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entrusted to Professors Caldecott and Mackintosh. Professor Caldecott, by his work on “The Philosophy of Religion in England and America"-most favorably noticed at the time of its publication in the INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS-raised himself to a position of commanding influence in the world of theological thought, and Dr. Mackintosh, by some careful review work, gave himself a good preparation for the part here entrusted to him. These professors say, in their admirable preface: "It is agreed on all hands, in our day, that no one, except here and there an original genius, can expect to be in line with twentieth century thought who dispenses himself from reference to the positions held by great minds. It is by training his mind in their high thoughts that he can expect to win power and insight for himself." These remarks are, no doubt, true and just, but there is also something to be said on the other side. Necessary as such knowledge is, it has its attendant dangers, which it is worth while to recognise. For the theological student is only too apt to be content to rethink the thoughts of the departed masters, and to remain within the closed circle of their thought to the repression of his own original power and thinking. The difficulty is precisely to get him to allow their thought to do no more than stimulate his own fresh thinking, and not to hold himself absolved from effort after new and independent modes of conception. Should the student so fail, it will, of course, be no fault either of the masters or the editors. The misgivings of the editors as to the wisdom of the selections made are quite needless, for nothing better could have been desired. The judicious use of them will not, for an instant, render the student's thought a pale semblance of that of a Lotze or a Martineau.

The subjects overtaken by Professor Caldecott are, Anselm, Aquinas, Descartes, Spinoza, the Cambridge Platonists, Berkeley, Cousin, Comte, and Janet. It may be said in a word, that the notes and biographical notices are very fine—fresh, scholarly, interesting. No stilted professional conventionalism keeps Professor Caldecott from saying what will really help the student. Worthy of the highest praise as the work is, a few remarks of more critical character may be added. In the Anselmic portion, ’tis hardly enough to say that Kant “severely” criticised the Ontological argument without indicating how "severely" criticised Kant was for pointlessness and irrelevance in his manner of doing so. The real modern significance of the Ontological argument might also have been more clearly indicated, for nothing whatever is said which will bring home to the student that the argument can be construed in terms of the self-assertion of spirit, to which the existence—and not merely the idea—of God, is a necessity of reason. The assertion, on the part of spirit, of the actuality of its own unique and infinite ideal—that is the modern bearing of the Ontological argument, too important for the student not to be held to it.

As to Aquinas, the notes are faultless and the selections good. Yet no one, who has made any careful study of a system so rich and vast, can fail to wonder what coherent idea the student will gather, from these scattered notes and extracts, of the system of one whom Rosmini styled the chief of Italian philosophers, and whose architectonic work embodied the whole philosophy of the Middle Ages, expounded in the spirit of the time. Some brief yet more systematic presentation of his theological and ethical ideas was badly wanted in such a case, in the interests of the student. Such a presentation would have succinctly put before him the positions of Aquinas on such matters as being, God, causality, creation, Divine intelligibility, reason, will, 'sin, the soul, and Providence, giving him an interest in the relation of Aquinas, theologically, to Augustine, Albertus Magnus, and others, and, ethically to Aristotle, Augustine, and Anselm, to all of whom he is, at certain well-defined points, distinctly superior. Such a presentation is by no means wanted in the case of more modern and accessible writers, and would be superfluous in instances like Descartes and Spinoza, which follow. Does it not seem a little hard on the student to present him, in the case of the Divine Substance of Spinoza, only with some “material” for a “provisional” judgment of his own? If doctors like Professor Caldecott—who is so well able to form conclusions of his own-refrain from expressing any personal opinion or judgment as to the real significance of Spinozism, the student will absolve himself from the attempt'to do so as presumptuous. I do not share Professor Caldecott's hesitation, but it would, of course, be wholly out of place to intrude any judgments of mine here. The references, in the chapter on the Cambridge Platonists, might well have included Bishop Westcott's chapter on Whichcote in "Religious Thought in the West," as more relevant than some of the items given.

Cousin and Comte are the subjects of the next sections under Professor Caldecott's care. As to Cousin, one would have liked some indication, in the introductory notice, of Cousin's position in relation to Theism, for the guidance of the student. As for Comte, one feels rather queer at finding him among theistic philosophers, especially in view of names that are wanting. The notes are admirable, though perhaps the merit of Comtism, in insisting on the objectivity of the true, as found in nature and history, rather than in the introspection of the ego, might have been more explicitly set before the student. Possibly, also, it might have been worth noting more clearly his method of elimination, whereby religion becomes in the end an artificial and idealized abstraction. In the excellent chapter on the Idealism of Berkeley, it seems to me somewhat strange that it has not been deemed necessary to append any note on the important passage (p. 152), wherein Berkeley says, "We have neither an immediate evidence nor a demonstrated knowledge of the existence of other finite spirits;" for surely the imperiled existence of finite spirits is too important a point of weakness in his and other idealistic systems not to be worthy of the student's attention. One would also have welcomed a clearer indication to the student that, notwithstanding Berkeley's talk about substance, it is causation which is the ruling idea when Berkeley comes to demonstrate the being of God. In the section on Janet, one is sorry to see such slender stuff as Teleology in "The Quest of Faith" recommended to students. Has it come to that with British thought? Turning to the portions edited by Dr. Mackintosh, we have first a section on Kant. The introductory statement to the student is good, being of the kind required. To the student beginner the notes will also be of much service, although they seem to me somewhat lacking in suggestiveness and independence. A carefully prepared section on Schleiermacher follows. Yet one cannot help feeling that the defects of Schleiermacher might have been presented in some more incisive and definite form. Also, the references to English writings might, with advantage, have been fuller. German references are more adequate here than in the section on Kant, where they are rather strikingly wanting.

Excellent chapters on Mansel and Lotze follow. The Mansel references might have included Caldecott's “Philosophy of Religion” and Flint's "Agnosticism" (though the latter is already mentioned in the notes), to name no others. It seems hardly desirable, in the Lotze section, that students be sent back so far as the paper by Dalgairns, even if allowed to have been "masterly"—it certainly was able—at the time it appeared. For thought has surely not stood still, even on the personality of God, during the last three decades, and in so small a bibliography, it is most essential that the student be somewhat up to date in his reading and sources. No references are given, in this section, to relative German literature. Martineau and Ritschl form the subjects of the last two chapters edited by Dr. Mackintosh. Martineau forms the theme of the next chapter. The introductory notice is appreciative, but it is a pity that, in the notes, the student is left in so unsatisfactory a position as to Martineau's real attitude on Freewill. Also, some meagreness attends the references. The work closes with a section on Ritschl, which seems carefully done.

Though I have deemed it necessary to say some things of more or less critical character, yet, taking the work as a whole, it is a welcome and highly useful addition to theological literature, and both editors are to be congratulated on the high measure of success they have attained in their praiseworthy task. Kilmarnock, Scotland.


ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS. By A. E. Taylor, Fellow of Merton

College, Oxford; John Fotheringham Professor of Philosophy in McGill University, Montreal; late lecturer in Owens College, Manchester. Methuen & Co. Pp. xvi, 419.

In the volume under review Mr. Taylor has given us an exposition of the principles of metaphysics from a point of view which is in the main that of Mr. Bradley. In doing so he has not failed to make use of the important works by Professors Ward, Royce, and others, which have seen the light since "Appearance and Reality" was published, while his own treatment of the subject is often both new and suggestive. Nevertheless, his book may, I think, be fairly regarded as an attempt to present its subject in as positive and constructive a manner as is possible without relinquishing the fundamental positions of Mr. Bradley with regard to the nature of thought and reality. If, notwithstanding the expository skill of the author and the many excellencies of his treatment of special questions, the main contentions of his work do not appear convincing to the present writer, it is mainly because of a suspicion, which will not be allayed, that the principles in question do not really admit of any positive construction whatever.

Mr. Taylor divides his work into four books, the first of which is devoted to a preliminary discussion of the problem, method and subdivisions of metaphysics. This is followed by a discussion in Book II of the general structure of Reality, including, in addition to an attempt to indicate the nature of the Absolute, the consideration of the most universal categories by which science and common sense seek to determine the world of things. The remaining books deal with the more special questions involved in the interpretation of nature and the interpretation of life.

We are brought, then, face to face at the start with the question of the nature of ultimate reality. To this question Mr. Taylor returns in its essentials the answer of Mr. Bradley. Reality must be conceived as an all-inclusive, perfectly consistent system, the materials of which are immediate experience. Separate chapters are devoted to the development of the implications of its experiential nature and to the consideration of the nature of the unity of the system. In the first of these, Mr. Taylor lays great stress upon the purposive character of all experience, in the uniqueness of which he finds the key to the meaning of individuality. In defining reality as experience we have therefore by implication asserted that it is thoroughly purposive and uniquely individual. Failure to realise the logical character of the unity of the Absolute and undue emphasis upon its merely numerical unity are signalised as errors into which monism in the past has fallen. Further, in endeavoring to conceive the nature of the system which constitutes reality, equal justice must be done to the aspects of unity and multiplicity. These must be apprehended as equally real and real through each other. This condition can only be realised if the whole constitutes an individual experience of which the partial constitutents are experiences. When we seek to substitute a more concrete conception for this very abstract formula we have at best only the analogies of our own personal and social consciousness. Mr. Taylor discusses the value of these and decides, mainly on the ground of the greater self-sufficiency of a society, that while both self and society must be pronounced to be finite appearance, "of the two, society exhibits the fuller and higher individuality, and is, therefore, the more truly real" (p. 351). Indeed “if the absolute cannot be called a society without qualification, at any rate human society affords the best analogy by which we can attempt to represent its systematic unity in a concrete conceptual form” (p. 350).

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