An Economic THeory of Democracy1957 |
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Page 22
... real world of politics . However , no one can answer them without specifying an ethical relationship between government and the rest of society . And since such specification is normative instead of positive , it lies outside the ...
... real world of politics . However , no one can answer them without specifying an ethical relationship between government and the rest of society . And since such specification is normative instead of positive , it lies outside the ...
Page 34
... real - world politics . The fact that our study is positive but not descriptive gives rise to an ineradicable difficulty of exposition . The statements in our analysis are true of the model world , not the real world , unless they ...
... real - world politics . The fact that our study is positive but not descriptive gives rise to an ineradicable difficulty of exposition . The statements in our analysis are true of the model world , not the real world , unless they ...
Page 112
... real world , this irrational development is a common phe- nomenon in social organizations . Even when an organization is created to serve one specific purpose , it develops other purposes connected with its survival per se and with the ...
... real world , this irrational development is a common phe- nomenon in social organizations . Even when an organization is created to serve one specific purpose , it develops other purposes connected with its survival per se and with the ...
Table des matières
vi | 19 |
Party Motivation and the Function | 21 |
CONTENTS | 29 |
Droits d'auteur | |
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Expressions et termes fréquents
abstain actually alternative ambiguous analysis assume assumption axiom basic benefits cause ceteris paribus coalition competition conclusion cost of voting decision-making definition democracy depends desire distribution of voters division of labor effect election period electorate equal equilibrium ernment example exist extremist fact favor favorite party gain goals government action government's groups hence hypothesis ideologies indifferent individual influence irrational issue J. R. Hicks Kenneth Arrow legislature majority principle marginal marginal cost maximize means ment motives multiparty system normative number of parties oligopoly opposition party outcome Paretian optimum party differential party's passionate majority platforms political parties position possible predict preferences proportional representation rational behavior rational citizen rational voter real world reason reëlected reliability social society strategy structure tion two-party system uncertainty utility functions utility incomes V. O. Key views voting decision Welfare Economics zero