at the pleasure and discretion of the own-been taken upon it. These propositions neers to export them. Hence a variety of frauds might arise on the revenue. It was therefore scarcely possible that this system could be followed without limitation or control. The inconveniences of the other system were obvious, they affected individuals and the revenue. It was therefore desirous to adopt an intermediate system that might, as far as possible, steer clear of the disadvantages which attended the other two-a system which would guard against frauds on the revenue, while it afforded accom. modation to mercantile transactions; a system that would protect the public revenue, without resorting to a rigour that was uncongenial to the spirit of our free constitution. Of the system he had in view, the country had already some experience, when two years ago it was applied to the articles of sugar, coffee, wine, &c. It then proved beneficial to the merchant, without injuring in any degree the public revenue. That experience afforded encouragement to extend the operation of this system, while the most perfect security would be afforded, both to the revenue and to the articles to which it would apply. These articles might be comprehended under five heads, and classed according to them in the bill. Under the first head would be comprised all articles of WestIndia produce; the second would comprehend tobacco, wine, brandy, &c. the third heavy and bulky articles, liable cessarily required much time and labour, and therefore prevented him from being able to bring forward the measure as early as he expected. The bill would, in the first instance, confine the benefits it held out to the city of London and the West-India Docks; but it would vest a power in the Privy Council to extend the licence to other ports on certain conditions. The licence would be granted only to such ports as carried on trade in the articles already enumerated to a just and reasonable extent, and which had docks, wharfs, &c. to afford the requisite accommodations for landing and warehousing such goods with security to the owners and to the revenue. From this power and discretion given to the Privy Council, no undue partiality or favour could be apprehended. The Privy Council would act under the inspection of Parliament, and any other check or guard, that could be suggested, for preventing any undue partiality, he should cheerfully attend to. Under these limitations and checks, it would be competent for the Privy Council to grant licences; nor shall it be necessary that the port solicit ing such licence should trade in all the above mentioned articles. To trade in some of them to any considerable extent would be sufficient. Indeed, it may become necessary to extend the advantages of the bill to many articles which have not been enumerated. But the Lords of the Treasury have not the power of making such an ex : to pay a small duty; the fourth, such arti--tension without the previous approbation of cles as required peculiar caution and care; the fifth, drugs, ingredients for dying, &c. which pay heavy duties: the whole to be. deposited in warehouses approved of by government, and placed under the inspection of custom house officers. Some articles would be committed to the care of the proprietors, upon their first entering into a bond to secure the payment of the duties; and in all other cases where the articles to be warehoused required no particular attention, they must be deposited in the warehouses appointed by government, and placed under the superintendance of custom-house officers. Such a distinction the Committee would, no doubt, feel the necessity of. To the principle of this measure he could not imagine there would be started any objection; at least he did not think that a mode could be devised less liable to objection. In framing the measure, every source was applied to from which information could be derived. The most intelligent merchants had been consulted, and the opinion of the Revenue Board and the Board of Trade had the Revenue Board, and the subsequent sanction of the Privy Council. Neither should any extension to other articles affect the accommodation that has already been granted to some merchants in some particular articles that accommodation will remain as before. Should the principle be not objected to, as he ventured to hope it would not, he trusted the House would allow the bill to be brought in immediately: what ob-jections might be urged against it would come best in the Committee. He hoped, therefore, the bill might be permitted to pass as rapidly as possible through its first stages; that it might then be printed; and after the interval of a few days, to be again considered and discussed. By limiting the bill in the first instance to the port of London, a variety of useless questions and discussions would be obviated, which would naturally be indulged in by those gentlemen who were more particularly connected with other ports; but that limitation would be no obstacle to extending the benefit of the bill to those ports also, where it should appear that they pos sessed the claims requisite for obtaining that indulgence. The right hon. gent. concluded with moving, that it is the opinion of this Committee, that it is expedient to permit certain goods to be warehoused without paying the duties. General Gascoyne did not rise to oppose the measure, as the right hon. gent, seemed to expect. On the contrary, he approved of it highly as far as it went. He was only sorry that it had not been brought forward somewhat sconer, and he feared that some alarm might arise from applying it exclusively to the port of London. Something - of that alarm did exist in his mind, but came rather from the apprehensions of those who might be affected by the measure, than from any opinion he entertained that it would operate to their prejudice. He trusted sufficient time would be allowed for the parties whom it may concern maturely to examine it. Until the out ports were acquainted with the nature and tendency of the bill, he should with-hold any observation upon it. Sir IVilliam Elford anxiously hoped that the benefit of the bill would be extended as fairly and as generally as possible, and that even the appearance of partiality might be studiously avoided; it would benefit not only the public, but also individuals, whom it would enable to extend their capital: all he should now ask was, whether government was to furnish the warehouses to which the privilege was to be granted, or whether they were to be provided by the individuals who solicited the indulgence? Mr. Vansittart observed, that individuals were to furnish the warehouses, which should be approved of by government. Mr. Hutchinson was anxious to know if the benefit of the bill might not be extended to Ireland? The Chancellor of the Exchequer said, that government did not intend that the bill should now extend to Ireland. Before it could be extended to Ireland, much investigation must take place, and much information be obtained, respecting the particular trade of the ports of Ireland. He felt with the hon. gent. how desirous it was to communicate these commercial advantages to Ireland; but he could not, for the reasons he already.alluded to, now attempt to extend the bill to that part of the united em pire. Mr. Vansittart reminded the hon. gent. that his right hon. friend (Mr. Corry) had already given notice of his intention to introduce a similar bill for Ireland.-The question was then put and agreed to; and the House being resumed, the report was brought up, the resolution agreed to, and the bill ordered pursuant to the same. DEFENCE OF THE COUNTRY.]-The General Defence Bill was read a third time; after which the following clauses were brought up a clause allowing persons who had more than one place of residence, to be enrolled in which they should prefer; a clause providing, that in case persons enrolled should, during the hours of training, misconduct themselves, they should be imprisoned a week, or fined five shillings; and a clause reserving the rights of the city of London. Mr. Alderman Coombe said, he could not with-hold his approbation of the respect which had been shewn for the charter of the city of London, but at the same time he hardly thought such a clause necessary, for in his opinion the bill did not tend to invade them, or the rights of the citizens. The bill did not force them to go to war, but only to put themselves in a better state for their own defence, in case the necessity for their exertions occurred. He approved highly of the bill, but thought the exemptions it contained might be prejudicial. Every man in the country ought to go forth when the exercise of the King's prerogative called upon him. There ought to be no exemption, but on the ground of inability. From one end to the other, the city of London were not only ready, but anxious to know how they could come forward with most effect. If there was any apprehension, it arose from the probability of embarrassment, by the myriads the city would pour out. In every ward, parish, and street, the people were waiting with impatience till his Majesty should point out the means of organising their courage.A clause was proposed for allowing those whose religious scruples made them averse to exercising on a Sunday, soliciting any other day, but restraining them from receiving pay. -The last clause brought up was for granting to the Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports the same power as Lords Lieutenants of counties. A short conversation took place relative to the allowance of one shilling to persons exercising; after which the question was put that the bill should pass. Colonel Craufurd observed, that he had already expressed some strong opinions as to the necessity of increasing the numbers of the regular army. Those opinions were not changed by any thing that had since taken place, nor did he mean in the smallest degree to retract them; on the contrary, he felt himself justified in supporting them. But lest he should be supposed to under-rate the exertions made by the government for the safety of the country, he thought it necessary to state, that no man in the House felt more than he did the immense importance of this bill: he believed government never had proposed, or Parliament adopted, a measure more calculated to produce the effect intended by it. He did not doubt, that, if it pleased God to crown the efforts of the navy with success, so as to prevent the invasion till the period when the bill should be carried into effect, it would place the country in such an attitude of strength as would defy the universe a state in which, should the whole world attack us, it would not be able to conquer us. He attached much importance to the co-operation our large army would receive from his countrymen in arms. He had concurred in the wish that the whole population of the country should be in arms; and, therefore, no man ever gave a vote with greater satisfaction than he did on this occasion. But, exclusive of the general advantages of arming, he conceived it was a mere measure attended with a moral advantage. The advantage he meant was, that it confirmed the truth of the language used by different gentlemen in the House. It was that language which had produced the effect of arming the country. It was the language of this bill that convinced them they were to be invaded by a powerful enemy, roused them to take up arms, and proclaim that they would not be conquered by all the enemies in the world. The people naturally said, if the danger was exaggerated, why have recourse to an army of 400,000 men? If we were not in a state of comparative weakness with reference to France, why increase the regulars by 40,000 men, and raise an army of 400,000 men? Such extraordinary measures justified those persons who had been stated to have held out desponding language; they had roused the people to a sense of their danger. He had been much misrepresented; he had been supposed to have held out, that this country had no alternative but submission to the enemy, and that such arguments had been used in order to ground an excuse for patching up a dishonourable peace. He never entertained an idea of peace with France. He thought that, under the circumstances of the times, his Majesty's ministers were entitled to the thanks of the country for the Treaty of Amiens. When they undertook to conduct the affairs of the kingdom, the crisis was a very peace they made was the best that could be made. In any sentiment he had at any time expressed, nothing was further from his mind, than that we should make a peace inconsistent both with the honour and dignity of the country. Now we could make no peace unless standing on the highest ground. Since the hour France said that England could not single-handed contend with her, peace had become impossible. Had she said so before the treaty of Amiens, we should not have made peace with her, without in serting in the face of the treaty, that singlehanded we could contend with her. We must now convince the whole world we were able to do so. He trusted it would please God to avert the invasion till our measures of defence were complete, when we should have nothing to fear. However, as we must, for some time to come, be in a state of comparative weakness, he lamented that more prompt measures had not been taken for carrying the old regular army of the country to the highest extent, for he was convinced that it was to that force we must ultimately look for the defence of the country. Every measure that, in a military point of view, was the best, ought to be taken; he therefore lamented that the measures for extending the regular army had not been more prompt and vigorous. It had been said, he had avoided mentioning the danger of the enterprize, when he talked of 60,000 Frenchmen landing, and marching to Londonthat he had totally set aside the danger of the winds and tides, and supposed a thing that never could happen. When the plan of defence was opened, he listened with satisfaction to that part of the speech of the Sec. at War, in which he admitted the possibility of an embarkation of 50,000, after 50,000 should have been drowned in the passage. For his own part he had only talked of drowning 30,000. He had been told that he had not taken into account any of the dif ficulties that would necessarily occur, and that he was supposing an impossible event. The conclusion he drew from this was, that the same thing said in this House by diffe rent people was taken differently, for the embarkation of 50,000 men was considered as impossible, when the impossibility was asserted by the Sec. at War. He did experience the most heartfelt satisfaction at this bill having been brought in; if carried into execution with promptitude, it would, with some other arrangements, which, no doubt, government would have recourse to, place us in a state of perfect security. It difficult one, and they had displayed an un- struck him, that instructing the people who common degree of vigour and energy. The should be enrolled merely for the present, would, if the measure was not extended to an effective armament, fall short of what was necessary. He did not think that government, having recourse to private arms, would be productive of any good. who came into the field with private arms would come with a small stock of ammunition, which might be fired away in a day; besides, their arms would be without that weapon, in the use of which the English particularly excelled-it would be unprovided with a bayonet. He observed, that it was proposed to exercise only the` first class. Perhaps it would contain as great a number as might be required; but there were some parts of the country where it might be necessary to, arm more than the first class. He was of opinion, that if ten thousand Frenchmen landed at any place, and they were opposed by five thousand regulars, assisted by the whole mass of the people, they would be driven in the sea again. There was a species of arms to the use of which the peasants were peculiarly adapted; he had seen them used with great vigour upon an unfortunate occasion in a neighbouring country, where he never again should see them so used-the arms he meant were pikes. Those who felt themselves the boldest young men would be in the pike corps; it would give a pledge that they would charge the enemy; they would know they could not be of use till they met the enemy. He was present at a charge of the Irish peasants, armed with pikes at Newross, and he had occasion to admire their courage. They came close to their opponents, and their attack was of a very formidable nature. He was sure the English peasants would make the same sort of attack when fighting for their country, their families, and independence. He should be happy to see the arming extended to the whole population. With all the advantages we might possess by carrying the present measure into effect, yet, if an invasion should take place, we should not be safe unless we had recourse to other measures, which military art pointed out. It 60 or 70,000 French troops should land, we should be in danger of having the fate of the capital decided by a battle. What would be the extent of the mischief, should a French army take London? There were those in the House who might calculate the mischief-he thought it unnecessary-it was too obvious. But even the very disgrace of an event taking place, against which the odds are three hundred to one, ought to operate as a reason for urging us to defend ourselves to that point when we could say-man can do no more under God VOL. IV. than to prevent the greatest city in the world from falling into the hands of the enemy. It would be such a disgrace to a great nation like this to have it said, there was even a chance of taking the capital, that we ought to go on till we could say the military art can do no more; we must trust to God and our own exertions. He thought we were far short of this point. He had a very great respect for the opinion of a noble baronet opposite to him, (Sir W. Erskine) who certainly had spoken like an Englishman and a soldier; but he was of opinion that an army of 60,000 landing at different points, might push on so near the capital, that a single battle might decide the fate of it. The most certain means of preventing this would be to increase the regulars, and to have recourse to the fortifying art. The first measure necessary was to increase the regular troops. He did not wish to say any thing to the prejudice of the militia in favour of the regular troops; but he would ask the hon. baronet he had already referred to, whether, if he was going to attack fifty thousand French troops, he would prefer regulars or militia. regiments? It was a long time before new regiments could be formed. When a new regiment was made, it was a long while before it became a good regiment. It might consist of brave and good irregulars. For these reasons, he regretted that measures were not adopted for reducing the militia force to the proportion which it ought to bear to the regular army, for the defence of the country. The militia ought not to be more than one-third of the force of the regular army. If the militia colonels were to give their assistance, the regiments of the line might all be completed. There were some regiments that had not above 150, others 6 or 700 men. He would carry every one of those regiments to its full complement. The regiments of the line contained that which constituted the excellence of the army, the very soul of the army, if he might so express it. He had been misunderstood when he was supposed to have been talking of the Austrian regiments as machines. He felt that it was a measure of necessity to have recourse to the militia to fill up the regiments of the line, and he was convinced we had the means of doing it. If the militia colonels were disposed to co-operate with government, we might have 20,000 trained men of the militia in the course of a month. The present, however, he considered an energetic measure. He thought the army of reserve was not made use of in the best way it might have been. If the regiments of the line were carried to 1200, we might * P If in a few weeks have an army of old regiments. In fact, we should have an army that would be able to contend with any that should land in the vicinity of the enemy capital. Without having recourse to the measures he bad alluded to, he thought we were in the most imminent danger of London falling into the hands of the enemy. 50,000 landed and pushed forward, and a battle took place, in which the French were victorious, it would be impossible to collect another army time enough to prevent their taking possession of the capital, He had never said that England would be conquered by London's being taken, but he believed it would place the country in the most disastrous situation any country ever was placed in, without being conquered. These were his opinions; he had expressed them only to induce the House to make every possible exertion for increasing the army by the most prompt and military measures. Even when this was done, he should not be satisfied. If this bill was carried into effect, and something further was done for increasing the regular army, he should still think we had not done enough, while the military art afforded resources for doing more, till we had done all that was possible in order to prevent a defeat, from throwing the capital into the hands of an enemy. While any thing was left undone, we ought to proceed-it was impious. to fall short. He had risen to blame no man, but to give his opinion. If he was asked why he had not brought these observations forward in former stages of the bill, all he had to answer was, that he had no reason to suppose his opinion would have influenced his Majesty's government, or that they would have been induced to have adopted what he recommended; he should. not even have expressed his opinion of the army of reserve, had he not found that it was proposed to raise 40,000 by ballot. He knew, he said, that it was not customary to occupy much of the attention of that House upon the details of such professional subjects, as he was desirous to treat of: but at a time when the country was called upon to fight for its existence, he thought some small portion of time might as well be employed upon military topics, as whole days frequently upon commercial and other subjects. The first thing he would advert to was, that since the alarm of invasion became so general, he observed that every thing had been done in the way of fortifications. This he considered to be a very material branch of defence; nothing could be done in it in the usual way of contractors, or by any other mode than as a great national work, in which his Majesty should be empowered to compel as many persons to work as may be sufficient, provided that it did not take away so many hands from agriculture, as to be likely to produce a famine, and that it did not materially interfere with the other military services. With regard to the manufactures, he said, that on such an occasion he made little account of them; for when the country was in danger of invasion, it was a very subordi nate consideration that the manufactures should be suspended; and in such an extremity he thought agriculture itself was little more than a secondary consideration. He did not know whether his Majesty did or did not already possess the power alluded to, but if he did not, it should be immediately given to him, at least all the workmen about London and its vicinity should be immediately set to work. He knew that in this country there existed a strong prejudice against fortifications, as the people were more disposed to look for security from that frontier which God had given them. Viewing the state of the nation, however, as a military man, he saw four objects upon fortifications should be erected without further delay. First, for the security of our naval and military depôts. He perceived in some gentlemen, he said, a kind of apprehension, as if he was about to proceed indiscriminately, but he assured them that he should not utter a syllable which could tend to give the enemy any kind of information. Perhaps it may not be in his power to give them any, for there was less secrecy in these things than people imagined. It had been said by a very competent authority, that it was not right to have a secret which the enemy may not know, and he confessed that he could scarcely imagine any other secrecy than what was required on the day or night before a battle, such as where the attack was to commence, or the great effort was to be employ ed in something connected with the arrangement for the action. All the nations of Europe were long since perfectly well acquainted with the topography of each others coun try, and what were the most advantageous points both of offensive and defensive ope rations. As a proof that all the points of this country were very accurately known, he stated, that when he was Resident Commissary with the Austrian army, in the year 1799, the Archduke Charles sent him a plan, taken from the pocket of a French officer, for a descent upon England. On examin ing that plan, he observed it contained a projet for a march from the coast in four columns to unite in the me |