admiral, be the seizor, he, and not the admiral, must be called as the immediate wrongdoer, to adjudication.(k)

DXX. It may happen that when a period has been fixed by Treaty for the cessation of hostilities, within or at a specified locality, and before this period has arrived, but with a knowledge of the Peace, a capture has been made. In such a case is the capture lawful? Jurists have entertained different opinions upon this subject. Mr. Chancellor Kent(7) adopts the opinion of Emerigon, (m) that it would be unlawful; and his reasoning, viz., that if a constructive knowledge of the Peace, after the time limited in different parts of the world, renders the capture void, much more ought actual knowledge of the Peace to produce that effect. It appears to the writer of these pages that this reasoning is sound and ought to govern the practice of states.(n)

DXXI. The effect of constructive knowledge has undergone considerable discussion in the French Prize Courts. It arose on the capture of the British ship Swineherd (o) by the French privateer Bellone in 1801. The Swineherd was carried into the Isle of France and condemned as prize. An appeal was instituted in the Conseil des Prises at [*648] Paris: that tribunal confirmed the judgment of the Court in the Isle of France. We are indebted to M. Merlin(p) for the report of the case. Unfortunately we are not indebted to him for the expression of his own opinion, which that learned and laborious jurist expresses his determination to withhold, when he introduces the case to our notice. He reports, however, at length the argument of the Advocate-General, M. Collet Descotils, in favour of the legality of the capture. The case depended in some measure upon the 11th article of the Preliminary Articles of the Peace of Amiens: it was decided, rightly or wrongly, that the French Privateer was entitled to its prize, the Swineherd, upon a variety of grounds, the principal of which appear to have been that the capture was made at a period anterior to the time fixed for restitution ; that it was sheltered by the Preliminary Article which has been mentioned; that there was, on the part of the privateer, "le défaut de connaissance suffisante de la cessation de toute hostilité."(q)

The exposition of the law upon this latter point by the French crown lawyer is sound, whether the application of it to the case before him

were correct or not.

"J'en reviens à l'opinion d'Emérigon et de Valin; je pense, comme eux, qu'un corsaire qui a une connaissance positive de la paix avant de rencontrer un bâtiment qui auparavant était ennemi, n'a pas le droit de l'arrêter, hors toutefois le cas d'une legitime défense, encore bien que les délais pour la validité des Prises, ne soient pas encore expirés.

"Mais qu'entend-on par connaissance positive de la paix? Ces auteurs en parlent, mais aucun ne la définit. Je vais tâcher de le faire d'après les principes de la raison, et de supplêer par-là au silence qu'ils gardent sur ce point.

(k) The Mentor, 1 Robinson's Rep., p. 171.

(1) Comment., i. p. 172. (m) Traité des Ass., c. xii. s. 19.

(n) Valin, Tr. des Prises, c. iv. ss. 4, 5.

(0) Le Porcher.

(P) Rep. tome xxv. (xiii.) tit. Prise Maritime, s. 5, p. 115: "En quel temps peut

être exercé le droit de Prise Maritime."

(g) Ib. p. 130.

"La connaissance dont il s'agit, doit être certaine, assurée, *indubitable; elle doit émaner médiatement ou immédiatement de [*649] la puissance à laquelle appartient l'armateur, et si l'on veut, de l'une ou de l'autre des deux puissances contractantes.

"Cette connaissance doit être telle, qu'elle, prévienne ou dissipe tous les doutes, toutes les incertitudes, toutes les craintes, tous les dangers que pourrait courir le corsaire; elle doit, en même temps qu'elle paralyse les lettres de marque, qu'elle impose au corsaire le devoir de s'abstenir de toutes hostilités, le mettre lui-même à l'abri de la capture; elle doit enfin être transmise par des pièces authentiques et légales qui prémunissent le corsaire contre le danger, en se retirant dans un des ports de sa nation, d'être pris par quelque navire ennemi non encore informé de la conclusion de la paix.

"Il s'en faut donc de beaucoup due je sois de l'opinion qu'une ignorance absolue de la paix soit nécessaire pour qu'une saisse faite avant l'expiration des délais, soit valable: l'admettre, c'est supposer qu'un bruit incertain, qu'une nouvelle douteuse, qu'une rapport dont aucune pièce authentique ne garantil la vérité, sont suffisans pour mettre un corsaire dans l'obligation indispensable de cesser sa croisière, et de rentrer dans le port de son armement, tout en demeurant exposé au danger d'être capturé pendant le temps de sa retraite.

"Je ne saurais convenir, avec le Capitaine Black, que, dans le cas d'une simple annonce de paix, non valablement justifiée, le corsaire n'ait le droit d'arrêter que provisoirement, sauf à relâcher le navire, sans être susceptible de dommages-intérêts, si la nouvelle se trouve vraie, ou à en poursuivre la confiscation, si elle se trouve fausse.

“Au moment même de l'arrestation, la saisie est bonne, ou elle est nulle, selon que le corsaire n'a point ou qu'il a la connaissance positive de la paix. S'il l'a, le navire doit être relâché avec dommages-intérêts; s'il ne l'a point, la saisie est valable, et la confiscation doit être prononcée." (r)

[*650]

*DXXIÍ. Another case different from the foregoing has happened, and been subjected to judicial decision, both in England and the North American United States, the case of a capture made before the period fixed for the cessation of hostilities, and in ignorance of the Peace; but not carried into port and condemned. The vessel was recaptured after the period fixed for the cessation of hostilities, but in ignorance of the Peace. In both countries the possession of the captor was holden lawful, and the divesting him of his possession unlawful.(s) The title of the owner was completely barred by the intervention of Peace, which quiets all titles of possession to property of this kind(t) arising from War.

It is no longer competent to the original proprietor to look back to the enemy's title, either in his own possession or in the hands of neutral purchasers.

Merlin Rep., vol. xxv. (xiii.,) p. 125, see also p. 130.

(s) 1 Kent, p. 173. The Legal Tender, Wheaton's (Amer.) Digest, p. 302. The Schoone Sophie, 6 Rob., p. 138.

(t) Vide ante, p. 504. Vide post, p. 653.

SEPTEMBER, 1857.-29

And here it may also be remarked, that if a new War break out after the Treaty of Peace, on account of non-fulfilment of its provisions or for any other reason, though that may change the relation of those who are parties to it, it can, as Lord Stowell observes, have no effect on neutral purchasers, who stand in the same situation as before. (u)

DXXIII. Having made the foregoing observations upon the period at which Treaties begin to operate; we have now to examine the effect of Treaties of Peace upon matters of Public Right. In order to do this we must take into our consideration

(a.) The rules of interpretation by which the provisions expressed in a Treaty are to be explained.

(8.) The rules of legal presumption, with respect to subjects, upon which the Treaty is silent, but which have either been among the matters of dispute which have caused the War *closed by the Treaty, or [*651] have arisen and been debated during the course and progress of

the War.

DXXIV. I. (a) With respect to the former the reader must be referred to the rules for the Interpretation of Treaties which have been mentioned in the Second Volume of this work. (x)

But, both with respect to the rules which govern the Interpretation of Treaties, and the Legal Presumptions which flow from the silence of Treaties, it is expedient to observe that there may be said to be four predicaments of a Treaty to which both are applicable.

The Treaty may adopt as its basis(y)—

1. The state of things existing before the War (status quo ante bellum.) 2. The state of things existing at the conclusion of the War (usually, however inaccurately, called uti possidetis.)(z)

3. A new state of things, composed perhaps of both the former.

[*652]

4. It may contain a general clause of amnesty, the effect *of which is a remission of all public wrongs and obligations. (a) 5. It may be silent as to all former public wrongs and obligations between the Belligerents.

(u) The Schoone Sophie, 6 Rob., p. 143.

(x) Vide ante, Vol. II., Part. V. Ch. VIII.

(૪) "At maximè disceptari solet, an injuriæ et damna ante bellum data per pacem remissa sint? Nos quatuor casus distinguimus; vel enim paci adjicitur clausula, quod omnia restitui debeant in statum, quo fuêre ante bellum, vel pactum est, ut omnia maneant in statu quo nunc sunt, vel plane, nihil dictum est de damnis injuriis et debitis, vel paci, clausula generalis amnestiæ adjicitur."-S. Cocceii Grotius Illustr., vol. v. p. 502, (1. vii. c. vii. s. 1864.)

(2) This term is borrowed from the well known interdict of the Roman Prætor. He, finding a litigant in de facto possession, forbad his expulsion by force; but then it was expressly stated as the foundation of the interdict, that the possessor was not in this possession by any act of violence. "Ait Prætor, uti eas ædes, quibus de agitur, nec vi, nec clam, nec precariò alter ab altero possidetis, quo minus ita possideatis, vim fieri veto;' (4) est igitur hoc interdictum quod vulgo uti possidetis appellatur, retinendæ possessionis; nam hujus rei causa redditur, ne vis fiat ei, qui possidet; (5) perpetuò autem huic interdicto insunt hæc, quod, nec vi, nec clam, nec precariò ab illo possideas."—Dig. 1. xliii. t. xvii. The phrase uti possidetis therefore is improperly used to signify the status quo of Belligerents at the conclusion of a War.

(a) "Remittit enim injuriam, qui se eam obliturum promittit, adeoque hactenus quoque omnia in statu, quo nunc sunt manent."-Cocceius, ubi supra, s. 1868.

DXXV. The principal distinction which it is necessary to observe in considering the legal presumptions which flow from the silence of Treaties, is, whether the property be movable or immovable.

To the eye of the philosophical jurist this latter division may, as a matter of abstract speculation, appear strange or untenable: but there is no doubt that to the eye of the practical statesman it presents a distinction most deeply and universally rooted in the laws, customs, and practice of all civilized nations. The distinction The distinction is indeed of less importance in matters of Public Right, because in practice the necessity for observing it but seldom occurs. (b)

DXXVI. It is now pretty generally acknowledged(c) that there is both absurdity and iniquity in classing territory obtained by conquest under the category of res nullius; and of applying, with unreasoning pedantry or sophistical injustice, not the spirit, but the letter, of the Roman law, (d) to a subject-matter which, like that of conquest, has necessarily undergone, in all its bearings, a most important change since the time of Justinian.(e)

The shameless pretext of Frederic the Second for the invasion of Saxony, in 1756,(ƒ) will not be alleged again by the most reckless despiser of International Justice.

*Various and many Treaties of Peace fortify the sound international doctrine that conquest and occupation(g) of territory are [*653] distinct public acts, carrying with them very different consequences, both to the state and to the individual. The language of Treaties which concern the acquisition of conquered territory is that the subdued state yields or concedes (cédera)(h) a certain territory to another; not that the conquering state retains or keeps possession of what it has seized, which would be the proper expression in the Treaty with respect to a State obtaining the recognition of an occupied territory.

"Il est incontestable (says Monsieur de Rayneval) que le mot cêder suppose essentiellement la propriété, par conséquent ni la guerre ni la conquête ni la détruisent. Ainsi la pratique dément le principe enseigné par le droit Romain et par la plupart des publicistes."

DXXVII. Immovable property, public or private, can, according to the modern understanding of International Law, be acquired under a sure title only in consequence of a Treaty of Peace or the entire subju

(b) Vide ante, p. 504.

(c) See pp. 388, 391, tit. Tercero, Seccion Cuarta, s. clix. of the "Elementos del Derecho Internacional obra póstuma, de Don José María de Pando, Ministro de Estado que fué en 1823. Madrid, imprenta de Allegia y Charlain, Cuesta de Santo Domingo, Num. 8, 1843." Pando was born at Lima, 1787; died at Madrid, 1840. (d) Vide ante, Vol. I. p. 34.

(e) Inst., 1. xi. 1-17. Dig., xli. t. ii. 1. i. 1. (ƒ) Pando, p. 616, note 4.

(g) Vide ante, vol. I. pp. 237-265.

(h) E. g. in the Treaty of Utrecht, 1713, between Louis XIV. and Frederic William of Prussia, it is said, (Art. 7,) "que la partie du quartier de Gueldres que possede et occupe le Roi de Prusse lui est cédée à la perpetuité."

In the preliminaries of the Peace of 1783, between France and England, it is said, respecting the Isle of Tobago, (Art. 7,) " que le Roi de la Grande-Bretagne cedéra à la France, l'Ile du Tobago." This island was, at the time of the Treaty, occupied under the title of conquest by the French. De Rayneval, ii. pp. 156, 7, note 35.

gation of the country of the original proprietor. Until one or other of these events the jus postliminii remains. ()

*The question whether, if the people shake off the subjuga[*654] tion, the jus postliminii would revive, is not without difficulty. Pando(k) wisely distinguishes between two predicaments :

1st. If the subjugation presents the appearance of being a mere temporary and involuntary submission to violence, the state of War continues, and therefore the jus postliminiï continues.(7)

2nd. If the dominion of the conquerors has been confirmed by the consent, express or tacit, of the conquered-a consent which is presumed in law after the peaceable possession of some years, (m)-then War has ceased, and the jus postliminii is for ever extinguished by Peace.

DXXVIII. A striking illustration of the importance generally ascribed to the presumption arising from the silence of Treaties is to be found in the recent adjustment effected between Russia and Denmark respecting the succession to the throne of the latter country. The following is a copy of the Protocol of Warsaw relative to the Danish Succession, and of the renewal of that document by Russia in 1852.(n)

"His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias and His Majesty the King of Denmark, taking into consideration the engagements entered into between their august predecessors, in the years 1767 and 1773;

"Considering that, as well for establishing the tranquillity of the North of Europe on a durable footing, as for removing all that could then, or for the future, give rise to misunderstandings or differ

[*655] ences in the august House of Oldenburg, the Emperor Paul, of glorious memory, then Grand Duke of Russia, renounced for himself, as also for his heirs and descendants, in favour of His Majesty King Christian VII., of glorious memory, as also of the heirs of his royal crown, all his rights and pretensions to the Duchy of Schleswig in general, and to the heretofore princely portion of that duchy in particular;

“That in the same manner, and from the same motives, His Majesty the Emperor Paul ceded for himself, as also for his descendants, heirs, and successors, all that he possessed in the Duchy of Holstein, whether in common with His Majesty the King of Denmark, or separately;

“Considering that this Act of Cession of the Duchy of Holstein has only been made expressly in favour of His Majesty King Christian VII., and of his male lineage, and also eventually in favour of the late Prince Frederick, the king's brother, and of the male lineage of that prince, and that the eventualities which the terms themselves of this Act of Cession admitted, have already in part been realized by the extinction of

(i) Pando, s. clxvii. p. 403: "Con respecto a las cosas, hay diferencia: o se trata de bienes-raices, ó de bienes-meubles."

"Asi pues, por lo que respecta à los bienes-raices, tanto particulares como publicos, et derecho de postliminio solo expira por et tratado de Paz, o por la completa subjugacion del Estado."-Pando, p. 404: he cites Olmeda, I. ii. c. xii.

(k) P. 404.

(1) Vide ante, Vol. I., p. 275, II. pp. 17-18.

(m) Vide ante, Vol. I., Chapter XIII., on Prescription.

(n) Return to an Address of the House of Commons, dated 18 February, 1856.