Evolving Enactivism: Basic Minds Meet ContentMIT Press, 9 juin 2017 - 360 pages An extended argument that cognitive phenomena—perceiving, imagining, remembering—can be best explained in terms of an interface between contentless and content-involving forms of cognition. Evolving Enactivism argues that cognitive phenomena—perceiving, imagining, remembering—can be best explained in terms of an interface between contentless and content-involving forms of cognition. Building on their earlier book Radicalizing Enactivism, which proposes that there can be forms of cognition without content, Daniel Hutto and Erik Myin demonstrate the unique explanatory advantages of recognizing that only some forms of cognition have content while others—the most elementary ones—do not. They offer an account of the mind in duplex terms, proposing a complex vision of mentality in which these basic contentless forms of cognition interact with content-involving ones. Hutto and Myin argue that the most basic forms of cognition do not, contrary to a currently popular account of cognition, involve picking up and processing information that is then used, reused, stored, and represented in the brain. Rather, basic cognition is contentless—fundamentally interactive, dynamic, and relational. In advancing the case for a radically enactive account of cognition, Hutto and Myin propose crucial adjustments to our concept of cognition and offer theoretical support for their revolutionary rethinking, emphasizing its capacity to explain basic minds in naturalistic terms. They demonstrate the explanatory power of the duplex vision of cognition, showing how it offers powerful means for understanding quintessential cognitive phenomena without introducing scientifically intractable mysteries into the mix. |
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... Two Takes 188 Basic Imaginings at Work: When REC Met MET 193 9 Remembering 203 Memory's Many Kinds 203 Enactive, Embodied RECollections 204 Narrative Practice and Autobiographical Memory 206 The Puzzle of Pure viii Contents.
... Pure Episodic Remembering 215 Roles and Functions of Remembering 221 Epilogue: Missing Information? 233 Don't Mess with Mr. In-Between! 233 Neurodynamics 236 Extensive Dynamics 245 Loops into Culture 253 Notes 255 References 283 Index ...
... pure episodic remembering; and narratively based autobiographical remembering. The chapter argues, on empirical and theoretical grounds, that autobiographical memory is not only content-involving but is a perfect example of a kind of ...
... pure episodic forms of remembering that operate before and below the capacity to autobiographically narrate the past. The chapter concludes by considering general arguments, motivated by empirical findings, that compel a rethinking of ...
... pure forms of conceptual analysis. The test of the tenability of a proposal or hypothesis about the nature of cognition is that it accommodates existing data better than rivals. This requires making comparisons with competing theories ...
Table des matières
1 | |
21 | |
3 From Revolution to Evolution | 55 |
4 RECtifying and REConnecting | 75 |
Whats It All About? | 93 |
Kinks Not Breaks | 121 |
7 Perceiving | 147 |
8 Imagining | 177 |
9 Remembering | 203 |
Missing Information? | 233 |
Notes | 255 |
References | 283 |
Index | 315 |
Autres éditions - Tout afficher
Evolving Enactivism: Basic Minds Meet Content Daniel D. Hutto,Erik Myin Aucun aperçu disponible - 2017 |