Evolving Enactivism: Basic Minds Meet ContentMIT Press, 9 juin 2017 - 360 pages An extended argument that cognitive phenomena—perceiving, imagining, remembering—can be best explained in terms of an interface between contentless and content-involving forms of cognition. Evolving Enactivism argues that cognitive phenomena—perceiving, imagining, remembering—can be best explained in terms of an interface between contentless and content-involving forms of cognition. Building on their earlier book Radicalizing Enactivism, which proposes that there can be forms of cognition without content, Daniel Hutto and Erik Myin demonstrate the unique explanatory advantages of recognizing that only some forms of cognition have content while others—the most elementary ones—do not. They offer an account of the mind in duplex terms, proposing a complex vision of mentality in which these basic contentless forms of cognition interact with content-involving ones. Hutto and Myin argue that the most basic forms of cognition do not, contrary to a currently popular account of cognition, involve picking up and processing information that is then used, reused, stored, and represented in the brain. Rather, basic cognition is contentless—fundamentally interactive, dynamic, and relational. In advancing the case for a radically enactive account of cognition, Hutto and Myin propose crucial adjustments to our concept of cognition and offer theoretical support for their revolutionary rethinking, emphasizing its capacity to explain basic minds in naturalistic terms. They demonstrate the explanatory power of the duplex vision of cognition, showing how it offers powerful means for understanding quintessential cognitive phenomena without introducing scientifically intractable mysteries into the mix. |
À l'intérieur du livre
Résultats 1-5 sur 70
... Hard Problem 41 3 From Revolution to Evolution 55 REC's Positive Program 55 A Certain Take on Predictive Processing 57 Bootstrap Heaven or Hell? 67 4 RECtifying and REConnecting 75 RECtifying 75 Making Sense of Contents.
... Sense of Sense Making 75 Keeping Affordances Affordable 82 REConnecting 88 5 Ur-Intentionality: What's It All About? 93 Getting to the Bottom of Intentionality 93 Ur-Intentionality: The Natural Explanation 104 Objects and Objections 114 ...
... sense that they represent the world in ways that might not obtain—that is, they represent it in ways that can be true or false, accurate or inaccurate, and so on. Yet it denies that the most fundamental forms of cognition involve ...
... from the traditional assumptions of cognitivism, revealing why and in what sense REC is radical. It also sets out the basic rules of naturalistic play, reminding the reader why attempts to dismiss REC by appeal Preface xvii.
... sense of REC's proposal that basic minds are contentless while nonetheless holding on to the claim that such minds exhibit a kind of basic intentionality. It situates REC's notion of Urintentionality within the larger history of ...
Table des matières
1 | |
21 | |
3 From Revolution to Evolution | 55 |
4 RECtifying and REConnecting | 75 |
Whats It All About? | 93 |
Kinks Not Breaks | 121 |
7 Perceiving | 147 |
8 Imagining | 177 |
9 Remembering | 203 |
Missing Information? | 233 |
Notes | 255 |
References | 283 |
Index | 315 |
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Evolving Enactivism: Basic Minds Meet Content Daniel D. Hutto,Erik Myin Aucun aperçu disponible - 2017 |