full knowledge of the ideas. Secondly, Dr. Jackson's view of the paradeigmatic ideas of the natural kinds, and of the relation of resemblance which particulars have to them, neglects Plato's doctrine that resemblance implies the possession of a common element; and thus does not get over the difficulty of the third man. Thirdly, Dr. Jackson has not explained what is meant by a natural kind. And as regards Mr. Gaye's pursuit of this theory into the question of immortality, it may be pointed out that in lack of a definition of natural kind, Mr. Gaye seems to nullify Dr. Jackson's views that there are ideas of natural kinds. For Mr. Gaye's arguments seem to lead to the conclusion that there is only one idea, the highest, i. e., that of man: for since a natural kind is apparently a kind which is perpetuated by nature, that is one which is always actually represented by instances, for how else distinguish between man and sophist?-and since Mr. Gaye's view, as he himself realizes, allows of the attainment by all souls to the highest state, namely that of man, it follows that the other kinds are not always represented by instances and are not, therefore, natural kinds any more than is, e. g., sophist a natural kind. Further, Mr. Gaye seems to have failed to realize as clearly as is necessary the outcome of his views that the soul of Plato's later theory is not immaterial. Mr. Gaye's words imply that this materiality is different from the materiality which he asserts, for very questionable reasons, to be involved in Plato's earlier doctrine. But his statement that the later theory is a relative dualism dependent on an ultimate monism does not fully explain the difference between the earlier and later doctrines. Indeed, the whole of the metaphysical interpretation of the "Timaeus," which Mr. Gaye accepts from Mr. Archer Hind, needs a far clearer statement than it has so far received. At present it is impossible to discover whether the finite minds which are differentiated in space and so perceived under the conditions of time and space, are parts of the infinite mind, or are objects of the thinking of infinite mind. They might, of course, be both in the sense that one part might have another part as the object of its thinking: but Mr. Gaye seems to imply that the part which thinks is itself the object which it thinks, a view which is in itself indefensible and which we have no reason to attribute to Plato. The acceptance, moreover, of one alternative only leads to difficulties. If the finite souls are parts of infinite mind, they are not, as Mr. Gaye says, necessarily material, since matter only arises as the phenomena of the perception of differentiated souls: and is not necessarily related to souls-unless absolute mind is itself necessarily material, as having parts. And if the souls are objects of the thinking of infinite mind, then the spiritual part of them is different from the material part, and both, if real at all, are equally real: and thus the criticism which Mr. Gaye urges against Plato's earlier conception of the relation of soul to body is as valid against his supposed later view. It is impossible to criticize this book adequately without a much more minute and lengthy discussion, which is here impossible. The task of criticism is rendered all the more difficult by the fact that to show that Mr. Gaye's interpretation of Plato is inconsistent is not to show that it is wrong: for Plato was not necessarily consistent. The main criticism of the book, however, is that though it makes its points clearly and is for that reason of considerable value for all students of Plato, it has failed to establish satisfactorily that the interpretation of Plato which it adopts is the only possible interpretation, or that Plato was really influenced by the difficulties and arguments by which Mr. Gaye assumes him to have been influenced. EDINBURGH UNIVERSITY. A. R. AINSWorth. FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE. Sermons by W. R. Inge, M. A., Fellow and Tutor of Hertford College, Oxford; Examining Chaplain to the Bishop of Lichfield. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1904. Pp. x, 292. I These sermons are thoughtful, scholarly, finely spiritual. should not think of calling them great or powerful. But they are good at times quite suggestive, though in places tolerably commonplace. I am more struck with the presence of theological elements than with distinctively ethical appeals, which are by no means wanting. These latter chiefly concern us in this JOURNAL. In one place, for example (p. 60), we find "the truth and reality of the ought to be" affirmed, and this latter declared to be "the supreme category of the mind." In another instance (p. 100), the author insists that "everywhere in Christian ethics, the direction of the will is fundamental." These sermons have a Preface, and an interesting one-an unusual thing for volumes of sermons. Their author frankly says he "has not much sympathy with the Wünsch-philosophie which is now so popular among Christian apologists." He regrets the tendency to "degrade the reflective reason to the position of a mere advocate retained by the will," and he disagrees with Lotze's dictum that "we strive to know only in order that we may learn to do." In all which, I confess myself in hearty agreement with him. Depreciation of the speculative reason has always seemed to me a disastrous mistake, and a no less imperious obligation seems to rest on man to use his powers of knowing than to exercise his powers of doing. There is more of interest in the Preface. But it does not seem to have occurred to the author that it is a serious thing to write so good a Preface in such a connection, because it is apt to raise dangerously high expectations of the sermons that follow. When all has been said, I think one may rightfully ask for a larger ethical appeal in Christian teaching than still obtains-I mean, not so much in the way of displacing doctrinal elements as in emphasizing the fact that such elements have not served their purpose until they land us in actual practice of ethical virtue. This virtue-at once Christian and human-it is their high and sufficient merit to help us attain. After four sermons-all good, and all rich in theological elements, though the theology is not in the first quite so strong as it well might be-we come to a sermon on "Justice," with marked ethical elements in its appeal. In it we are told that "we are so constituted that we cannot believe in an ought to be which is merely the antithesis or the complement of what is,” and that "we must look for justice rather by the transformation of our personality than of our circumstances." Further, "that nothing but a bad will can separate us wholly from God," and that "we must work out our salvation, and work off our perdition, day by day. We are always sowing our future; we are always reaping our past; and our past began long before we were born." It is open to question, however, whether insistences like these have been quite satisfactorily related to theological doctrines which this same sermon shows the author to hold. That seems to me one of the most commonly neglected things in writers who in one breath make theological insistences, and in the next give you ethical appeals. Both may be true, but at least their harmonious relation should be shown, and the ethical virtue flowing from Christianity properly adjusted to its theological sources or supports. "Truth in Love" is another sermon in which ethical elements are finely prominent. After emphasis on the will's fundamental place, the author goes on to discuss why we are least judicial in subjects where it is "most important that we should know the exact truth." Manifestly, this is due, in the view of our author, "to the interference of the will with the calm processes of the intellect. The will is the disturbing influence," and he goes on, in an interesting passage which is too long to quote, to show that there is a way of maintaining the truth in our willing, as in our thinking. But why does the author, who has in the Preface shown his dislike to "mere" retained advocates, say so contentedly that "we cannot promise to be impartial"? Can we not say at least that superiority to prejudice, uprightness in judging, and impartiality in estimate and inquiry, are indeed the goal in all our striving? The one and only thing we have a right to promise is, discontent with our own imperfectly attained impartiality: we have no greater need than a spirit of reverence for Truth so supreme that we hold ourselves in readiness to drop every prejudice and prepossession before the Truth as laid open to us or discoverable by us. is Reason for on which he so finely and truly insists-but to guide the purified and rectified will to this exquisite poise and balance in judging of the truth? What is Religion for but to open the mind to Truth, so that we shall welcome light from whatever quarter it may come? I am, of course, aware of the high authority for so speaking, but none the less should we shrink from adopting it, or acquiescing in it. What "Humility" is the theme of the sermon that follows, and the treatment is here ethical rather than theological. Indeed, the sermon, which is a good one, is interesting as developing, historically and ethically, what Canon Liddon developed theologically, in his strong University Sermon on the same text. is altogether needful to vindicate the character of Christian. humility as Mr. Inge has done, but the greatness of humility wants showing on every side. The religious greatness of humility has been set forth by no one more impressively than the late Bersier, of Paris, but if we want the more human and ethical aspects of the greatness of humility, we have certainly to look less to preachers than to writers like Emerson. The greatness of humility is not known till we have touched it on all these sides, and found its ever-deepening greatness. Some interesting ethical insistences are found in the sermon on "The Inspiration of the Individual." "In religion the will must never be passive." "The way to strengthen the will and direct it in the right way, is to interest ourselves in the things that really matter. A man's rank in the scale of living beings is determined entirely by the objects in which he is really interested. I commend this as one of the most vital truths of practical philosophy." So in the sermon on the "Religious Consciousness,' it is said, "the religion of the will makes conduct not three-fourths of life, with Matthew Arnold, but the whole"; and in that on "Eternal Life," that "it is this latter conviction which is at the root of all religious faith, the belief in the reality of the ought to be." Amid a good deal of purely theological matter, we have, in the sermon on the "Theologica Germanica"-one of the most interesting in the book-the following of ethical import: "Virtue in the highest sense is its own reward, and sin its own punishment. There is nothing arbitrary or external about God's judgments. Whatsoever a man soweth, that, and nothing else, shall he reap." "The doctrine that goodness is its own reward and badness its own punishment, in no way forbids us to believe that both reward and punishment are infinite." Two remarks may be made as to this volume in closing, one, that the author is not merely preacher and rhetorician but, one is pleased to find, a capable spiritual thinker, and the other, that the style is always clear and good. The publisher's work is perfect. KILMARNOCK, SCOTLAND. JAMES LINDSAY. PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE IN TAXATION. By Stephen F. Weston, Pp. 299. Dr. Weston approaches the subject of justice in taxation from the three-fold standpoint of political science, economics, and ethics. For, as he says, the whole problem grows out of the relation of the individual to the state; but economic goods and economic relations are necessarily involved, and the taxable subject, man, has an ethical character. Hence, there are separate chapters on the political, economic, and ethical bases and principles of taxation. |