannot be the result of their operations. The elements of matter operate by their powers, or attributes. These powers, by whatever names they are called, and however diversified in their operations, are only two; attraction and repulsion. But it is cer tain, that the only influence, which these powers can have on corpuscles, must be originally contained in the powers themselves. But, nothing is more certain, than that there is no resemblance to thought, either in the operation of drawing one particle of matter to another, or in that of forcing one particle of matter from another; nor in the capacity of thus drawing, or being drawn, nor in that of thus repelling, or being repelled. But, if the powers themselves, and the particles in which they inhere, possess no resemblance of thought, they can never communicate thought to each other. What they have not, they cannot give.

Further, the only possible results of chymical attraction and repulsion, arise solely from motion, relative position, condensation, and attenuation. But it has already been shown, that neither of the three last can have the least influence towards enabling matter to think. Every result of chymical powers and operations, hither to explained, has been satisfactorily explained to be the effect of attraction and repulsion; nor is there the least reason to believe, that there is any other chymical power.

5thly. Thought is not the result of Motion.

Motion is a change of place, or relative position; or a continued succession of such changes. It has been already shown, that no relative position can have any possible influence towards the production of thought; and that particles, if not originally cogitative, cannot become so by any possible relative position; nor by any distance from each other, whether greater or less. Of course, it is certain, that no change of position, which is nothing but the mere assumption of a new position, or a variation of distance, and, there fore, that no succession of such changes, can have any influence: for motion is nothing but this succession of changes. Accordingly, a cannon ball approximates no nearer to thought by moving at the rate of four hundred and twenty miles an hour, than when lodged in the chamber of a cannon: the air when moving with the swiftness of sound, than when at rest: the electrical fluid, or the rays of light, than brass, marble, or dust.

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As motion cannot contribute at all to thought; so no combination of motions, however complicated and diversified, can have any such efficacy. Organic motion, therefore, though so multiform and mysterious, as to perplex our minds, and to leave us, in a sense, lost, when contemplating it, in admiration, being only a combination of simple motions, each of which has no tendency towards the production of thought, has not in any degree this tendency, however diversified, or however mysteriously combined.

6thly. Thought cannot be superadded to matter, so as, in any sense, to render it true, that matter can become cogitative.

If thought be superadded to matter, the thought must be first created, and exist separately, and independently of the matter. Should it be said, that the creation of an attribute, without ject, or being, in which it inheres, is an absurdity: I readily grant any subit; but it is an absurdity, of which the persons whom I oppose, are the authors. They must, therefore, charge it to themselves, and not to me. But the thought, or consciousness existing by itself, and independently, before it is annexed to the matter, must exist also in the same independent manner afterwards. It may be annexed, or joined, to the matter; but it cannot be inherent in it. thought may exist within, or without, the matter, as an appendage; The but it is not, and cannot be, a property, or attribute, of the matter. The matter was perfect in all its essential properties, antecedently to the annexation of thought; and thought was not one of those properties. Thought is no more one of the properties of matter, after being annexed to it, than it was before; and, if separated from it again, will leave the matter still perfect, or possessed of all its properties. Before the thought was annexed to it, it could not be truly said, that the matter was cogitative: It can be no more truly said now, after it is annexed: for the matter itself thinks no more, than before. The supposition, therefore, that thought may be superadded to matter, is a palpable absurdity.

7thly. This doctrine intends, either that the properties of matter and mind are the same; or that the substratum of mind is the same with the substratum of matter; and, in either intention, is an absur dity.

That thought, volition, and motivity, the properties of mind, are the same things with solidity, extension, and mobility, the properties of matter, is a proposition, which contradicts intuitive certainty; and is therefore intuitively false. The substrata, in both cases, are absolutely unknown, by us. But it is a palpable absurdity to say, that an unknown thing in one case, a thing of which we have no conception, is the same with a thing, in another case, equally unknown. I grant, that a proposition concerning things unknown may be true; but it can never be known by us to be true. Ideas, which we have not, we cannot possibly compare; and therefore can never discern whether they agree, or disagree. To form propositions about them, therefore, so long as this is the fact, is ab

surd and ridiculous. But, if both these proposititions are absurdities, then the proposition, that mind is material, is also an absurdity: for it is formed either of one, or both, of these.

The only mode of legitimate argumentation on the subject, considered in this manner, is the following. Mind and Matter present to us two totally diverse sets of properties. The substratum, in which these properties co-exist, is, in each case, rationally regard ed as the cause of this difference. The properties (you will observe, I speak of essential properties only) are commonly, and justly, considered as a part, and an inseparable part, of the nature, or constitution, of the substratum, in which they are inherent; not as merely annexed, or arbitrarily adjoined, to the substratum; but as inseparable from it in such a sense, that the destruction of the properties would be also the destruction of the substratum. Thus if matter should cease to be extended, solid, or moveable, it would cease to be matter. Thus, if minds ceased to be perceiving, conscious, voluntary, and active, they would cease to be minds. This part of their nature, therefore, which we call their properties, is so absolutely dependent on the constitution of the substratum, or that part of their nature which lies beyond our reach, that both necessarily exist, or cease to exist, together. The substratum is, therefore, by its constitution, the necessary and inseparable cause of the properties; that is, the properties are what they are, because the substratum is what it is. As, therefore, the effects are totally unlike, it is rationally argued, that the causes are unlike, from the well known and intuitive truth, that unlike effects cannot proceed from the same cause.

8thly. The existence of the substratum itself cannot be proved. This truth is so well known to every metaphysician, and even to every person tolerably acquainted with logic, as customarily taught in schools of science, that it would seem hardly to demand an illustration. Still it may be proper to observe, that as this sup posed substratum, if it exist, is a thing, of which we do not, and cannot, form a single idea; we can, of course, neither affirm, nor deny, any thing concerning it, with any possible knowledge, that either the affirmation, or negation, is true. All that we can do is to render one, or the other, in a certain degree probable. Of course, every discussion, and every doctrine, tending to establish the materiality of the soul, is founded originally in uncertainty, and absolutely incapable of proof: for, if it cannot be proved, that such a substratum exists, it plainly cannot be proved, that the soul is such a substratum, connected with its properties.

I have hitherto considered this doctrine, as it is presented to us by reason. I shall now proceed to examine the account, which is given of it in the Scriptures.

Here I observe,

1st. That all other thinking beings, of which we have any knowledge, are exhibited in the Scriptures as being Immaterial.