ProtagorasLombardo and Bell have translated this important early dialogue on virtue, wisdom, and the nature of Sophistic teaching into an idiom remarkable for its liveliness and subtlety. Michael Frede has provided a substantial introduction that illuminates the dialogue's perennial interest, its Athenian political background, and the particular difficulties and ironic nuances of its argument. |
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Adeimantus agree akrasia Alcibiades answer arete argument Athenian become beliefs Callias Charmides citizens claim Cleinias consider courageous cowardly Critias debate dialectical dialogue discussion Epimetheus Eryximachus expertise fact fear hard Hedonism hedonist thesis Hephaestus Hesiod Hippias Hippocrates Hipponicus Homer honorable human ignorance justice and piety kind knowledge or wisdom listen lives long speech look means mind names one's opposite Orthagoras overcome by pleasure Pausanias perhaps Pericles person Phaedrus philosophical Phronesis pious Pittacus Plato Plato's Protagoras pleasant pleasure and pain poem poet position power or function praise Prodicus Prometheus Protagoras and Socrates punishment ques question reason refute respondent seems sense Simonides someone sophist sophrosune soul Spartan speak Stanley Lombardo tagoras talking taught teach virtue teachable tell things think that virtue tion translated true unity of virtue willingly wise Xanthippus young Zeus Zeuxippus
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Page 17 - Thus b equipped, human beings at first lived in scattered isolation; there were no cities. They were being destroyed by wild beasts because they were weaker in every way, and although their technology was adequate to obtain food, it was deficient when it came to fighting wild animals. This was because they did not yet possess the art of politics, of which the art of war is a part.
Page 58 - I have no other reason for asking these things than my desire to answer these questions about virtue, especially what virtue is in itself. For I know 361 that if we could get clear on that, then we would be able to settle the question about which we both have had much to say, I — that virtue cannot be taught, you — that it can. "It seems to me that our discussion has turned on us, and if it had a voice of its own, it would say, mockingly, 'Socrates and Protagoras, how ridiculous you are, both...
Page 54 - being overcome by pleasure" is — ignorance in the highest degree, and it is this which Protagoras and Prodicus and Hippias claim to cure. But you, thinking it to be something other than ignorance, do not go to sophists yourselves, nor do you send your children to them for instruction, believing as you do that we are dealing with something unteachable. By worrying about your money and not giving it to them, you all do badly in both private and public life.
Page 50 - They would say yes. Then you and 1 would ask them again: 'In what sense do you call these d things ruinous? Is it that each of these things is pleasant in itself and produces immediate pleasure, or is it that later they bring about diseases and poverty and many other things of that sort? Or even if it doesn't bring about these things later, but gives only enjoyment, would it still be a bad thing, just because it gives enjoyment in whatever way?
Page 24 - Then these also are parts of virtue — wisdom and courage?" "Absolutely, and wisdom is the greatest part." 330 "Is each of them different from the others?" "Yes." "And does each also have its own unique power or function? In the analogy to the parts of the face, the eye is not like the ear, nor is its power or function the same, and this applies to the other parts as well: They are not like each other in power or function or in any other way. Is this how it is with the parts of virtue? Are they...
Page 54 - I have to give in order to answer the question you asked us. You asked it, if you remember, when we were agreeing that nothing was stronger or better than knowledge, which always prevails, whenever it is present, over pleasure and everything else. At that point you said that pleasure often rules even the man who knows; since we disagreed, you went on to ask us this: 'Protagoras and Socrates, if this experience is not d being overcome by pleasure, what is it then; what do you say it is? Tell us.
Page 54 - Protagoras and Socrates, if this experience is not d being overcome by pleasure, what is it then; what do you say it is? Tell us.' If immediately we had said to you 'ignorance,' you might have laughed at us, but if you laugh at us now, you will be laughing at yourselves. For you agreed with us that those who make mistakes with regard to the choice of pleasure and pain, in other words, with regard to good and bad, do so because of a lack of knowledge, and not merely a lack of knowledge e but a lack...
Page 8 - Hipponicus, and his 315 brother on his mother's side, Paralus, son of Pericles, and Charmides,5 son of Glaucon. On the other side were Pericles' other son, Xanthippus, Philippides, son of Philomelus, and Antimoerus of Mende, Protagoras' star pupil who is studying professionally to become a sophist. Following behind and trying to listen to what was being said were a group of what seemed to be mostly foreigners, men whom Protagoras collects from the b various cities he travels through.
Page 48 - ... good? I mean, isn'ta pleasant thing good just insofar as it is pleasant, that is, if it results in nothing other than pleasure; and, on the other hand, aren't painful things bad in the same way, just insofar as they are painful?" "I don't know, Socrates, if I should answer as simply as you put the d question — that everything pleasant is good and everything painful is bad. It seems to me to be safer to respond not merely with my present answer in mind but from the point of view of my life overall,...
