An Economic THeory of Democracy1957 |
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Page 32
... hence their conception of good behavior must be reëxamined . Such contradictions cannot be discovered in a normative model unless the behavior it prescribes as good is tested for rationality . By transforming our positive model into a ...
... hence their conception of good behavior must be reëxamined . Such contradictions cannot be discovered in a normative model unless the behavior it prescribes as good is tested for rationality . By transforming our positive model into a ...
Page 58
... hence the incumbents win even though con- ditions one and two hold . Thus when the weakened version of condition three is in effect , the opposition can be certain of victory only if a fourth condition also holds : 4. No matter what ...
... hence the incumbents win even though con- ditions one and two hold . Thus when the weakened version of condition three is in effect , the opposition can be certain of victory only if a fourth condition also holds : 4. No matter what ...
Page 134
... hence it must design a policy spread which includes all of them . But there are more voters in the middle than at the extremes . Therefore each party structures its policies so that its net position is moderate , even though it makes a ...
... hence it must design a policy spread which includes all of them . But there are more voters in the middle than at the extremes . Therefore each party structures its policies so that its net position is moderate , even though it makes a ...
Table des matières
vi | 19 |
Party Motivation and the Function | 21 |
CONTENTS | 29 |
Droits d'auteur | |
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Expressions et termes fréquents
abstain actually alternative ambiguous analysis assume assumption axiom basic benefits cause ceteris paribus coalition competition conclusion cost of voting decision-making definition democracy depends desire distribution of voters division of labor effect election period electorate equal equilibrium ernment example exist extremist fact favor favorite party gain goals government action government's groups hence hypothesis ideologies indifferent individual influence irrational issue J. R. Hicks Kenneth Arrow legislature majority principle marginal marginal cost maximize means ment motives multiparty system normative number of parties oligopoly opposition party outcome Paretian optimum party differential party's passionate majority platforms political parties position possible predict preferences proportional representation rational behavior rational citizen rational voter real world reason reëlected reliability social society strategy structure tion two-party system uncertainty utility functions utility incomes V. O. Key views voting decision Welfare Economics zero