the destruction of neutral prizes were allowed, there would be but little difference between neutral and enemy ships, and neutral governments would be almost powerless to protect their merchantmen. The German delegate "shared entirely" the Russian point of view, while the United States and Japanese delegates supported the British ; the Italian delegate pointed out the intimate connection between the subject and the right of using neutral ports, and a combined meeting of the two Examining Committees was held with the following result: free access to neutral ports for belligerent prizes was carried by a small majority (9 for, 3 against, 6 abstentions), prohibition of destruction, made by most conditional to free access, was carried by a slightly larger majority (11 for, 4 against, 2 abstentions), the Russian proposal for right to destroy had a small majority (6 for, 4 against, 7 abstentions)1. The subject of the destruction of neutral prizes was brought into striking prominence during the Russo-Japanese war by the sinking by the Russians of various neutral merchantmen, the Knight Commander, the Hip-sang, the St Kilda, the Ikhoma, the Oldhamia, the Thea and others. The British Government entered a strong protest against this procedure, which it characterised as "a serious breach of international law"; and a distinguished English publicist terms it an "outrage" and a "gross breach of international law 2." It will be noticed that the "questionnaire" of M. de Martens referred to the "laws of different countries" and "international practice." Sir Ernest Satow asked for the view of the Committee on the existing state of international law, but M. de Martens objected to put this question to the votes. The "laws of different countries" as evidenced by their naval instructions undoubtedly show a lack of uniformity, but such instructions have no international force, as will be seen from Lord Salisbury's correspondence with Germany in 1901 in the cases of the Herzog and Bundesrath. According to the Naval Codes and Prize Regulations of Russia, the United States and Japan, the sinking of neutral prizes is allowed under certain circumstances; the British proposal was however supported by the delegates of the two latter states. The British Manual of Naval Prize Law prohibits this procedure. From Naval Codes and the opinions of certain writers on international law (chiefly continental), the language of the British Government cannot be wholly 2 T. J. Lawrence, War and Neutrality, p. 257. 1 See post, p. 478. 3 See The Times, 8th Aug. 1908. 4 Parl. Papers, Cd. (1900); J. Dundas White, The seizure of the Bundesrath, 17 L. Q. R. 14. L. Oppenheim, Vol. I. pp. 470-1. supported, but it is certainly supported by modern international practice. In no modern naval war has any Government put forward such a doctrine as that enunciated by the Russian, and no belligerent since the Declaration of Paris has acted as the Russians. The doctrine of the Russian Government would, as Lord Lansdowne stated, justify the destruction of any neutral ship taken by a belligerent vessel which started on her voyage with a crew sufficient only for her requirements, and therefore unable to furnish prize crews for her captures; it is in effect a negation of the Declaration of Paris. There is a clear distinction between the right of seizure of enemy and neutral ships. The former is the legitimate exercise of a right of appropriation of all enemy property found on the high seas, the latter is exercised only for the purpose of punishing certain special acts which do not necessarily involve condemnation of the ship1. If the destruction of enemy ships is now generally recognised as lawful only in special cases, the list of exceptions should either vanish altogether, or be reduced to the minutest dimensions in the case of neutral prizes. The "Institut de Droit International" in 1887 pronounced in favour of the first alternative which is undoubtedly supported by modern practice. An agreement on this subject would materially aid in maintaining the peace of the world by removing a not improbable cause of war on the part of a neutral Power whose commerce was being ruined by the adoption by a belligerent of the practice advocated by the Russian Government2. The Conference was, however, able to make some progress towards a Code Beginnings of a Code of naval warfare. of naval warfare by the adoption of the Conventions relating to the status of enemy merchant ships at the outbreak of hostilities (No. 6), the Convention relative to the conversion of merchant ships into war ships (No. 7), the Convention relative to the laying of automatic submarine contact mines (No. 8), the Convention respecting bombardment by naval forces in time of war (No. 9), the Convention placing certain restrictions on the exercise of the right of capture in naval warfare (No. 11), the Convention for the creation of an international prize court (No. 12), and the Convention concerning the rights and duties of neutral Powers in naval war (No. 13). These Conventions are of unequal value, and some bear evident traces of a desire that some agreement on the subject to which they relate might be registered after so many weeks of labour; they will, doubtless, on many points need revision by the next Conference. 1 L. Oppenheim, Vol. 1. p. 469. 2 See post, pp. 557, 597. The next ference1. The First Conference had closed without making any provision for the summoning of another. The Second Conference was dragging Hague Con- on, hampered by its want of preparation and of adherence to parliamentary precedents, and many of those who looked for solid results were "in genuine anxiety about the consequence of a real collapse," and possessed by a "genuine desire that the Hague institution should not perish of what were not, perhaps, essential defects?." A Meeting of the First Delegates was held on the 14th September to consider the situation, and it was resolved to bring before the next Plenary Meeting a Vou with reference to a future Conference. The United States Delegation was instructed to "favour the adoption of a resolution by the Conference providing for the holding of further Conferences within fixed periods and arranging the machinery by which such Conferences may be called and the terms of the programme may be arranged, without awaiting any new and specific initiative on the part of the powers or any one of them." This had been recommended by the Inter-parliamentary Congress in 1904. The Conferences would then become real international assemblies presided over by a President chosen without any regard to the requirements of diplomatic etiquette, and discussing a programme which had not been prepared for it, but which it had previously settled for itself. The actual form in which the Vou found acceptance is as it appears in the Final Act, and M. Nélidow, the President of the Conference, proposed it at the Sixth Plenary Meeting on the 21st Sept., but the initiative must be assigned to the United States Delegation. "The somewhat slow and at times uncertain progress of our labours," said the President, "as well as the impossibility which the Conference finds of solving some of the problems submitted to it, or which have been brought forward in the course of our labours, have suggested to some of our colleagues the idea of taking into consideration the advantage of another meeting of the Conference, and of the necessity of preparing for it in advance a detailed programme and the method of its working and organisations." In these words the President concisely specified some of the causes of the want of success which had attended the wearisome and laborious discussions on many of the topics which had been under consideration. The Roumanian delegate, M. Beldiman, in supporting the Vou paid a tribute of homage to the August Initiator of the First and Second Conferences, adding that the 1 J. B. Scott, Recommendations for a third Peace Conference at the Hague, Am. Journ. of Int. Law, Vol. I. p. 815. 2 See Article in Edin. Review, Jan. 1908, p. 224. 3 Parl. Papers, Misc. No. 4 (1908), p. 42; La Deux. Confér. T. 1. p. 169. Vou in his opinion did not prejudge the taking of the same august initiative in the future, while the Austro-Hungarian delegate in rendering grateful homage to the Tsar added that they considered the initiative of Russia was definitely accepted in this matter. A general desire was expressed that the Queen of Holland would extend her hospitality to the next Conference. It will be seen that the speeches of the Roumanian and Austro-Hungarian delegates go beyond the actual words of the Vou. To whomsoever the initiative of the next Conference may belong, if in 1915 the Third Conference should meet in accordance with this Vou, two years before that date a preparatory Committee is to collect the various proposals to be submitted, to ascertain the subjects which are ripe for embodiment in an international regulation and to prepare a programme which the Governments shall decide upon in sufficient time to enable it to be carefully examined by the countries interested. The Committee is also to be entrusted with the work of proposing a system of organisation and procedure for the Conference itself. The Second Hague Conference has thus taken an important step, and, taught by its own tedious and cumbersome procedure, it has endeavoured to spare its successor from suffering from the like causes. If Hague Conferences, meeting in the future at specified intervals, are to develope into a world legislature, a veritable "Parliament of man," they can only be certain of producing beneficial and lasting results if the states taking part have thoroughly made up their minds both in regard to the matters to be discussed, and the views which their representatives are to support. The delegates of future Conferences will also be spared the chagrin and annoyance from which on several important occasions Plenipotentiaries suffered in 1907, when, owing to lack of instructions, they were unable to speak with any authority for the states they represented; while the latter will not hurriedly, and without due warning, have to formulate a policy on any topic which may be introduced without previous notice and consideration. |