sity of meanings, attached to the same term, render it necessary that some terms, more fixed and certain in their meaning, should be substituted in its place. But this will be more evident, when we come to the application and uses of power. Before we proceed to the direct object, a few remarks on the source of power are appropriate and necessary. The first remark is, that power is always associated with intelligence in its source. Instruments may be employed to connect cause and effect, which have no intelligence; but, however numerously or frequently they may be so employed, they cannot be considered the source of energy. Whenever we recognise, or conceive of power, we greatly mistake if the idea of intelligence is not always, and necessarily, associated with its source. Matter is in itself inert, in all its forms of organization; it cannot, therefore, be the source of any action, energy, or even motion. All its motions, and the laws of their regulation, indicate a governing energy from an intelligent source. We need not enter into a minute and extended illustration of this remark. We think all inquisitive minds will readily arrive at the irresistible conclusion, that intelligence is essential to the source of power.

Another remark on the general subject is, that the source of power is voluntary. Its exercise is always connected with will, or volition, the operation of will. All the laws of motion, which philosophy recognises, necessarily indicate both an intelligent and voluntary source. Whatever material agents are instrumentally employed, earth, water, air, fire, electricity, magnetism, or any of the chemical agencies, we recognise no power in them, but in some source of their motion, in which there must be design and volition. Experience demonstrates the truth of this statement; and no philoso

phy, which claims to be rational, can invalidate or contradict it. Here we leave this remark, confident that all thinking minds will. readily perceive its truth. We might have said before, that power must have a living source. But it was no part of our intention to engage in a philosophical discussion of life. We, therefore, take for granted, what none will doubt, that life, whatever its definition may be, is essential to the source of power. Our object, at present, is to show, that the source of all power is mind, which must live, know, feel, and choose. If mind be capable of volition, it must feel. There can be no such thing as volition without feeling. This has been illustrated in a former article, and needs no further discussion for our present purpose.

The original source of all power is the eternal, self-existent, and independent Mind. He has infinite power, and is irresponsible for its exercise; but He is infinitely good, as well as infinitely intelligent and powerful; therefore his government is infinitely safe and desirable.

But what most concerns the present discussion is, that all our conceptions of divine power connect with God's will: it is indicated by the connexion between his volition and the effects produced. This connexion, according to the sure testimony of divine revelation, is illimitably certain.

God has created minds, which are finite, dependent on his will for existence, for all their faculties and all their power. These minds are, by God's will, constituted immortal and indestructible. We speak of two orders, angels and men; whether there be other minds we know not, and need not inquire. We do not suppose that either angelick or human minds are incapable of annihilation by that power which gave them being, but we know that it is his will they shall live for ever. Our present

inquiry respects the ability of dependent, mortal and immortal

men.

One more general remark may here be made. It relates to man's responsibleness, as connected with power. For all the power given to creatures, they must be responsible to their Maker and Sovereign; both for its estimation and employment. This is directly inferred from their relations to him who made, sustains, and governs them. The basis of this responsibleness to God, so far as found in men, is their faculties of knowing the use of power, of feeling the influence of obligation, and of will, or volition, to direct its use. Mind is, therefore, the source of man's power, and responsible for its employment. But mind, unin-. telligent, insensible and inactive, could not be a source of power, nor be held responsible. Such a supposition, however, takes away the essential properties of mindthe faculties of intelligence, feeling and action. This general remark is all we need at present. The subject of responsibleness and its connexion with power, will occupy more properly, and more fully, another place in this discussion.

That men have power is demonstrably certain. The whole face of the inhabited earth bears testimony to the fact, every man's consciousness certifies it, and the revelation of God abundantly confirms the truth. This power is derived, dependent and limited. It is derived from the great Source of all things. God has endowed men with life and faculties, capable of producing certain effects. This capability, like life, is the gift of God, and is found in different degrees in different persons, just as the great Author has seen fit to bestow it on them. Can this be doubted? The facts, in proof, are before every eye.

For the continuance of this ability, men are dependent on the will Ch. Adv.-VOL. X.

of God, as really and as certainly as for life. We often see men utterly, or partially, deprived of it, while life yet continues. Derangement of intellect takes it away, or diminishes it; insensibility of feeling destroys or misdirects it; and various circumstances of its medium and instruments change or destroy it. The whole phenomena of power show its dependence on the omnipotent source. That man's power is limited, admits of no question. But to fix some of its limits, and define its applications, is very difficult. The general fact of limitation to men's ability is admitted on all sides, but much controversy obtains among philosophers and theologians, concerning several particular limits. Were this controversy confined to subjects of speculative philosophy, it would not be worth the pains of investigation. But since it has an important influence in scriptural interpretation, and the discussion of theological doctrine, it will be necessary to examine some of those limits in question. But this also belongs to a consideration of the uses and applications of ability.

Here it is proper to say, that man's power, derived and limited as it is unquestionably, is man's own, as certainly as life is man's own, and in the same sense that the faculties of mind are his. The derivation, dependence, and limits of the power affect not its connexion with the mind, to which it essentially belongs. We have said that mind is the source of power in man. To the mind or spirit be long, essentially, life, faculties of intelligence, feeling and volitionto it also belongs power. We are not able to determine which faculty is the source of ability; nor is it necessary to decide such a question. We know that the primary source of agency or action in man is the faculty of feeling, but this agency is manifested by the will, and has some connexion with in

tellect. Man's power is always indicated by a connexion between the volition and the effect; it is therefore immediately connected with the will. It resides not in matter. Let mind be separated from the body, and the whole material machine has lost its power. While life and spirit inhabited the organized matter, its functions were the medium of manifesting ability in various forms; but when deprived of life, the whole is powerless. Man's power must, therefore, have a living, intelligent, feeling and voluntary source: and it is enough that we show its connexion with mind, and trace its manifestation to the will, without attempting to define its precise residence. Here we obtain our substitute for a definition of power the connexion between volition and effect.

Ability is suggested by something being done: and if it be man's ability, it is something voluntarily done. Let any man, who thinks carefully, examine the idea of man's ability, he will come at length to that which actually connects, or may connect, the effort with his volition; this is power. This is its true description; and with a single exception, so far as man's ability is concerned, there is no other, which corresponds with the fact. Whatever a man has power to do will be done, if he wills to do it. This expression, if we mistake not, meets the common sense and common apprehensions of men-what is more, it corresponds with the general current of the Holy Scriptures. With a single qualification, which respects the opportunity of exercising the power, we make the appeal to all the above authorities, and fearlessly assert that whatever a man has power to do, give him the opportunity to do it; and it will be done, if he wills to do it.

The exception to which we al

luded applies to certain exercises of body and of mind, which have no perceptible dependence on volition. The idea is suggested by this fact, and has several applications, with various shades of meaning, from mere susceptibility, to a close resemblance to what we have already considered power: and we have no objection to call it ability, in certain cases, although not indicated by our substitute for a definition of power. Thus the process of digestion, circulation of the blood, growth of the muscle, and other parts of the body, are involuntary-the perceptions and feelings of the mind are not under control of the will. It is often said of the body, in the cases referred to, that the organs have power to perform those functions; and of the mind, it has power; or is capable of perceiving and feeling. In this sense of ability, we readily concede that the exercise of any faculty denotes a power to exercise. But without stopping to examine the theory of involuntary bodily motion, it is proper to discuss a little the laws of mind, involved in its involuntary phenomena. The mind is capable of exercises appropriate to each faculty, but the principal advantage of using the term power is, to describe the nature of mind-thus the mind has power to perceive, feel, and choose. The idea is suggested by a connexion between the faculty and its appropriate exercise, as between cause and effect. Whatever this power may be, the most important principle to be recognised in its law is, that this capability of feeling is not under control of the will. Pleasure and pain, ecstasy and disgust, are not under the influence of volitions.

The distinctions of power have been many, and most of them useless. There are, however, two classifications, which have been made in reference to those differ

ent applications above considered, and which may occupy a few mo

ments.

It has been called active and speculative. Active power moves the body, and turns the thoughts from one subject to another. Speculative power is that included in the exception made above-the ability of judging, remembering, and all intellectual exercises. The other classification referred to is, active and passive. Passive power is the capacity of receiving impressions or suffering. In these classifications, speculative and passive power are both of doubtful propriety. At all events, passive power is merely susceptibility, which we hesitate much to call ability.

We had intended to dispose, in this place, of some remarks on several uses of terms indicating power, but it will divert us more from our object than to take notice of them as they occur in the next article. Some remarks on the kinds of ability, as distinguished by its source, instruments, limits and effects; particularly some of the latter, are important, and will close the present number. From the sources these are distinguished, divine, angelick, human and animal power, because it is connected with the volition of different agents, and recognised as from a different origin. This need not be discussed. With respect to the instruments employed, there are mental, muscular, mechanical, gravitating and chemical power. Of this distinction in denominating the kinds of power, it is only necessary to observe, that instruments do not alter the nature, but only change the relation or use of the ability. It is of some importance to recollect this, because many are misled by the diversity of names and terms, which only denote the various instruments and relations of power. As to limits, there are small and great, of indefinable varieties and degrees. If we speak

of divine power, it is unlimitedinfinite; but of finite ability the degrees are many, and the limits not easily defined. Hence men often over estimate their power, and are often disappointed in their expectations and efforts, in many things important to their interest or usefulness. Again, on the other hand, men frequently make an under estimate of their ability, and drone away their time to little purpose, when, if roused to exertion, and made acquainted with the extent of their power, they might accomplish much that is important and useful. In most cases, however, of the above classifications, there is, comparatively, little difficulty in ascertaining the signification of the terms employed. But the most difficult classifications and indefinite terms in use, are those relating to the effects produced. With many of these our present object has no connexion-such as political, ecclesiastical, judicial and martial power. We are aware that these terms suggest other associations than those which we have described as connected with power; but the difference, when carefully analyzed, would be found less than may seem at first view. In this class there are in extensive use the distinctions of physical, natural and moral power, which require particular examination.

Physical and natural are often used synonymously, but sometimes distinctively, although it would seem that there can be little difference in their technical meaning. It is not worth our while to examine here the different shades of meaning attached to these terms, as connected with power; our purpose will be answered by considering them as having the same meaning when opposed to moral. We shall, therefore, use them indiscriminately as synonymous.

Man has physical and moral power, entirely distinct in character, each limited to its proper sphere,

and no wise interfering with the functions of the other. We learn this fact, and the knowledge of this distinction, from the effects produced and the relations of men's actions. This fact, however, is greatly abused, misconstrued, and misapplied. We doubt very much, whether the metaphysico-theological writers and preachers, who abound in this speculative age, and who use so freely this distinction, have ever examined, inductively, or even settled in their own minds, what they mean by moral ability. Multitudes seem not to have any fixed association of thoughts with natural ability, although they hobby the phrase so constantly. It would be easy to illustrate this remark by a reference to a host of modern writers; and any thinking man has only to open his ears to the metaphysical jargon from many pulpits in the land, to be more than convinced of its truth. We think it very questionable, whether the distinction between natural and mo-. ral ability is useful at all, in theological discussions. What is more, we think it extremely doubtful whether the only proper meaning of moral power is apprehended at all, by those who make the most free use of it in theological subjects.

What is intended by man's physical power? This question has been already answered, if we have succeeded at all in our object. A condensed view of the doctrine involved in the answer to this question may be given. It is suggested by a connexion between volition and the effect-mind, living, intelligent, sensitive and voluntary, is its source it is dependent and limited; distinguished by its source, instruments, limits and effects. A substitute for its definition is, the connexion which suggests the idea of power. All that need be added is, the reason why it is called physical or natural. To us it seems

evident, that it is so denominated from the effects produced. Physical effects are produced by physical power. Walking, and in general, bodily motions, are physical effects. The arts and employments of life, are of the same character. But we have not room for extended illustration.

What is man's moral ability? We only say now that it is so called, because the effects are of a moral character. This subject, together with some of the uses and applications of power, will constitute the objects of inquiry in our next article. These objects are among the most interesting topicks of discussion before the Christian publick.

(To be continued.)

F.

EXTRACT FROM THE CHRISTIAN OBSERVER.

We take the following instructive and pleasing paper from the Christian Observer of September last. The writer shows himself to be an Episcopalian, and to have some partialities, such as all good men have for the Christian denomination which they conscientiously prefer. But he is neither a bigot nor an exclusionist, although his charity extends to some who are so. A principal object which he had in view was, to oppose those in Britain, of whom there are at present a considerable number, even among protestants, and those too that are esteemed truly pious, who believe in modern miracles, and a revival of the prophetick spirit. As yet, this example of improvement and the march of mind, has not, so far as we have heard, been exhibited in this country, unless it be among the Mormonites, and the followers of Jemima Wilkinson. But we shall not be at all surprised to hear of it soon, among