Evolving Enactivism: Basic Minds Meet ContentMIT Press, 9 juin 2017 - 360 pages An extended argument that cognitive phenomena—perceiving, imagining, remembering—can be best explained in terms of an interface between contentless and content-involving forms of cognition. Evolving Enactivism argues that cognitive phenomena—perceiving, imagining, remembering—can be best explained in terms of an interface between contentless and content-involving forms of cognition. Building on their earlier book Radicalizing Enactivism, which proposes that there can be forms of cognition without content, Daniel Hutto and Erik Myin demonstrate the unique explanatory advantages of recognizing that only some forms of cognition have content while others—the most elementary ones—do not. They offer an account of the mind in duplex terms, proposing a complex vision of mentality in which these basic contentless forms of cognition interact with content-involving ones. Hutto and Myin argue that the most basic forms of cognition do not, contrary to a currently popular account of cognition, involve picking up and processing information that is then used, reused, stored, and represented in the brain. Rather, basic cognition is contentless—fundamentally interactive, dynamic, and relational. In advancing the case for a radically enactive account of cognition, Hutto and Myin propose crucial adjustments to our concept of cognition and offer theoretical support for their revolutionary rethinking, emphasizing its capacity to explain basic minds in naturalistic terms. They demonstrate the explanatory power of the duplex vision of cognition, showing how it offers powerful means for understanding quintessential cognitive phenomena without introducing scientifically intractable mysteries into the mix. |
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... thing about the philosophy, or the ideas, behind the laws. Even a very small effect sometimes requires profound changes in our ideas. —Richard Feynman, The Feynman Lectures on Physics Classical physics got it wrong. Mass isn't a ...
... thing— that is, they all put forward contentful hypotheses about how things stand with the world (see, e.g., Hohwy 2013; Gerrans 2014; Clark 2016). By REC's lights, this is a mistaken view. According to Preface xiii.
... things stand with the world, but only anticipating, influencing, and coordinating responses in a strong, silent manner. In promoting its peculiar bifold vision of cognition, Radicalizing Enactivism advanced a series of arguments ...
... things-considered assessments. Victors write histories. But no one is in a position to write the history of cognitive science yet. So we must be careful not to prejudge outcomes. And, in this regard, it is important to be mindful that ...
... things are considered, and attending to, rather than shying away from, matters of deep theory. The six chapters of part I aim to clarify REC's duplex account of cognition and to motivate its acceptance. Chapter 1 sets the scene. It ...
Table des matières
1 | |
21 | |
3 From Revolution to Evolution | 55 |
4 RECtifying and REConnecting | 75 |
Whats It All About? | 93 |
Kinks Not Breaks | 121 |
7 Perceiving | 147 |
8 Imagining | 177 |
9 Remembering | 203 |
Missing Information? | 233 |
Notes | 255 |
References | 283 |
Index | 315 |
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Evolving Enactivism: Basic Minds Meet Content Daniel D. Hutto,Erik Myin Aucun aperçu disponible - 2017 |