Evolving Enactivism: Basic Minds Meet ContentMIT Press, 9 juin 2017 - 360 pages An extended argument that cognitive phenomena—perceiving, imagining, remembering—can be best explained in terms of an interface between contentless and content-involving forms of cognition. Evolving Enactivism argues that cognitive phenomena—perceiving, imagining, remembering—can be best explained in terms of an interface between contentless and content-involving forms of cognition. Building on their earlier book Radicalizing Enactivism, which proposes that there can be forms of cognition without content, Daniel Hutto and Erik Myin demonstrate the unique explanatory advantages of recognizing that only some forms of cognition have content while others—the most elementary ones—do not. They offer an account of the mind in duplex terms, proposing a complex vision of mentality in which these basic contentless forms of cognition interact with content-involving ones. Hutto and Myin argue that the most basic forms of cognition do not, contrary to a currently popular account of cognition, involve picking up and processing information that is then used, reused, stored, and represented in the brain. Rather, basic cognition is contentless—fundamentally interactive, dynamic, and relational. In advancing the case for a radically enactive account of cognition, Hutto and Myin propose crucial adjustments to our concept of cognition and offer theoretical support for their revolutionary rethinking, emphasizing its capacity to explain basic minds in naturalistic terms. They demonstrate the explanatory power of the duplex vision of cognition, showing how it offers powerful means for understanding quintessential cognitive phenomena without introducing scientifically intractable mysteries into the mix. |
À l'intérieur du livre
Résultats 1-5 sur 33
... respects can be of practical and scientific value. Such a framework might provide productive and useful insight into some phenomena, even if this insight proves limited—even if such a framework only allows us to see xvi Preface.
... respects— connected, and sensitive, to facts of embodiment. Experimental findings of this sort—those that Goldman (2012) makes much of—include the use of circuits associated with motor control functions in higher-level language ...
... respect to it. Some E-theorists see no need for any revisions to standard cognitivism—neither to the two pillars of cognitivism nor to the I-conception of mind. In attempting to make good on this idea they argue that cognition can be ...
... respect to the boundaries of skin and skull, just as long as they make an appropriate contribution to explaining the overall shape of the system's responsiveness. On this issue, REC disagrees with ultra conservative views of cognition ...
... respects, dynamical systems are importantly unlike linear systems. Linear systems can be functionally decomposed and analysed in terms of their structural parts and respective operations. Functional decomposition of a linear system into ...
Table des matières
1 | |
21 | |
3 From Revolution to Evolution | 55 |
4 RECtifying and REConnecting | 75 |
Whats It All About? | 93 |
Kinks Not Breaks | 121 |
7 Perceiving | 147 |
8 Imagining | 177 |
9 Remembering | 203 |
Missing Information? | 233 |
Notes | 255 |
References | 283 |
Index | 315 |
Autres éditions - Tout afficher
Evolving Enactivism: Basic Minds Meet Content Daniel D. Hutto,Erik Myin Aucun aperçu disponible - 2017 |