Evolving Enactivism: Basic Minds Meet ContentMIT Press, 9 juin 2017 - 360 pages An extended argument that cognitive phenomena—perceiving, imagining, remembering—can be best explained in terms of an interface between contentless and content-involving forms of cognition. Evolving Enactivism argues that cognitive phenomena—perceiving, imagining, remembering—can be best explained in terms of an interface between contentless and content-involving forms of cognition. Building on their earlier book Radicalizing Enactivism, which proposes that there can be forms of cognition without content, Daniel Hutto and Erik Myin demonstrate the unique explanatory advantages of recognizing that only some forms of cognition have content while others—the most elementary ones—do not. They offer an account of the mind in duplex terms, proposing a complex vision of mentality in which these basic contentless forms of cognition interact with content-involving ones. Hutto and Myin argue that the most basic forms of cognition do not, contrary to a currently popular account of cognition, involve picking up and processing information that is then used, reused, stored, and represented in the brain. Rather, basic cognition is contentless—fundamentally interactive, dynamic, and relational. In advancing the case for a radically enactive account of cognition, Hutto and Myin propose crucial adjustments to our concept of cognition and offer theoretical support for their revolutionary rethinking, emphasizing its capacity to explain basic minds in naturalistic terms. They demonstrate the explanatory power of the duplex vision of cognition, showing how it offers powerful means for understanding quintessential cognitive phenomena without introducing scientifically intractable mysteries into the mix. |
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... claim that such minds exhibit a kind of basic intentionality. It situates REC's notion of Urintentionality within the larger history of attempts to explicate the notion of intentionality simpliciter, showing that there is conceptual ...
... of a kind of cognition that depends on the mastery and exercise of narrative capacities. In defending this strong claim about autobiographical memory, drawing on REC's understanding of contentless imaginings, Preface xxi.
... claim to have the resources needed to explain how and why embodied cognition is so pervasive. They attempt to do so by appealing to the fact that the brain gets a great deal of its cognitive work done by reusing or redeploying embodied ...
... claim,” “assert”) things to be a certain way the notion that analytic philosophers and classical cognitive scientists commit to when they suppose that cognizers “represent things as being thus and so—where, for all that, things need not ...
... claim that REC must reduce to REB do not see Noë's CEC approach as falling afoul of a similar fate. Why not? Any E-theory of a CEC kind, such theorists hold, is safe to the extent that it endorses unrestricted CIC.7 Thus Noë's 2004 ...
Table des matières
1 | |
21 | |
3 From Revolution to Evolution | 55 |
4 RECtifying and REConnecting | 75 |
Whats It All About? | 93 |
Kinks Not Breaks | 121 |
7 Perceiving | 147 |
8 Imagining | 177 |
9 Remembering | 203 |
Missing Information? | 233 |
Notes | 255 |
References | 283 |
Index | 315 |
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Evolving Enactivism: Basic Minds Meet Content Daniel D. Hutto,Erik Myin Aucun aperçu disponible - 2017 |