Gross On this he observes that the relations between South African Republic and Nr. 11451. Great Britain, as recognized by international law, already excludes any attack britannien. upon independence of former from within any part of British dominions, and 25. Apr.1896. an offer of something is therefore made to South African Republic of which it is already in possession. With regard to an attack from territory of a foreign power, his Government has never desired nor requested any such guarantee. Despatch proceeds as follows verbatim:- || Quotation begins: "Should Her Majesty's Government, after due consideration, not see its way clear to an immediate discussion of the London Convention and its being replaced by a Treaty of amity and commerce containing the most-favoured-nation clause unless certain alleged grievances relating to certain internal matters in the Republic are also brought on for discussion, this Government, deeply sensible of the necessity of allaying the excited feeling in South Africa and promoting a friendly relation between the white races, will be prepared under existing circumstances not to press at present for a realization of its desire to obtain a reconsideration of the Convention, and would, as the aggrieved and injured party, prefer to content itself with the postponement of this question. It will rest satisfied for the present [? future] with the exercise [?] of its rights to a pecuniary compensation by reason of the violation of territory of the Republic caused by the Jameson inroad, and to an assurance on the part of Her Majesty's Government that no violation of such territory shall be repeated from out of any of Her Majesty's possessions. It will still remain in the discretion. of Her Majesty's Government to render it possible for the State President with confidence to propose to the Volksraad that leave should be given him to proceed to England upon the basis of discussion suggested or indicated by His Honour." Verbatim quotation ends. || The despatch concludes with assurance of sharing with Her Majesty's Government solicitude for the interests of South Africa as a whole, and expresses the opinion that through friendly co-operation the confidence so rudely shaken, as well as peace and prosperity, will be restored. Nr. 11452. GROSSBRITANNIEN. Der Kolonialminister an den Gouverneur in Kapstadt. Gross Telegram. 27th April, No. 1.-I have received your telegram of Nr. 11452. 24th April, No. 4. I regret the President does not see his way at present britannien. to ask the Volksraad for permission to come to England to discuss in a 27. Apr.1896. friendly spirit subjects which affect the security of the South African Republic and the general welfare of South Africa. || Under the circumstances, however, Her Majesty's Government have no alternative but to withdraw the invitation, which it appears from the President's message was given under a misappre Grossbritannien. Nr. 11452. hension of the facts. || On a review of the whole correspondence, Her Majesty's Government are reluctantly obliged to come to the conclusion that the 22. Apr. 1896. difference of view between themselves and the President is at present so considerable that no useful purpose would be served by the proposed conference in London till a greater approach to agreement has been arrived at. They take note of the statement of the President that his Government is at all times prepared to receive in a friendly spirit any private suggestions which Her Majesty's Government may wish to make with regard to interests of British subjects in the South African Republic, and to give such suggestions due consideration. They also note the assurances of the President of the readiness of the Government of the South African Republic to listen to complaints brought forward constitutionally, as evidenced by their Proclamation of 30th of December, and as the Session of the Volksraad begins next month Her Majesty's Government will await with confidence the fulfilment of this promise. Meanwhile they heartily reciprocate the hope of the President that through friendly co-operation confidence, peace, and prosperity, may be speedily restored. Nr. 11453. Zum Angriffe Jamesons auf die Südafrikan. Republik. (Vgl. Bd. 58). British Agency, Pretoria; May 1, 1896. (Received May 26, 1896. Sir, In taking the liberty of endeavouring to put certain facts before britannien. you with appropriate comment, I feel myself placed in the undesirable posi1. Mai 1896. tion of having to dilate upon services rendered, and perhaps overlooked, owing to the peculiar surroundings connected with the anomalous nature of the office I hold, but I feel that, in justice to myself, I cannot remain longer silent, and allow to stand unchallenged certain unwarranted misrepresentations which have appeared in some newspapers, evidently for the purpose of throwing dust in the eyes of Her Majesty's Government, and keeping them in ignorance as to the facts connected with the services I rendered during the late most trying crisis, and I feel assured that, when the particulars as herein stated shall come to your knowledge, my plea for justice will not be in vain. || I know that I am subordinate to his Excellency the High Commissioner, and at the scene of my labours I am expected to carry out his instructions, which I have always done to the best of my ability, as the success of the High Commissioner in Transvaal affairs has depended on the manner in which his instructions have been carried out. || However, during the late extraordinary and trying period I was compelled to act in the best *) Blaubuch 8164. 1896. Gross interests of Her Majesty's Government on my own responsibility and without Nr. 11453. instructions. || Let me first invite your attention to some remarks on the late britannien. agitation in Johannesburg before I deal with subsequent events. || For months, 1. Mai 1896. rumours and reports of a disquieting nature were freely circulated, and very tall talk was indulged in as to the course of action the leaders in the ferment intended taking, but no one outside expected or anticipated any such serious steps or violent action having for an object the overthrow of the local Government. However, as time rolled on, these reports increased in intensity and assumed a more definite form, it being then stated that the agitators had a large quantity of firearms at their disposal, and men willing to use them. Still, all this created at first nothing but vague suspicions in the minds of the Government of the Republic, who, with their hundreds of officials in daily contact with the leaders of the disturbance, were even themselves without accurate information. Therefore, with a view of finding out, if possible, the real condition, and for the purpose of raising a warning voice to the leaders, I visited Johannesburg on the 28th December last, and, learning from persons unconnected with the movement that serious steps were apprehended, I spoke to several of the leaders and warned them against the consequences of hostile acts. I told them that, though I was not in their secrets and did not know what organisations or preparations they had, I felt convinced, judging from the condition of the community, that they were not able to cope with the burghers of the Republic, who, I heard, had been warned to be ready at a moment's notice. This latter report may have been inaccurate, but I felt justified in using it as an argument to show what might be expected, and how disastrous the consequences would be to Johannesburg in the event of a conflict. || Still, the evidence gathered was not of such a nature as to arrive at the conclusion that Johannesburg would, or could, rise. My own impression was, from what I could learn, that the organisation was still a hazy and formless affair, too weak for clever and practical men to embark as leaders of such a hazardous scheme as to oppose the Transvaal Government by force of arms. || I returned the same evening to Pretoria (28th December), and on Monday, the 30th December, when I was just on the point of commencing an official report on what I had observed in Johannesburg, President Kruger sent for me. I then met his Honour presiding over the Executive with an Extraordinary Council, and was informed that an armed force of English troops had entered the South African Republic. I lost no time in conveying this to the High Commissioner, as per copy of telegram marked "A" attached. I then kept myself in hourly communication with the Government, and whatever information was received his Excellency the High Commissioner was duly advised by me, as can be shown by such telegrams as these annexed, marked "B" and "C". Under such circumstances I could not act without instructions, the first of these being in a telegram dated 30th December, but was only delivered here at 9 o'clock on the morning of the 31st, the same Gross Nr. 11453. day as it was handed in at the Cape Town telegraph office at 6 o'clock in britannien. the morning, instead of having been handed in there on the day previous 1. Mai 1896. (certified copy attached, "D"). In spite of this delay (inexplicable to me) before the message reached Pretoria, I immediately endeavoured to obtain a reliable man and a good horseman to convey his Excellency's message to Dr. Jameson. This could only be done by 11 o'clock, with the assistance of General Joubert, and it was even then 1 o'clock in the day before the messenger and escort could start, but Dr. Jameson was reached early the next morning, on New Year's Day, and before any fighting had taken place. The excitement both at Johannesburg and Pretoria was of the wildest character. In official quarters the impression gained ground that Johannesburg was well organised and effectively equipped with all the necessary munitions of war, that it would rush to the assistance of Jameson, attack Pretoria any moment, and that Kafirs as well as Europeans had been armed. || To refer to all the telegrams passing between his Excellency the High Commissioner and myself would be needless repetition, but the one of these containing the text of his Excellency's proclamation deserves especial comment, as I was blamed for any delay in carrying out instructions. This telegram was despatched from Cape Town on the 31st December at 5.5 p. m., and received in the telegraph office here at 5.40 p. m., but it was proved conclusively that it was not delivered at this Agency until 9 o'clock on that evening, the messenger in the meantime attending a young men's meeting with the telegram in his pocket. As soon as I was in possession of the message I went to the house of General Joubert, read to him the proclamation, and, as previously done, used his telephone connected with the President's house to likewise inform his Honour. General Joubert found it inconvenient to assist me with a messenger to forward the proclamation. Although I was without instructions to publish it, General Joubert, at my request, allowed one of his orderlies to proceed to the offices of the "Press" (the only morning journal) and bring a reporter to my house, where I gave to the latter the substance of the proclamation, and which appeared in the issue on the following morning. To obtain a messenger that night was impossible in spite of the most strenuous exertions, and it was only at 10 o'clock next morning I succeeded in engaging the man Celliers, who left my house with a copy of the proclamation under a covering despatch at noon on the 1st January, and who delivered this official communication at 7.5 the next morning. However, I later definitely ascertained that fighting began at 2.30 p. m. on the 1st January at the Queen's battery, a couple of miles west of Krugersdorp, and at about 11 o'slock a. m. on the 2nd January Jameson surrendered. || At this point a word of explanation is due to myself, as I have been blamed for not endeavouring to carry out the order of personally meeting Jameson. I received such instruction at past 2 p. m. on the 1st January, after fighting had commenced, and after my messenger had left, and while I was in hourly Gross communication with the local Government, having for several nights never Nr. 11453. retired to rest, and was therefore comparatively exhausted, and while expec- britannien. ting news of fighting at Johannesburg and an attack on Pretoria. How then 1. Mai 1896. could I be expected to leave Pretoria, with no one to act in my stead, and perpetrate the cruelty to a man of my advanced years to do an eight hours' ride on horseback during the night? || A few words further about Jameson before treating of matters in Johannesburg. After the discovery of the Willoughby - Cronjé correspondence, I was again made to bear the blame of others, because I had reported that the terms of Jameson's surrender was unconditional. This statement was often made by General Joubert in the Executive Council, and reiterated when he informed me of the surrender. In the face of this it seems unreasonable to cast the blame upon me for not knowing what took place between Willoughby and Cronjé, and which only came to light two months' afterwards. || From your remarks respecting an arrangement with President Kruger with reference to my going personally to turn back Jameson, you must have been under the impression that I could travel by rail to do so, and if Sir Hercules Robinson had not failed to enlighten you on this point I should not be blamed as I have been. || Again, before passing over to the Johannesburg affair, I wish to explain the apparent discrepancy between my despatch of the 27th December 1895 (Blue Book, page 64) and telegram of the 31st Decemcer (Blue Book, page 7), as to the condition of Johannesburg with regard to arms and organisation. My telegram was based on information received by the local Government from their various and numerous officials on the Raand Gold Fields-and who could posses reliable information if these did not, who were daily in touch with the ringleaders? and naturally I considered such information to be the most reliable. I should here observe that of Jameson's connexion with the Reform Committee, and his intentions, I never dreamt or suspected. || In the early morning of the 1st January, half an hour after midnight, the President sent for me to come to his house, with the Commissioner of Police. There I found assembled the President, the members of the Executive Council, three judges, and other head officials. I was then informed that armed forces had marched from Johannesburg that evening, presumably for Pretoria, and I was asked what I could do in order to avert bloodshed. Knowing the position taken by Her Majesty's Government in accordance with the proclamation of the High Commissioner, received three and a half hours previously, I stated that if I was given an escort to conduct me through the Burgher forces, I would at once proceed to Johannesburg, meet those forces, and endeavour to turn them back. At the same time I expressed the opinion that I did not believe that Johannesburg was on the march to attack Pretoria. The President asked me if I could suggest another method, as he did not consider it right for me to risk my life in passing through the Burgher lines. I then suggested sending a telegram to the Reform Committee, which was agreed to, |