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the enemies of Russia, but the Russian cabinet itself that drew the parallel in the Manifesto of May 18, 1792.
"C'est ainsi qu'ils ont eu la perfide adresse d'interprèter l'acte, par lequel la Russie garantit "la constitution légitime de cette nation, comme
un joug onéreux et avilissant, tandis que les plus grand empires, et entre autres celui de l'Allemagne, loin de rejetter ces sortes de garantie, les "ont envisagées, recherchées et reçues, comme le "ciment le plus solide de leurs proprietés et de "leur indépendance.” (!)
This was considered ominous. Häberlin concluded his "Staatsrecht" (1797), after alluding to guarantees and their consequences, with the words. "The first step to managing the German Diet, as formerly the Polish Diet at Grodno, was hereby "taken." Complimentary writings and resolutions of the Diet (from Swabia and Franconia) of course ensued; to say nothing of the notes of Oct. 1799, on which the author sets great value, but which, however, did not proceed from many, but only from some (six), and those the Ecclesiastical, Diets. Then followed the mediation and plans of indemnity which were discussed by France, Prussia and
Russia (to the exclusion of the Emperor and the empire), and were then laid before the Imperial Deputations. The services done by Russia at that time are not forgotten by the Germans.
(To be continued.)
[Alarmed at the progress of the negotiations for the payment of the third series of the loan guaranteed to the King of Greece, by England, France, and Russia, we are induced at once to publish the following Despatch, although we are thereby compelled to break through the order which we had originally proposed to ourselves of developing from its origin, the complete system of delusion by which Russia has hitherto successfully cajoled every administration in England.
Our object in selecting this Despatch is not so much for the facts it contains, as for the developement of Russia's system of procedure. We here perceive two sets of Despatches, one secret and one ostensible; consequently a set of arguments and appearances distinct from the real objects; a knowledge of the instructions of all the other ambassadors; the committing of them with respect to their own courts, and the committing of their courts through them. Here also are most clearly revealed the grounds of the diplomatic success of Russia. She plays her double game with perfect confidence, from the consciousness of the absence of any duplicity, we may almost say, of any intention, in the minds of the British Cabinet.
This Despatch shows Russia's perfect acquaintance with the national character and feeling, with the position and interests of parties, with the feelings, qualities, and weaknesses of individuals. It shows her constant attention to every detail, her incessant communication of the minutest intelligence, and the bringing of all these to bear upon objects, invariable in their course through centuries; and, in addition to this, we must recollect that no favour, that no patronage overlies her diplomatic system, and that her first object is ability in the individuals charged with the execution of her policy.
The exposure here made of the means by which she has invariably succeeded in making use of us, even while appearing to oppose us, will, we trust, be considered by the opposition, if not by the Government, with reference to the actual negotiations respecting the Greek Loan.]
COPY OF A VERY SECRET DESPATCH
COUNT NESSELRODE TO M. DE RIBEAUPIERRE,
THE RUSSIAN ENVOY EXTRAORDINARY AT CONSTANTINOPLE.
DATED ST. PETERSBURGH, JAN. 11, 1827.
In addressing to your Excellency the ostensible instructions which you will receive by the courier of to-day, we have fulfilled our engagements with the Cabinet of London, and taken advantage of a favourable occasion for exposing the general system of our policy towards the Ottoman Empire.
The more we have reason to believe that in spite of the noble moderation of the Emperor Alexander, and the principles which direct our august Sovereign, false opinions give rise to secret uneasiness as to our intentions with respect to this empire, the more it was necessary that we should make known with frankness both the grave interests that we can never abandon there, and the real advantages that will be offered to us by the order of things which is there established, as soon as we
shall see, on the one hand, the convention of Akermann executed with fidelity; and on the other, Greece, tranquil and flourishing, contribute as formerly to the prosperity of the Russian Provinces. whose productions were taken off by her ships, and by the enterprise of her merchants. Such is the double aim of our preceding Despatch. It develops truths which we cannot too forcibly impress upon other powers, or upon ourselves.
But there are others which also demand your Excellency's particular attention.
You have perused the annexes of the confidential Despatch that we latterly addressed to M. de Minciaky, and you will doubtless have been
struck with the difference that exists between the communication that the British Minister made to us concerning the Greek question, at the two periods very close to each other, between the instructions with which it furnished Mr. Stratford Canning the 4th Sept. 1826, and those which it sent to him in the month of December following.
The former, sent during the conference of Akermann, ordered him to push with vigour the negotiations destined to re-establish in Greece a happy tranquillity. The second enjoined him to remain