An Economic THeory of Democracy1957 |
À l'intérieur du livre
Résultats 1-3 sur 24
Page 261
... abstain . There- fore , whether abstention is rational depends entirely on the nature of the returns from voting . A. WHY ONLY THOSE CITIZENS WHO ARE INDIFFERENT ABSTAIN In the last chapter we pointed out that a citizen's reward for vot ...
... abstain . There- fore , whether abstention is rational depends entirely on the nature of the returns from voting . A. WHY ONLY THOSE CITIZENS WHO ARE INDIFFERENT ABSTAIN In the last chapter we pointed out that a citizen's reward for vot ...
Page 267
Anthony Downs. cause only those who are indifferent abstain . But positive voting costs alter this situation by causing some men who have definite prefer- ences to abstain also . In fact , since each citizen's vote value is usu- ally ...
Anthony Downs. cause only those who are indifferent abstain . But positive voting costs alter this situation by causing some men who have definite prefer- ences to abstain also . In fact , since each citizen's vote value is usu- ally ...
Page 273
... abstain also have no influence on who wins the election . Thus voting behavior is à crucial determinant of the distribution of political power . There are two reasons to suspect that the proportion of low - income citizens who abstain ...
... abstain also have no influence on who wins the election . Thus voting behavior is à crucial determinant of the distribution of political power . There are two reasons to suspect that the proportion of low - income citizens who abstain ...
Table des matières
vi | 19 |
Party Motivation and the Function | 21 |
CONTENTS | 29 |
Droits d'auteur | |
14 autres sections non affichées
Autres éditions - Tout afficher
Expressions et termes fréquents
abstain actually alternative ambiguous analysis assume assumption axiom basic benefits cause ceteris paribus coalition competition conclusion cost of voting decision-making definition democracy depends desire distribution of voters division of labor effect election period electorate equal equilibrium ernment example exist extremist fact favor favorite party gain goals government action government's groups hence hypothesis ideologies indifferent individual influence irrational issue J. R. Hicks Kenneth Arrow legislature majority principle marginal marginal cost maximize means ment motives multiparty system normative number of parties oligopoly opposition party outcome Paretian optimum party differential party's passionate majority platforms political parties position possible predict preferences proportional representation rational behavior rational citizen rational voter real world reason reëlected reliability social society strategy structure tion two-party system uncertainty utility functions utility incomes V. O. Key views voting decision Welfare Economics zero