Evolving Enactivism: Basic Minds Meet ContentMIT Press, 9 juin 2017 - 360 pages An extended argument that cognitive phenomena—perceiving, imagining, remembering—can be best explained in terms of an interface between contentless and content-involving forms of cognition. Evolving Enactivism argues that cognitive phenomena—perceiving, imagining, remembering—can be best explained in terms of an interface between contentless and content-involving forms of cognition. Building on their earlier book Radicalizing Enactivism, which proposes that there can be forms of cognition without content, Daniel Hutto and Erik Myin demonstrate the unique explanatory advantages of recognizing that only some forms of cognition have content while others—the most elementary ones—do not. They offer an account of the mind in duplex terms, proposing a complex vision of mentality in which these basic contentless forms of cognition interact with content-involving ones. Hutto and Myin argue that the most basic forms of cognition do not, contrary to a currently popular account of cognition, involve picking up and processing information that is then used, reused, stored, and represented in the brain. Rather, basic cognition is contentless—fundamentally interactive, dynamic, and relational. In advancing the case for a radically enactive account of cognition, Hutto and Myin propose crucial adjustments to our concept of cognition and offer theoretical support for their revolutionary rethinking, emphasizing its capacity to explain basic minds in naturalistic terms. They demonstrate the explanatory power of the duplex vision of cognition, showing how it offers powerful means for understanding quintessential cognitive phenomena without introducing scientifically intractable mysteries into the mix. |
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... or PPC, is offered as a shining example of how this procedure works in action. We show how the central ideas of PPC can be given a REC rendering by abandoning standard cognitivist interpretations, and why this xviii Preface.
... cognitivist interpretations, and why this crucial adjustment to PPC is theoretically well-motivated and justified. Chapter 4 provides further examples of RECtification, this time with the aim of showing how REC can fruitfully ally with ...
... With these reminders about the core features of the dominant cognitivist framework in place, it is possible to gauge to what extent and precisely how existing E-theories are more or less 4 Chapter 1 Degrees of Radicality.
... cognitivist commitments. They hold that nonneural, temporally extended embodied engagements can feature in, and perhaps even constitute, cognition. A familiar version of such an approach, promoted by advocates of the extended mind ...
... cognitivist thinking.3 It holds that central forms of cognition are constituted by and supervene on wide-reaching, temporally extended, interactive embodied engagements with the world. Yet it steers clear of any form of computational ...
Table des matières
1 | |
21 | |
3 From Revolution to Evolution | 55 |
4 RECtifying and REConnecting | 75 |
Whats It All About? | 93 |
Kinks Not Breaks | 121 |
7 Perceiving | 147 |
8 Imagining | 177 |
9 Remembering | 203 |
Missing Information? | 233 |
Notes | 255 |
References | 283 |
Index | 315 |
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