An Economic THeory of Democracy1957 |
À l'intérieur du livre
Résultats 1-3 sur 50
Page 8
... behavior in it to behavior in the real world . In the latter , some men do cast votes to please their wives - and vice versa - rather than to express their political preferences . And such behavior is often highly rational in terms of ...
... behavior in it to behavior in the real world . In the latter , some men do cast votes to please their wives - and vice versa - rather than to express their political preferences . And such behavior is often highly rational in terms of ...
Page 10
... behavior which does not help him attain his political goals efficiently , we ... rational men to make systematic errors in politics and ( 2 ) to avoid any ... rational behavior , and ( 3 ) the fact that it is an empirical phenomenon which ...
... behavior which does not help him attain his political goals efficiently , we ... rational men to make systematic errors in politics and ( 2 ) to avoid any ... rational behavior , and ( 3 ) the fact that it is an empirical phenomenon which ...
Page 11
... rational behavior requires a predictable social order . Just as the rational producer must be able to make reasonably ac- curate forecasts of his demand and costs if he is to invest intelli- gently , so the rational man in politics must ...
... rational behavior requires a predictable social order . Just as the rational producer must be able to make reasonably ac- curate forecasts of his demand and costs if he is to invest intelli- gently , so the rational man in politics must ...
Table des matières
vi | 19 |
Party Motivation and the Function | 21 |
CONTENTS | 29 |
Droits d'auteur | |
14 autres sections non affichées
Autres éditions - Tout afficher
Expressions et termes fréquents
abstain actually alternative ambiguous analysis assume assumption axiom basic benefits cause ceteris paribus coalition competition conclusion cost of voting decision-making definition democracy depends desire distribution of voters division of labor effect election period electorate equal equilibrium ernment example exist extremist fact favor favorite party gain goals government action government's groups hence hypothesis ideologies indifferent individual influence irrational issue J. R. Hicks Kenneth Arrow legislature majority principle marginal marginal cost maximize means ment motives multiparty system normative number of parties oligopoly opposition party outcome Paretian optimum party differential party's passionate majority platforms political parties position possible predict preferences proportional representation rational behavior rational citizen rational voter real world reason reëlected reliability social society strategy structure tion two-party system uncertainty utility functions utility incomes V. O. Key views voting decision Welfare Economics zero