expect from them. Nevertheless one memorable fact could not escape the attentive observer of the course of this war. The demonstration of the Greek army did not remain without influence on the success of the campaign. The whole of the Albanians, threatened at home, refused to march to the Danube and to the Balkan, and so strong was the impression amongst these populations produced by the Greek manœuvre, combined with the success obtained in spite of the President, who wished to confine himself to threats, by the western army commanded by the Generalissimo, Sir Richard Church, that the Pacha of Scodra did not leave his Sandjak until after the raising of the blockade of Prevesa, in May, 1829.

The 25,000 men of Mustafa, Pacha of Scodra, arrived at Philippopolis in Sept. 1829, evidently retarded in their departure by the state of uneasiness which tormented Albania at that period. The numerical forces of the Russians had just decided the fate of the campagn, in permitting them to pass the Balkan. Had an additional force of 25,000 men, and those men Albanians, been placed in the defiles between Schumla and the sea, it is allowable to believe that General Diebitch, would not have

gained the title of Sa Balkanski. Thus, it is not presumptuous to suppose that Count Capodistrias obtained for him his laurels on the Gulf of Lepanto.

It may not be uninteresting to quote an extract here from the Memoir of a Greek Patriot, dated from Ægina, in Nov. 1829. It was at that period equally applicable to Turkey and to Greece.

"The Cabinet of St. Petersburgh has never concealed her projects. It is too strong to require to do so, and too skilful to undertake that which had no probability of success. Profiting by the disposition of the powers, Russia explained, from the very commencement of the Greek revolution, her views as to the fate which she thought convenient to accord us. It is at Laybach; it is in the notes of Lord Strangford at the period of the interview of the Emperors at Czernovitz; it is in her memoir presented to the European Courts in the winter of 1823 to 1824; it is in fine in the Protocol of 4th April, 1824, that she has given before-hand the explanation of the Xth Article of the Treaty of Adrianople.

"What fatal charm blinds the eyes of our generous supporters, France and England? The word Liberty engraven on our chains! this is the work

of their magnanimous intervention? Servile resignation to the will of Russia! Is this the task worthy of the two great powers who have to defend, not only the interests of their own policy, but those of civilization in general? Since the battle of Navarin, until the steps taken with Diebitch, at the Treaty of Adrianople, how many anomalies, how many contradictions, how many errors do we not see in their conduct? What abandonment of principle, what subjection to the power of words, what a want of independence, of dignity, of courage! They united themselves with Russia in July, 1827, in order to prevent a war from taking place with the Porte, and not only has war resulted from the union, but furthermore, subaltern assistants at the sacrifice, they have garrotted the victim and placed it on the altar. They have taken part in the intervention, in order to secure to themselves that Russia should not dispose of us according to her good pleasure, and they have placed their fleets, their troops, their millions, at the disposal of a Russian Cabinet, and of a Russian minister, to make of Greece (and Turkey) what Russia expressed her desire to make of her from the first day, or rather from the eve of our revolution. In fine, it seems that they have

prided themselves on omitting nothing in this affair to surrender up their political consideration, and Russia, doubtless, will account to them for these short moments of wakefulness which, in unmasking their chagrin, has still more unmasked their weakness."

After every consideration of the opinions of the various speakers on this question, we think there is great ground of satisfaction for the Merchants who petitioned Parliament, and for the advocates of Mr. Stewart's views, in finding that the Members of both sides of the House of Commons, however much they might differ in other respects, and as to the mode of dealing with the question about Cracow, were unanimous as to the value of our commerce and relations with Turkey and Persia; and that, if clear ground could be shown for complaint against Russia as interfering with these interests in a directly hostile or injurious manner, they would support any measure which would be necessary to counteract such national injury, should the Government find the means they ought first to use insufficient.

VOL. III. No. 19.

F

We hear that among mercantile men this is the decided and general impression; and also that, as there was such a variety of opinions in that respect, the Government has by the defence of its course of policy taken upon itself the entire responsibility of the proper protection and support of our Eastern commerce, and of the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire. It was argued by some of the speakers that there was no positive case of Russian aggression made out-that it was only feared; and that, if any such case had been shown, the House might then have expressed a much more decided opinion as to the course to be pursued by the Government. But it appears, by the letter of a mercantile house in the Times of the 26th April, that a most flagrant case of aggression on our commerce did occur several months ago in the Danube.

It would appear that Russia, doubtful as to the efficacy of her demand of tolls at the mouth of the Danube, has resolved on establishing there such a vexatious system of quarantine, that if permitted to be carried into effect, both Great Britain and Austria may give up all idea of carrying on trade in that river, and thus the only egress of the produce of these powerful "rivals" of the Southern Pro