Infantry Regiments, as well as the 6th Regiment of Lancers, are placed at your disposal. If, in the mean time, a larger force should be necessary, you are authorized to take it from the troops of the commander-in-chief quartered nearest to the destined point; and, in so far, as in consequence of this regulation the garrison of Cologne must be so disproportionally weakened as to require a reinforcement, the General of Infantry, von Müffling, is ordered by me to detach at your demand a part of the 14th division to garrison Cologne.

Berlin, the 22nd August, 1832.

(Signed)

FREDERIC WILHELM.

position verblieben. Sollte indess auch eine grössere Truppenzahl gebraucht werden, so haben Sie solche immer von den dem Bestimmungsorte am nächsten stehenden Truppentheilen Ihres General-Kommandos zu entnehmen, und sofern, in Folge einer diesfälligen Anordnung, die Besatzung von Köln unverhältnissmässig geschwächt werden musste, dergestalt, dass das Bedürfniss eines Ersatzes eintrete, ist der General der Infanterie, von Müffling, von Mir angewiesen, auf Ihre Requisition einen Theil der 14ten Division zur Besatzung nach Köln zu detachiren.

Berlin, den 22 August 1832.

(Gez.)

FRIEDRICH WILHELM.

OPINION OF GERMANY ON THE INFLUENCE

OF RUSSIA.

[We are happy to be able to contrast with the preceding documents the following Letter from an eminent German writer.]

SIR,

To the Editor of the Portfolio.

Banks of the Elbe, June 22, 1836.

In looking over a recent number of Blackwood's Magazine, I perceive an article entitled "Foreign Results of Democratic Ascendency." Whenever any palpable error has been committed, or a mistaken course of foreign policy has been adopted, it is natural enough for one party to shift the blame from their own leaders, and fasten it if possible upon their opponents. In the present instance, as far as the alarming progress and ulterior plans of Russia are concerned, it must be clear to every unprejudiced observer that the question at issue has been hitherto very little understood by any party, and that, as soon as its merits began to be at all appreciated, it was brought forward as a question not of political party, but of national and European interest. It is not my intention, nor would it be worth your while, to dwell on this subject after your repeated declarations, which will not fail of giving satisfaction in the quarters for which they may have been intended. But, in the article in question, I meet with a strange misconception of German affairs, which I cannot leave unnoticed. The domestic policy of the Reform administration is there described as having been instrumental in alienating the affections of the German people, and compelling them, from an instinctive dread of "revolutionary principles," to throw themselves into the arms of Russia. It would surely be a work of supereroga

tion if I were as a foreigner to meddle with this charge as brought against the principles of the English Reformers; but, I may be allowed to offer a few remarks as far as regards the disposition of the majority of the German people. And since the writer in Blackwood treats (or affects to treat) Germany as "the most effectual barrier against Moscovite ambition," it may be presumed that the Conservative party in England will not consider the actual extent and real motives of Russian ascendency in the German States as a matter of indifference.

It is of no use to talk of Germany in the aggregate, in the same way as the names of England or France are familiarly introduced to denote the system of government or the interests of the nation. These States, however distracted they may have been by domestic parties, have at no time experienced any thing like the provincial division, which is part and parcel of our political existence. It is necessary before all things to advert to the distinction which cannot but strike even the most superficial eye. There are on the one hand the two leading States, in which there exists no visible opposition to the government, or in which the police has as yet been sufficient to put down any thing that may have threatened to assume that shapeAustria and Prussia; and on the other, the Constitutional (or minor) States, in which the existence of a body of opposition more or less compact is legalized by the representative form of government, and manifested in spite of the restrictive regulations of the censorship by the tendency more or less pronounced of part of the public press.

With regard to the people of the latter, the Constitutional States, it may safely be asserted that, far from betraying any inclination towards Russia, they have upon one or more occasion exhibited most unquestionable symptoms of the contrary. I need but allude to the deep sympathy manifested

in the fate of Poland, and to the enthusiastic reception which the Polish exiles met with in their progress through the country. These are matters of public notoriety: they need no proof. But the addresses are upon record, respectably and numerously signed, which were presented to the German Diet in 1831, praying the diplomatic interference of the Diet in the murderous struggle which appeared intended for and seemed likely to terminate in the annihilation of a generous people.

It is true that the spread of a pestilential disease was at the same time apprehended from the Russian invasion; but this step of addressing was so uncommon and so little to the taste of the addressed that any pretext would have been welcome to give a more plausible occasion and a more pointed bearing to the prayer. The Diet thought fit, not very consistently with their former declarations, to pronounce such addresses illegal.* In the Representative Chambers the name of Poland was introduced on every suitable occasion, though the blank looks and extreme uneasiness of ministers seemed to intimate that such a course might prove exceedingly dangerous.

And, when all was over, the generous remnants of the Polish army were every where received with those honours which are due to the representatives, though vanquished for the time, of a noble and heart-stirring cause. The triumph of physical force seemed to be forgotten in the consciousness of indefeasible right; the day of retribution was confidently spoken of, and the acts of the Autocrat were denounced in no very measured terms. These ebullitions again were severely commented upon by the writers of a more moderate or more timid disposition, and the progress of the Poles was

* We have seen the same line adopted in Greece, when the Primates of the Morea drew up loyal addresses to Prince Leopold, which were pronounced by Capodistrias to be illegal.-EDITOR. See Narrative of Greek Affairs, Part ii.

gravely said to be the progress of revolution. Yet the motives were unimpeached, from which material assistance was tendered where it might be wanted, by the combined and willing exertions of thousands. Committees were established at Leipsic, Dresden, Altenburg, Frankfort, Nurnberg, Heidelberg, Carlsruhe, Manheim, Stutgard, Ulm, Darmstadt, Cassel. The Germans have no reason to boast of what they may have done in this way; what nation, not unmindful of the laws of honour and hospitality, could have done less? But, it is a little curious that, while on the one side the political excitement of those days had given rise to apprehensions and imputations which, though intelligible from the novelty of the thing, have not been justified by the event, the Germans should on the other hand be charged with an inclination to throw themselves into the arms of Russia.

It cannot be said that the actual position of Russia is well understood by the Germans. The German liberals are either too much occupied by the struggle at home, which demands their unremitting attention, or they are too flighty to descend to particulars; and in neither case are they likely to apply themselves seriously to a comprehensive and matterof-fact study of European politics. But, in the Constitutional States, a notion is prevailing that the growth of Russian power must be somehow or other associated with the fall of the Constitutions. The plans actually pending have probably been little attended to; many symptoms may have been altogether overlooked; but they can hardly be far from the mark, in reading the trace of Russian influence in whatever quarter they may turn to; since we know that it is everywhere. There is one view of the subject peculiarly adapted to the German mind. There are those who compare the present with the past, and from thence anticipate the return of military despotism. In this they busy them