Thus the "protection theory" of taxation is treated first in the political chapter, and reappears in the economic and ethical chapters as the "benefit theory." An attempt is made to distinguish the political and economic theories, though it is admitted that they are inseparable phases of a single problem. This apparent excess of analysis necessitates some repetition and is at first somewhat confusing to the reader, but it serves a useful purpose in emphasizing that he who would solve the problem of justice in taxation must be master of all three of the sciences named.

Dr. Weston rejects the protection or benefit theory from all three standpoints, and follows the orthodox economists in their preference for the "ability" theory-that taxes should be proportioned to the ability of individuals to pay them, rather than to the benefits received from government. It might, perhaps, be objected that the ability theory seems more appropriate to voluntary contributions than to legally compulsory exactions; but the author forestalls any possible criticism on this score by ascribing to taxation a semi-voluntary character: "The people first voluntarily agree, directly or indirectly, to tax themselves; . . . and only here and there the self-seeking individual endeavors to make himself an exception to the general rule, and upon such it is agreed, individually and collectively, that compulsion shall be applied, the voluntary and compulsory character of a tax thus implying each other."

Ability is measured primarily by income, but this does not lead necessarily to an income tax. The author finds it more practicable to reach income indirectly through the medium of taxes on certain kinds of property which produce or are produced by income, or which may be taken as indices of income. But the general property tax as it exists in America is condemned in the strongest terms, particularly from an ethical standpoint because it punishes honesty and puts a premium upon perjury.

The book is not easy reading, and it is not to be recommended to elementary students, but it is one scholars cannot afford to neglect. Not the least part of its value lies in its exposition of the theories of German, Italian, and other foreign writers, giving evidence of a wide familiarity with economic and philosophical literature. An index of names and subjects would have greatly increased its value for purposes of reference.

BUREAU OF CORPORATIONS, WASHINGTON, D. C.

MAX WEST.

DESIDERIUS ERASMUS, CONCERNING THE AIM AND METHOD OF EDUCATION. By William Harrison Woodward, Professor of Education in University of Liverpool. Cambridge: The University Press, 1904. Pp. 262.

To inquirers into the origins of modern culture, and to students of the history of education generally, this book will prove invaluable. Professor Woodward has already made students of education his debtors, by his learned and lucid study of the influence and work of Vittorino da Feltre and his associates in the Renaissance of European culture. This study of the life work of Erasmus as an educator is characterized by the same thoroughness, lucidity, and sympathy that made his earlier study so attractive and interesting.

Erasmus as sketched here is not an altogether attractive personality. "As all his biographers have admitted, the correspondence of Erasmus with his ally who had the ear of the lady-who yielded not very adequately to persuasion-leaves an unpleasant savor. Irritable self-conceit, shameless importunity, perfect indifference to the person importuned, are all in evidence; it is hard to banish a sense of contempt for a scholar who could play so sordid a part." And the self-centered, self-sufficing nature of the man is seen in his irresponsiveness to beautiful surroundings, whether of nature or of art.

Yet much can be forgiven one who holds that "The father who neglects the training of his son is guilty of offence against the fatherland"; "Children are born for the state and for God"; "not where, but how nobly we spend our lives." And another saying of his was, "When I have money, I will first buy Greek books, and then clothes." How curiously modern all this sounds! And indeed, this whole book of Professor Woodward's prompts the thought which Compayré formulates: "The theory (i. e., of education) we must look for in the works of Erasmus, Rabelais, and Montaigne, of whom it may be said, that before pretending to surpass them. even at this day, we should rather attempt to overtake them, and to equal them in the most of their pedagogical precepts." Let me enumerate some of these "modern notions" of Erasmus. He held that the first step to be taken in educational reform was to obtain a new type of teacher; he asserted strenuously that before any reform in national education is possible we must have a better public opinion; the school cannot make opinion but opinion can make the school. Again, he advocated that the study of Latin

should be conducted on the principle that it is a "living" language, in other words that a foreign language should be taught on just those lines now approved by our latest reformers. His ideas on the moral training of the young are precisely those of our most modern educators. He warns the master against turning moral teaching into teaching about morals, and bases his whole system of moral training upon personal religion, home example, and intercourse; the value of the law of interest in education he fully appreciates; liberal note-taking he very rightly condemns; while the use and abuse of grammar teaching in the language exercises he clearly formulates. Science teaching he, like not a few modern humanists, appreciates only as a means of pointing a moral, or perhaps, adorning a tale.

Lastly, must a word be said in appreciation of the attitude of Erasmus towards the school discipline of his time. At a period when the normal attitude of not only teacher, but parent also, toward the child was one of uncouth tyranny and unsympathetic treatment, it required not only knowledge, but courage also to advocate kindness, sympathy, and love in the treatment and instruction of children. When corporal punishment was universal it required courage to declare that "the boy who is not influenced by the fear of God, by regard for his parents, by shame, by conscience, is not likely to be molded aright by mere physical pain."

Lastly, what shall be said of the life-work and general attitude of these early humanist writers towards education and life, except to express our indebtedness to them? Whether we be realists or humanists (and shall I say, realistic humanists), our debt to the men who rekindled the torch of culture in Europe and kept it burning amid a gloom of ignorance and intolerance is incalculable; and to such students as the writer of this book our debt is not small for placing before us, in all their native imperfection, these leaders of light and molders of thought.

NEWPORT, ENGLAND.

R. E. HUGHES.

HOBBES. By Sir Leslie Stephen. In the English Men of Letters Series. Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1904. Pp. 243.

Professor Maitland tells us that Sir Leslie Stephen was engaged upon this book during the last months of his life. It makes a very bright conclusion to a varied list of works of Vol. XV-No. 3.

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learning. That it does not attempt to trace, even in outline, the influence of Hobbes on subsequent thought is owing to the interruption of the author's labors by his last illness. But one cannot read Sir Leslie Stephen's book without appreciating that, apart altogether from the circumstance that English moral philosophy shaped itself and, for the most part, frankly-as an answer to Hobbes' daring system, Hobbes for his own sake makes a charming study. The reference to Croom Robertson's book in Professor Maitland's note will disarm comparison: the student will miss much unless he reads both. Never have we seen better done the task of writing about philosophy: sometimes there is the air of the blunt, intelligent outsider, but the substance is masterly and it is a true and even great philosopher who is speaking. One notices very early the effect of Hobbes' bewitching English style upon his expositor. To write or lecture upon Hobbes is to find one's self always slipping into quotations, but Sir Leslie Stephen finds for his readers the gratification of many sentences pointed and turned after Hobbes' own manner, with judgments of the same shrewd sort. We have to remind ourselves, of what the author makes us almost forget, that if it was not possible in Hobbes' day to live a life entirely uneventful, yet Hobbes must have come as near to quiet as most among contemporary Englishmen. Very few of the many things which caused him apprehension can be made to appear so imminent or terrible as to evoke pity enough or fear enough to purge the passions of the reader of to-day. Yet there is not a dull ten minutes in the book.

In the exposition of Hobbes' philosophy we would point first to the suggestive, though unfortunately scattered, remarks in reference to Hobbes' relation to Spinoza. Of the "Tractatus Theologico-Politicus," Hobbes said to Aubrey, "He has cut through me a bar's length, for I durst not write so boldly." Their "naturalism" is the same and their views on the meaning of good and evil (p. 140); they have the same physiological theory of desire and the same determinism; the same doubts of the evidence of established creeds. When Hobbes plays mathematician, Sir Leslie Stephen is usually jocose; the quarrel with Descartes is touched on lightly; but one unlearns here what one collects (quite wrongly) from other quarters as to Hobbes' isolation. In the young stream of the "mechanical philosophy" Hobbes' rivulet may not be counted for much, but it is not wasted in windings of its own.

Hobbes' attitude to the ancients might be reprehended more severely. It is right, perhaps, not to take too seriously (what Hobbes meant in the utmost seriousness) the view that classical republicanism was a wholly corrupting influence. But when Hobbes argues that there is no such thing as the felicity of the ancient philosophers, "and no way to it more than to Utopia," because "there can be no contentment but in proceeding," it is not conscionable that he should be left unrebuked. "We cannot sit down," says Sir Leslie Stephen, reproving the scholastics (p. 124), "upon a solid lump of pleasure outside of time and change." Yes, but the poor ancient philosophers are led off to condemnation meanwhile for not knowing what they taught the world.

Locke's well-known statement that we cannot know the essence of a pebble or a fly seems to have been echoed from Hobbes. The principles of natural science "are so far from teaching us anything of God's nature, as they cannot teach us our own nature, nor the nature of the smallest creature living" (p. 151).

Seldom, among the many parodies of the faculty psychology, have we come across a better than is given on p. 166: "Bramhall talks," says Hobbes, "as if the will and the other faculties 'were men, or spirits in men's bellies.''

Those who know the history of English thought upon jurisprudence will not require to be reminded that all the principles of the "analytical" school are taken straight out of Hobbes. Hobbes' attitude toward Coke and the party of parliamentary privilege is well described (p. 206): he became law student at seventy-six and attacked Coke in a "Dialogue between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common Laws of England," a work noticed by Maine as showing that Hobbes anticipated many of the legal reforms afterwards advocated by Bentham (p. 61).

Much of the savagery of Hobbes' absolutism, his contempt of Hampden, his aversion to Coke, his hatred of the Presbyterians, arises from the fact that Hobbes was hoisting Whiggery with its own petard, and took care accordingly that the materials. should not grow cool. The conflict between Empire and Papacy had given rise to "the divine right of kings," and in Hobbes' day the problem was still Church and State. Not the same great Church, "no other than the ghost of the deceased Roman Empire sitting crowned upon the grave thereof," but "every man, nay, every boy and woman" who "thought they spoke with God