such as Greece never had during her struggle for independence, paralysed the action of Albania, enabled Diebitch to pass the Balkan, and thus made Greece, even after the affair of Navarin, contribute directly to the signing of the Treaty of Adrianople. The Greek army, which exercised by its peculiar position so fatal an influence upon the destinies of the East, and for the assembling of which not a shadow of a cause existed in Greece, was commanded by a Knight of the Guelph! This incident will bring home, we think, to whoever peruses it, two convictions, the first, that we must fail in every scheme where we pursue an object of detail, unless we have embraced the whole of the question with which we have to deal, that is to say, the whole of the policy of Russia. The second is, that the few Greeks who can penetrate into the labyrinth of the policy in which they are involved, are justified in the bitterest reproaches against this country for the cruel consequences of its best intentions, and in designating the gold sent from London as "chains sent from St. Petersburgh."

Amongst the effects of the most degrading and painful character, recently introduced into Greece by what has been termed civilization, there is one

which we have only to quote to show how powerfully acts upon the minds of so sensitive, so intellectual a people, the disappointment of hopes once so bright, and the realization of a condition so undeserved and so unexpected. We allude to suicide. The veteran Admiral Tombazi, and the son of Admiral Miaulis, lately destroyed themselves, and the reason assigned for both these catastrophes was the degradation into which they found their country plunged, and the hopelessness cast over it by the policy of England and France.

TO THE

INHABITANTS OF CONSTANTINOPLE.

HOWEVER little we may feel ourselves justified in encouraging the Turks to believe in our support, disheartened as we are by the inconceivable apathy manifested by our Government, and viewing indeed with alarm, the consequences which may arise from the disappointment of the expectations hitherto entertained by the Ottoman Nation, still we cannot help imploring the Sultan and his people, first of all, not to underrate their own strength, and secondly, not to be deceived as to the character of the designs of Russia.

It is natural to expect that in consequence of their present disappointment, they may turn round with a feeling of self-destructive bitterness towards the very power which has reckoned on the present result, and which has formed but too correct an estimate of the torpor or apathy-or insanity, which prevents the Government of England from attending to its own interests, and casting the shield and moral support of Great Britain, round our natural, commercial, and ever-faithful Ally.

To bring home to the Inhabitants of Constantinople, the true character of the friendship entertained towards their patriotic Monarch, by the Allies of Russia, we publish the following Extract, from the work of General Valentini, which appeared in 1822; at the very moment when the Russian Cabinet was endeavouring to enlist the support of the European Governments, to favour her plan of putting down the Greek Rebellion, which she had excited in Turkey.

We must bear in mind that no Prussian officer would be allowed to publish a political work without the sanction of his Government; and that every paragraph must have previously obtained the approval of Prussia, and by a natural consequence, that of the Protectress of Prussia. And, besides, the work is chiefly a compilation from Russian official documents.

VALENTINI

ON THE

MILITARY OCCUPATION OF CONSTANTINOPLE.

THE study of the past is only truly useful in so far as we know how to derive instruction for the present and the future. Although the war that we have just described ought not to serve as a model, it teaches us at least the nature of the country and the means of penetrating into it, as well as the character of the people, and the best means of combating them; and we may thence draw conclusions as to the conduct that ought to be pursued by those whom Providence may select to emancipate these fair regions from the yoke of the barbarians.

Such a study ought not to be classed amongst the useless speculations, even if the execution of our plan should be reserved for future generations.

The road which leads to the centre, and which goes straight to the capital, must doubtless be preferred; however great the advantages that any less

direct route appears to offer for the safety of the enterprise. Nevertheless, there is one idea which naturally presents itself it is that of effecting disembarkation in Asia Minor before coming to the attack of Constantinople. Such a measure would produce the happiest effects in a military point of view, besides hindering the Grand Seignior from quitting the seraglio and fleeing into Asia with his treasures, which must serve to indemnify the expenses of the war.

At the same time, then, that the army by land advances by Adrianople, the fleet must follow its movement along the coast of the Black Sea, and must convey directly to the entrance of the Bosphorus the troops that will disembark in Asia, under the protection of the vessels of war, and whose first care will be to entrench themselves properly. Although the defence of the coasts is reputed to be ill organised amongst the Turks, one might fear that the points in the neighbourhood of the Euxine would be better defended than the rest; but the most recent descriptions speak only of the two castles constructed in 1773 by Baron de Tott, one on the coast of Europe and the other on that of Asia. These castles, which could not much