I think, be admitted that there are important differences between the two kinds of mental fact which Mr. Gibson means by "motives" and "wants"; and also that some well-known psychologists and moral philosophers have sometimes assumed that there was no difference. If so, then Mr. Gibson does here call attention to a distinction of some phychological and ethical importance; and it even seems possible that in a "motive," the subject does, in some sense, "identify himself with an object," whereas in a "want" he does not. But Mr. Gibson does not help us to discover what that sense is. (3) In his third sense, Mr. Gibson again maintains that there is a spiritual element in all facts: and, so far as I can see, he offers no arguments whatever in support of this contention. He seems to regard it as following directly from his first thesis that "all facts are known"; and if we accept this first thesis; if, further, we accept the view, attributed to Prof. Stout, that all consciousness is conative consciousness; if we also take conative to imply "purposive" in the sense above explained; and if, finally, we identify a fact with the consciousness of a fact (as Mr. Gibson appears to do), the conclusion seems to follow. But we may take it, I think, that there must be at least one mistake in these premises, since Mr. Gibson himself appears to admit the very obvious fact that the conclusion is untrue. He admits, we have seen, that some "tentative efforts" may "fail to prove purposive" (p. 188), whence it would seem to follow that some facts, at all events, do not lead to success. Mr. Gibson's success in showing that there is "a spiritual principle in moral facts" does not, then, appear to be very striking. We have examined three of the theses, which he advances in support of this conclusion, and our result is as follows: His first thesis is a highly disputable conclusion, which seems to be totally unsupported by the reason he gives for it. His second asserts a difference between two kinds of mental fact, which undoubtedly do differ, and of which the difference has sometimes been neglected; and gives a very vague, metaphorical description of the nature of this difference. His third appears to be obviously false; is admitted by Mr. Gibson himself to be so; and no attempt is made to prove it. But although Mr. Gibson has failed to prove it, it may perhaps be the case that, in all these three senses, a "spiritual principle" is present in all moral facts; and that unless this is so, there can be no such thing as Moral Philosophy. Mr. Gibson has told us that in advocating these three propositions about moral facts, he is advocating the existence of Moral Philosophy; and it is, therefore, pertinent to inquire whether, if true, these three propositions would establish that conclusion. What bearing, then, upon Moral Philosophy have the three theses (1) that all moral facts are known, (2) that "will" differs from "want" in a peculiar way, (3) that all moral facts serve a purpose? "Ethical Science," Mr. Gibson tells us, is a purely "inductive" inquiry; and by this he seems plainly to mean that it merely seeks to discover, by observation, what are the causes or effects of certain facts. Now certainly the object of Ethics, as commonly understood, is to discover something quite other than this: part, at least, of its object is to show that some actions "ought" and others "ought not" to be done, and that some of the objects, at which men may aim, are better than others. We may, then, I think, assume that since Mr. Gibson does not include these questions in the sphere of "Ethical Science," he does intend to include them in that of "Moral Philosophy"; and that, therefore, when he tells us that his three theses will establish the existence of Moral Philosophy, he must regard them as sufficient to show that some actions are right and others wrong, and some objects of pursuit better than others. But do they show this? The first merely informs us that all moral facts (whatever these may be) are alike in respect of the fact that they are known; and how it will follow from this that they or some other facts are unlike in a totally different respect-how, because all "moral facts" are known, it follows that some things are right and others wrong, or that some things are better than others, I cannot conceive. With regard to the second thesis, it has been already admitted that it is of some ethical importance; but its importance certainly does not consist in its having any tendency to establish the existence of a Moral Philosophy. From the mere fact that "will" exists, it will not follow that anything is good, and still less that some things are better than others, or that some are right and others wrong. The adherent of "Ethical Science" might perfectly well admit Mr. Gibson's distinction between "will" and "want," and yet, with entire consistency, deny that Vol. XV-No. 3. 25 there is such a thing as Moral Philosophy. It is true that Mr. Gibson, following Green, supposes that in will there is always present "some idea of the man's personal good" (p. 83). This may, perhaps, be true, in some sense; and if so, from the fact that will exists, it will follow that some things are regarded as good; but that anything is so will again not follow. It is only the third thesis which seems to have any possible connection with the establishment of Moral Philosophy. We have seen that by "purposive" Mr. Gibson sometimes means "conducive to success"; and if he uses the word "success" in one of the senses which it may have, namely, in the sense of a "good result," then from the thesis that all moral facts have good results it will follow that some results are good. If this is what Mr. Gibson means, that we may admit that he here enunciated a principle which is essential to the existence of Moral Philosophy; though it is by no means sufficient to establish that existence. Moral Philosophy does differ from "Ethical Science" by recognizing that some things are good; but it must also recognize that some are better than others, and Mr. Gibson gives us no hint as to how this further conclusion is to be established. But there is grave reason to doubt whether, after all, Mr. Gibson does understand "purposive" in this, the only sense which will give to any of his theses even the slightest connection with the establishment of Moral Philosophy. For in spite of his explicit declaration that, even where conations have no "aim," they are yet "purposive," yet it is only from those doctrines of Prof. Stout, which deal with "purposes" in the sense of "aims," that Mr. Gibson professes to see "that the transition to Moral Philosophy proper is not only not difficult but inevitable" (p. 207). That, indeed, it is with "purposes" in this sense, and not in any other, that he connects Moral Philosophy, might have been inferred from that perplexing passage in which he told us that blind conations, though "purposive," are yet not strictly "teleological." It is then, not from any connection of "moral facts" with good results, but only from their connection with results that have been aimed at, that Mr. Gibson hopes to establish the existence of Moral Philosophy. It is from doctrines of Prof. Stout's, which consists solely in generalizations about the causes and effects of "aims," that he finds the transition to Moral Philosophy inevitable. In short, it appears that Mr. Gibson is entirely at one with the adherents of "Ethical Science," in hold ing that what "ought" to be can be inferred from what regularly does happen. The "teleological" method, which he is recommending as essential to Moral Philosophy, differs in no respect from that which he regards as characteristic of mere "Ethical Science." Both will merely give us causal laws; but Mr. Gibson's will give us laws about the causes and effects of "purposes," whereas, we presume, "Ethical Science" merely discovers the causes and effects of other things. We may certainly agree with Mr. Gibson that purposes have causes and effects; and that if "Ethical Science" denies this, "Ethical Science" is wrong. But that to recognize this, or to recognize any particular causal law whatever, is to establish the existence of Moral Philosophy, we certainly cannot agree. So much for Mr. Gibson's advocacy of "the spiritual principle in Ethics." Is he a more successful advocate of "the point of view of Personal Idealism"? And, first of all, what precisely does he mean by this point of view? As we have already seen, to advocate this point of view in Ethics is to advocate the view that "the individual's own inviolate spiritual experience is the central fact in Moral Philosophy." And elsewhere Mr. Gibson gives us other phrases which seem to be intended to express the same meaning. We are told that Personal Idealism "adopts as its starting-point the human soul's immediate self-consciousness" (p. 159); and again, that "it starts from the individual's immediate experience"-takes this as its "datum" (p. 212); and again that "the characteristically philosophical datum is the fact of experience as it is for the experient" (p. 220). We presume, then, that in advocating this point of view, Mr. Gibson is, at least, advocating the view that "the individual's immediate experience" (to choose one phrase out of many) is a correct and sufficient starting-point for philosophy generally, and for Moral Philosophy in particular; and by this again we presume he means that from this "experience," we can infer all truths, both moral and philosophical, which can be inferred at all. It only, then, remains to discover precisely what Mr. Gibson means by "the individual's immediate experience"; and here, too, we have data for forming an opinion which seems to leave little room for "To start from God's own immediate experience," it appears, would be to start from "what God is for himself" (p. error. 219); and our own spiritual experience is apparently "inviolate," in the sense that what we are for ourselves is something which nobody else can ever know (pp. 139, 140). Mr. Gibson is then maintaining that from "what we are for ourselves," all other truths, both moral and philosophical, which can be inferred at all, can be inferred. But we must notice still one other point, in order to define his meaning quite precisely. Plainly no one can take as his starting-point what all of us are for ourselves, since what any other is for himself is just what no man can ever know. Mr. Gibson is then maintaining that from what each of us is for himself, all other truths can be inferred: he can infer them from what he is for himself, and I can infer them from what I am for myself. So much for Mr. Gibson's meaning. By way of argument for this extraordinary proposition, I cannot find that he offers anything whatever. It only remains, then, to consider whether the mere statement of it is sufficient to advocate it successfully. Surely it must be plain that, on the contrary, it refutes itself, since, if this proposition were true, there would be at least one proposition, namely, itself, which could not possibly be inferred from what anyone is for himself. What I am for myself is, by hypothesis, totally unknown to Mr. Gibson; and this being so, surely, from what he is for himself, he cannot infer that from this totally unknown thing, which I am for myself, all truths can be inferred? Surely it is plain that from what I am for myself, if that is my only premise, I cannot infer even that there are any other selves. From what I experience, as it is for me who experience it, much can no doubt be inferred; and this is sometimes all that Mr. Gibson seems to mean. But even from this, if it were all "inviolate," in the sense of unknown to anyone else, I certainly could not infer that anything which I know could be inferred from what any one else experiences. It is, therefore, only if we understand the starting-point, which Mr. Gibson recommends, to be "what the individual experiences, as it is for the experient," that there seems anything to be said for that starting-point; and though his experience of what he experiences may, no doubt, be inviolate in the two senses that it is a different thing from anybody else's experience of the same thing, and that nobody else knows it in precisely the same manner as he knows it, we must be careful to insist that not even his experience of what he experiences is totally unknown to others. But, if this be all that Mr. Gibson |