present day" (p. 12). It appears as if modern controversy "would not hesitate to call in question the received code of morality, and to revise our standard of right and wrong" (p. 13). "It is on this ground, therefore because I believe that the ethical question is no longer so purely an academic question as it was some years ago, because it affects not only the philosophic thinker but the practical man who is concerned with the problems of his day-that I have selected the topic for these lectures" (p. 13). "Perhaps we might trace the beginnings of this controversy as to the content of what is right and what is wrong to an older opposition in ethical thought . . . the controversy of Egoism and Altruism" (p. 14). But while both egoist and utilitarians have agreed "to insist that morality means the same for both, . . . on the other hand, the more recent tendency to which I refer emphasises and exalts the egoistic side, and thus accentuates the difference between the new moral code-if we may call it moral-and the Christian morality" (p. 18). "Nietzsche, the enfant terrible of modern thought, is the 'boldest exponent' of this tendency" (p. 32). He maintains that man's life must be interpreted "physiologically only and not spiritually," and he would "replace philanthropy by a boundless egoism." The trend which Professor Sorley thus describes in modern. ethical thought, he ascribes in large measure to the material success of last century; to the feeling of irresponsible power in those who have accumulated vast wealth-("the world seems to lie before them as something to be bought and sold;" "they are unrestrained by the traditional obligations of ancient lineage"); to a slackened feeling for duty, and a lessened belief in human goodness, which Mr. Sorley apprehends in literature, of which Ibsen's and Zola's works are taken as typical. A misapplication of the biological doctrine of "natural selection" is also responsible for a large measure of the present confusion of ethical thought. This brings the reader to Chapter II, in which this misapplication is dealt with at length. The line taken is that with which readers of Mr. Sorley's "Ethics of Naturalism" have been made. familiar. "Natural Selection" is, in biological evolution, a negative process. Nature produces spontaneously variation; the unfit are eliminated by Natural Selection. Fitness, in the individual, implies the qualities of strength, courage, prudence, and temperance; in the group, self-restraint, self-sacrifice, and obedience must be added. But how shall we account for the development 234 cf such palines is at which ner n in sonradan bernd the point mase or the scene of the group Sem moterima of satural selecTeen ni deas, and the surlap this Norte in Sorter as the theory Bisa berforce was in its strugge for pastener is pure, MI W de Trumplam Lalectic of Se Metart # 1 1 1 parmarchal old age, ai fint is fear from the face of the art because he me test teler of ns me had re natural selection is a gir sezi, external, 201ecave process. . . It is simply azural la v. Here . C as elsewhere Nature' seems for Professor Sorler the moonscious. And though he would loudless deny the intention, he seems to use the terms ". ectre” and “extema!” as though be corective vere to be external v mnd. Moreover, “umpi" natum av seems to be a law that ives act me in mind. T: be "mbiective" is I be out of the domain of “natural law." But when Mr. Scriey maintains that the histnere Saracteristic cf human action is that it implies cice, he is also chiged to admit that “incice always follows some and of principle" 2.781; and if the principle that chcice always follows s-in the last resort-icgical necessity, have we not here also a "natural law"? Hare ve act also something "ob eene" which is at the same time within mind? In Chacter. Professor Scriey deals with the ethics of medern Healism, as represented by the "Prolegomena to Ethics" of T. H. Green: the "Appearance and Reality” of Mr. F. H. Bradley: and the "Problem of Conduct" of Mr. AE. Tarion. While holding Green's "Prolegomena" to have been the "ontribution of greatest nine" made by "is idealist movement" "to English 1 It logical to lay the premises in the intellectual piane-the condict of ideamand to draw the conclusion in the biological piane-the survival or otherwise of the men? Most men have more than one idea. thought" (p. 88), Mr. Sorley finds within it the germs of the tendency which he most deplores in more recent Idealism. "Those whose business it is to test intellectual notions," he says, "have been impressed by the difficulties involved in Green's metaphysical positions and in his connection of them with morality" (p. 90). These difficulties may be gathered together as represented by Green's use of the word "self-realisation," and by the connection of the implied point of view with his metaphysical doctrine that "the consciousness which is in man and which raises him above nature is the manifestation of-the 'reproduction' of itself byan eternal self-consciousness" (p. 97). In order that the practical value of this conception may justify itself, it is necessary that "the distinction of good from evil must be first of all made clear. Green's appeal to an eternal selfconsciousness does nothing of itself to elucidate this distinction. Tendencies to exalt selfish interest over common welfare, and to prefer sensual to what are called higher gratifications, enter into the nature of man, and have fashioned his history. Green does not even ask the question whether these also are not to be considered manifestations, or 'reproductions' of the eternal selfconsciousness. But his metaphysical view does not exclude them; and if they are included, morality disappears for lack of any criterion between good and evil" (p. 99). This passage is exceedingly characteristic of Mr. Sorley's whole attitude throughout this book. Mr. Bradley develops, in Mr. Sorley's judgment, this fundamental mistake of Green's. "Like Green, he looks upon man's moral activity as an appearance-what Green calls a reproduction -of this eternal reality" (p. 101), and, "he brings out the consequence, which in Green is more or less concealed, that the evil equally with the good in man and in the world are appearances of the Absolute." "Mr. Bradley's Absolute (p. 106) is eternal, relationless, ineffable. To it goodness cannot be ascribed; indeed, no predicate can be properly applied to it, for any predication implies relation." "If all predication involves relation, and relation is excluded from reality, then no predicate-not even truth and goodness-can be asserted of the real" (p. 102). "From the monistic view of morality, as set forth by Mr. Bradley, there is no direct route to the distinction between good and evil. If the distinction is reached at all it will be found to be psychological rather than cosmical, to be relative to the attitude pitfalls ancient philosophy is pervaded throughout its length and breadth by two unsolved contradictions, that between Egoism and Altruism on the one hand, and that between Necessity and Free Will on the other. If, in despair of solving, or escaping, these the student bethinks him of modern philosophy, a still deadlier danger lies in wait for him. The two ancient horrors have given birth to a modern monster by whom the unwary will be not only mentally confused, but morally corrupted. One cannot wonder if such people will add the authority of a philosopher to the authority of "the Christian morality of modern civilisation" and refrain from further inquiry. That would be, often, an excellent result. But is it the result desired by Professor Sorley? Seriously, though the difficulty of presenting philosophical ideas to a popular audience is very great, it is not so insurmountable as to justify a philosopher in simply stating puzzles without giving his hearers any clue or hint as to the solution, or as to the direction in which solution might be sought. The difficulty has been overcome many times in recent years. An instance might be given in a field of philosophy other than that touched upon by Professor Sorley, viz., Prof. A. C. Bradley's lecture: "Poetry for Poetry's Sake" (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1901). It is perhaps not too much to say that both in method and in implied point of view Mr. Sorley's book is too slight and too oldfashioned to do justice either to recent philosophy, or to Professor Sorley's position in it. London. MARY GILLILAND HUSBAND. METHODS OF INDUSTRIAL PEACE. BY N. P. Gilman. New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co. London: Macmillan Co. Pp. x, 430. "Within two years there will be the greatest struggle between organised labor and organised capital that the United States has yet seen." This prophecy, made to me last October by an American economist, bids fair to receive ample fulfillment in the many grave conflicts now in progress in various parts of America. The organisation of labor has gone on apace; probably between three and four millions of industrial workers are enrolled members of labor unions, a number twice as large as three or four years ago. Such a rapid influx of new blood has naturally imbued leaders and followers alike with a sense of increased strength and a deter |