Evolving Enactivism: Basic Minds Meet ContentMIT Press, 9 juin 2017 - 360 pages An extended argument that cognitive phenomena—perceiving, imagining, remembering—can be best explained in terms of an interface between contentless and content-involving forms of cognition. Evolving Enactivism argues that cognitive phenomena—perceiving, imagining, remembering—can be best explained in terms of an interface between contentless and content-involving forms of cognition. Building on their earlier book Radicalizing Enactivism, which proposes that there can be forms of cognition without content, Daniel Hutto and Erik Myin demonstrate the unique explanatory advantages of recognizing that only some forms of cognition have content while others—the most elementary ones—do not. They offer an account of the mind in duplex terms, proposing a complex vision of mentality in which these basic contentless forms of cognition interact with content-involving ones. Hutto and Myin argue that the most basic forms of cognition do not, contrary to a currently popular account of cognition, involve picking up and processing information that is then used, reused, stored, and represented in the brain. Rather, basic cognition is contentless—fundamentally interactive, dynamic, and relational. In advancing the case for a radically enactive account of cognition, Hutto and Myin propose crucial adjustments to our concept of cognition and offer theoretical support for their revolutionary rethinking, emphasizing its capacity to explain basic minds in naturalistic terms. They demonstrate the explanatory power of the duplex vision of cognition, showing how it offers powerful means for understanding quintessential cognitive phenomena without introducing scientifically intractable mysteries into the mix. |
À l'intérieur du livre
Résultats 1-5 sur 27
... fundamental forms of cognition involve contentfully representing the world or being contentfully informed about it in the sense of instantiating correctness conditions of some kind. Making this twist to how we think about cognition is ...
... fundamental difference between responding to and keeping track of covariant information and making contentful claims and judgments that can be correct or incorrect. As he makes clear, These two notions of representation should properly ...
... fundamental problems—so, where possible, it is best to steer clear of CEC's halfway-house proposals. What is required in order to get our understanding of cognition on a positive footing? Presumably, the optimal account would do all the ...
... fundamental respects can be of practical and scientific value. Such a framework might provide productive and useful insight into some phenomena, even if this insight proves limited—even if such a framework only allows us to see xvi Preface.
... fundamental to all cognition. By REC's lights, acquiring the capacity for cognition that involves content is a special achievement. Creatures capable of contentful cognition, in the REC view, will have had to master very special kinds ...
Table des matières
1 | |
21 | |
3 From Revolution to Evolution | 55 |
4 RECtifying and REConnecting | 75 |
Whats It All About? | 93 |
Kinks Not Breaks | 121 |
7 Perceiving | 147 |
8 Imagining | 177 |
9 Remembering | 203 |
Missing Information? | 233 |
Notes | 255 |
References | 283 |
Index | 315 |
Autres éditions - Tout afficher
Evolving Enactivism: Basic Minds Meet Content Daniel D. Hutto,Erik Myin Aucun aperçu disponible - 2017 |